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The subjects of “civilization” are trapped in an alienating, inauthentic culture, but can 
escape by cultivating the “primitive” hidden within themselves: grotesque, even 
terrifying, but authentic in its drives, desires and relationship to the world. Known as 
primitivism, this diagnosis of cultural failure and its purported cure profoundly 
influenced modernist artists. Beyond the succès de scandale they enjoyed by inverting 
the hierarchy of savage and civilized, primitivists claimed to speak from a position that 
was, as Eliot put it, “deeper” and “older” than – and uncontaminated by – their culture. 
They plumbed an unchanging, inner essence, of which they saw glimpses everywhere 
from ancient artifacts and African masks to drawings by children and mental patients. 
The rediscovery of primitive mentality thus promised to overcome modernity’s 
characteristic epistemological anxiety – what James Clifford called “off-centeredness in a 
world of distinct meaning systems.” Yet while primitivism revalued the stereotype of the 
savage and prized the primitive as mysterious and unknowable, it never overcame the 
objectifying view that “primitives” were fundamentally all the same, and important 
primarily as a window onto suppressed aspects of the civilized personality.  
 Primitivism informed (and in some cases deformed) Eliot’s, Woolf’s and 
Lawrence’s critical social theories, their justifications for writing and publishing, and 
their understanding of their own aesthetic projects. These writers were preoccupied with 
the conflict between their need for authentic, radical expression, and their relationship to 
 
 
the public. Primitivist aesthetics justified their art as a spiritual and societal necessity and 
shielded it from attack as mere neurotic acting-out. Further, each writer drew on 
primitivist discourse to develop theories of literature and the artistic impulse, from Eliot’s 
theories of poetic imagination to his and Woolf’s ideas of the importance of 
“impersonality.” At critical moments in their creative lives, including the writing of “The 
Waste Land,” The Voyage Out, and The Plumed Serpent, primitivism enabled these 
writers to set the criteria by which their writing should be understood. 
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Primitivism and the Promise of Authentic Artistic Production 
 
 
1.  Background of a movement 
 
 
The concept that people were better off when their relationship to the natural 
world was unmediated by things like clothing and agriculture dates back at least to the 
Biblical story of the Fall.  The anthropologist George Boas traced the sentiment that life 
was better long ago back to Hesiod’s myth of mankind’s degeneration through “five 
ages” of decline.1  In fact, the act of tracing things back to the Bible or the Greeks itself 
exemplifies an analytical move – the creation of a criterion by returning to an “origin” 
seen as purer or more essential than its subsequent derivations – that Derrida argues is as 
old as analysis itself.2  Good comes before evil, “the simple before the complex, the 
essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation.” Yet for all the antiquity 
of these tropes, from the late-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, the discourse of 
primitivism gave them new intensity and appeal. 
Coined in late-nineteenth century France, “primitivism” originally denoted the 
“Imitation des primitifs” in the “B[eaux]-arts.”3 The term soon expanded to other 
languages and broader meanings. The 1934 edition of Webster’s English dictionary stated 
that “primitivism” meant the “belief in the superiority of primitive life” and the desire to 
                                                 
1 “Our own race, that of Iron, is the worst,” in Hesiod’s view. “It is a period of greater and greater 
degeneration and our race will disappear when it is ‘born with greying temples.’” George Boas, 
“Primitivism,” Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Vol. 3.  Scribner’s: New York, 1973-74, p. 578. 
2 Limited Inc., as discussed in Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After 
Structuralism, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1982, p. 93. 
3 According to the Nouveau Larousse illustré, published between 1897 and 1904; quoted in William Rubin, 
“Modernist Primitivism: An Introduction,” p. 2, in “Primitivism” in Twentieth Century Art: Affinities of the 
Tribal and Modern, Vol. 1, ed. William Rubin. MOMA: New York, 1984. 
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“return to nature.”4  Primitivism’s influence spanned the aesthetic spectrum from 
Gauguin (1848-1903) to Tarzan (who first appeared in 1912); art historians have 
identified primitivism in aesthetic movements “from Symbolism and Art Nouveau in the 
1890s […] through American Abstract Expressionism in the 1940s.”5  The common 
thread running through these iterations of primitivism was the idea that “primitive” 
peoples had something vital which modern “civilization” had lost, and which writers and 
artists could uncover and even, perhaps, restore.  
Whatever the merits of primitivism’s diagnosis of the malaise of modernity, it 
proved alluring to artists.  Primitivism promised to free the artist from conventions that 
foreclosed the possibility of self-expression, and restore to him his lost birthright of a 
meaningful external world. Modernity has been defined as “a pervasive condition of off-
centeredness in a world of distinct meaning systems, a state of being in culture while 
looking at culture.”6  By identifying with the primitive the artist implied that he was, as 
Eliot put it, “deeper” and “older” than his culture.7  The artist who asserted his 
identification with the primitive “othered” his civilized environment, distanced and 
recreated it as an aesthetic object, and adduced to his artistic productions the urgency and 
relevance of radical social critique. The artist who was aware of modernity’s loss of 
primitive ways of life but also of the hidden, continued existence of the primitive beneath 
the surface of civilization, also asserted a privileged position in relation to modernity.  
                                                 
4 Cited in Rubin, id., p. 74. 
5 A notable primitivist “tendency” is the “use of nominally prior artefacts as models for developments in 
[artists’] own work.” Rhodes, Colin. Primitivism and Modern Art, Thames and Hudson: New York, 1994, 
p. 7. 
6 Clifford, James. The Predicament of Culture, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1988, p. 9. 
7 See Eliot’s 1919 review of Wyndham Lewis’ Tarr, discussed in the following chapter. 
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 Civilization, like primitivism, is also a French term – coined around 1766 “to 
capture the essence of French achievements, compared to the uncivilized world of 
savages, slaves, and barbarians.”8 For his part, the modern French “savage” originated in 
the 1700s, as information about an ever-increasing number of colonized peoples began to 
flow with increasing rapidity to metropoles.  This information was sorted according to 
taxonomies that tended to be based on perceived physical and cultural characteristics and 
often drew on familiar Old World social classifications.9 With the rise of the racial 
sciences, the stereotype of the low-browed, sensuous-lipped, lazy, cruel, irrational savage 
grew ever more meaningful.10   
The developments of racial and evolutionary theory added a temporal aspect to 
the savage’s debased difference. Savages were living fossils, stunted ambassadors from 
the earliest era of human development.  In a boys’ adventure novel (from 1914), the 
heroes, lost in a jungle, tie a pygmy to a rope and order him to lead them to safety; the 
narrator comments, “this little creature linked the Present with the world of ten thousand 
years ago.”11  Colonial officials debated whether the primitive could be improved by 
education – could a primitive student really be “present” in class? – or whether his 
descendants could be improved by cross-breeding with higher races.  
Varied motives drove this debasement of the primitive.  Colonialists portrayed 
primitives as too incompetent to be allowed to govern themselves: stubbornly against 
                                                 
8 Conklin, Alice L. A Mission to Civilize: The Republican idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1890-
1935, Stanford University Press: 1997, p. 14. 
9 Brian Street cites the example of Blumenbach’s craniological analysis of primitives. Street, The Savage in 
Literature: Representations of primitive society in English literature, 1858-1920.  Routledge: Boston, 1975, 
p. 52.  Cesare Lombroso similarly compared savages to criminals based on skull shape. 
10 Street, p. 75. 
11 Gilson, Charles (Major). In the Power of the Pygmies, London: 1919 (first published in seven parts in 
The Boy’s Own Paper beginning v. 37, no. 1, November 1914), p. 35. 
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innovation, trapped in wretchedness, and hopelessly superstitious, prey to witch-doctors 
who dominated them by such tricks as predicting eclipses.12  Missionaries argued that 
“the more degraded, backward and immoral” the native, the greater the urgency with 
which he must be “saved” – although they did not press the point too far, lest the native 
seem inhuman and unworthy of grace.13  Darwin, on the other hand, may have 
dehumanized the Fuegians he encountered in Patagonia (during the voyage of the Beagle) 
to make the theological implications of his evolutionary argument easier to swallow: 
Such were our ancestors … absolutely naked and bedaubed with paint, their long 
hair was tangled, their mouths frothed with excitement, and their expression was 
wild, startled and distrustful. They possessed hardly any arts, and like wild 
animals lived on what they could catch; they … were merciless to everyone not of 
their own small tribe … For my own part I would as soon be descended from that 
heroic little monkey.14 
 
As Brian Street reads On the Origin of Species, Darwinian theory seems to support the 
idea that the gap between primitive and civilized man was unbridgeable, insofar as the 
theory of evolution “pushed the formation of different [human] races back into such a 
remote epoch that, to all intents and purposes, the differences … were ‘primordial’.”15   
Upping the ante, “degenerationists” argued that the modern-day primitives found in the 
colonies had actually regressed on the evolutionary scale and represented a lower “stage 
“than the original condition of man.16 
                                                 
12 Street cites the vivid instances of native misrule – “providing fertile ground for English rule” – amongst 
the fictitious people of Zu-Vendiland in Rider Haggard’s Allan Quatermain, and cites astronomy as a 
means of controlling the superstitious savage in Mitford’s The King’s Assegai (1896), and Kipling’s “The 
Man Who Would Be King”. Id., pp. 136, 140, 156. 
13 Cairns, H. A. C. Prelude to Imperialism: British Reactions to Central African Society, 1840-1890. 
London: Routledge, 1965, p. 89. 
14 Darwin, Charles.  The Descent of Man, [1871], p. 618. 
15 Street, Brian. The Savage in Literature: Representations of primitive society in English literature, 1858-
1920.  Boston: Routledge, 1975, p. 95. 
16 Degenerationists like Archbishop Whately of Dublin found evidence in the ruins of the city of 
Zimbabwe, discovered in the late 19th Century.  The city’s current inhabitants, presumed to be descended 
from the original builders, were seen as utterly incapable of producing its like.  Street, op. cit., pp. 88-89. 
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But the baseness of the savage also took on a life of its own—as manifested, for 
instance, in fantasies of knowing the lowest of the low.  The boy’s adventure novel 
discussed above placed the fictitious “Batwa” tribe – a “hairy, vindictive, and jealous” lot 
– a step “lower on the scale of humanity even than the bushmen.”17  Many texts sought 
out what Freud termed the “most miserable and backward” of primitives:18 the tribe with 
the fewest words, letters or phonemes in its language;19 the fewest tools in its technology; 
the most barbaric beliefs in its religion. “Primitive mentality” became a particularly well-
cooked topic.  (Ernst Haeckel observed that “the psychic difference between the crudest 
savage of the lowest grade and the most perfect specimen of the highest order is colossal 
– much greater than is commonly supposed.”20)  The civilized/savage binary proved a 
rich mine of frisson.  Adventure novels featured British boys like Tarzan and Tabu Dick, 
raised among savages, whose racial superiority revealed itself only gradually as they 
matured.21 Civilized by their very nature, their race ultimately split them apart from the 
beloved savages who had nurtured them. 
Enter primitivism. Because the savage occupied the lowest level in the hierarchy 
of human development, to claim that savage instincts survived within supposedly 
civilized individuals, and that savage tribes were in some sense superior to civilized 
                                                 
17 In the Power of the Pygmies, p. 18.  
18 Freud uses the phrase in Totem and Taboo. 
19 Until the 1970s the Guinness Book had an entry for “Most Primitive Language,” with the honor going to 
Aranda, an Australian Aboriginal tongue, though an English-based creole dialect called Taki-Taki was 
mentioned as well (for having only 340 words).  This fascination with the primitive’s impoverished means 
of expression, which indicate their lack of interior lives to express, bears an interesting relationship to 
George Orwell’s Politics and the English Language, which makes a fetish of keeping English trimmed to 
its most basic lexicon, syntax and grammar.  
20 The Riddle of the Universe, trans. Joseph McCabe, Buffalo Books: New York, 1992 [1899], p. 427. 
21 The perversity of such an exact measurement of debasement mirrors the adventure genre’s perverse 
desire to observe civilized boys in prolonged proximity to primitives.  The same desire played out in 
contemporary literature’s ugly fascination with “the half-breed” (e.g., The Broken Road, of 1907, in which 
an Oxford-educated Indian’s cultural “varnish” peels away under strain, discussed in Street, p. 112). 
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nations –specifically in the fine arts, the summit of civilization’s achievements – was 
shocking.22  
Primitivism’s notion of inverting the savage / civilized hierarchy could be seen as 
the stratagem of an avant-garde movement (or movements)23 seeking to gain ascendancy 
at a time of cultural ferment.  By the 1890s, according to Michael Levenson, capitalism 
and colonialism had elevated “the middle classes of Western Europe” to an 
uncomfortably luxurious position.  It had become possible for the bourgeoisie both “to 
enjoy the delicacies of a long cultural tradition and to overstep the boundaries of that 
tradition, to witness civilization at its most finely wrought and to confront its rude 
origins, to contemplate the refinements of social convention and to watch such 
conventions dissolve.”24  As they dissolved, a multitude of avant-garde movements began 
to precipitate: from symbolism to fauvism, cubism to vorticism.  (Like many other 
“isms,” primitivism can claim its own manifesto.25) The “modern” moment has been 
described as the first period “in all the history of art, to be characterized by a complex 
                                                 
22 Primitivism emphasized trends that had existed even within the racist discourse previously described.  In 
Allan Quatermain, the narrator observes that “even highly civilized artists might learn something from the 
… masterpieces” adorning a heathen temple – although the hero soon learns that the temple is used for 
human sacrifice, and the masterpieces open into a literal fiery furnace. (Haggard, 1887, p. 34; quoted in 
Street 82).  The primitive was, as well, seen to have been blessed by nature.  Fantasies of “tropical 
exuberance” in the African interior – perhaps sparked by the high mortality rate of settlers confined to the 
African coast – led to myths of fabulous wealth in Timbuktu, and even the idea, derived from Swedenborg, 
of a new, purer religion arising from Africa (Street, pp. 121-125; Emanuel Swedenborg, True Christian 
Religion (1771), trans. John C. Ager (1906), p. 840).   
23 Robert Goldwater differentiates four sub-movements of primitivism: the “romantic” (Pont Aven – 
Gauguin); “emotional” (Brücke school); “intellectual” (Cubist – Picasso); and “subconscious” (Dada) 
schools of primitivism.  Primitivism in Modern Art. Harvard University Press: Cambridge: 1986 (enlarged 
ed.; 1st ed. 1938). 
24 Levenson, Michael.  Modernism and the Fate of Individuality: Character and Novelistic Form from 
Conrad to Woolf, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991, p. 1.   
25 Stanislaw Przyoyszewski, Primitivists to the Nations of the World and to Poland (1920).  Reproduced in 
Manifestos: A Century of Isms, ed. Mary Ann Caws. University of Nebraska: Lincoln, 2001, p. 100. 
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stylistic pluralism rather than by the simple hegemony of a unique and superior style.”26  
Seen in this context, primitivists had multiple motives for overstepping boundaries, 
confronting rude origins, and exploding refined conventions.  Doing so promised to 
épater les bourgeois and blaze a path through the overgrowth of aesthetic choices.  
An example of a primitivist succès de scandale is Igor Stravinsky’s The Rite of 
Spring.27  The ballet evokes an “ancient Slavic society” and culminates as a girl, the 
“Chosen One,” dances herself to death before a circle of elders in a ritual fertility 
sacrifice.  Stravinsky enjoyed toying with taboos while he was composing The Rite in 
1910-11; he had nude photographs taken of himself in forested settings, ostensibly to 
emphasize how deeply he had entered into the spirit of his composition, and mailed prints 
to friends.  By association with the primitive he sought to position himself on 
modernity’s cutting edge. The ballet score (notwithstanding its general tonality and the 
fact that it followed convention by beginning with an overture) was technically 
revolutionary in its attempts to capture the primitive ethos of its subject; the scoring for a 
massively expanded orchestra required over one hundred rehearsals. But Vaslav 
Nijinsky’s deliberately stark, awkward choreography prompted the Ballets Russes to 
“mutiny” in rehearsal.  The tipping point was the premiere in 1913, where, Stravinsky 
later recalled, the Parisian audience rioted soon after the curtain rose on “a group of 
knock-kneed and long-braided Lolitas jumping up and down.”  Nijinsky had to shout 
cues to the dancers, who could no longer hear the orchestra over the crowd.  Stravinsky 
stormed out of the theatre.   
                                                 
26 Poggioli, Renato. The Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald.  Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, 1968, p. 180.   
27 See Walsh, Stephen.  Stravinsky: A Creative Spring, Russia and France, 1882-1934, Knopf: New York, 
1999. 
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The lights came up on what seemed to be a catastrophe, but insofar as 
Stravinsky’s premise was the primitive’s relevance to modernity, the ballet audience 
proved his point by the violence of its reaction. Gustave LeBon had compared the 
violence and irrationality of crowds (even if he did not have ballet audiences in mind) 
with the traits of primitive individuals. Freud expanded LeBon’s argument by reasoning 
that the primitive id was temporarily liberated from the civilized superego when the 
modern individual found himself in one of the enormous agglomerations of humanity that 
urbanization had made possible.28  Primitivism claimed not only that modern life bore a 
resemblance to savagery, but that the characteristics of the savage, which were thought to 
have been eradicated, survived in civilized man and had merely gone underground.29 
Perhaps the opening night debacle of Stravinsky’s ballet, like the death of the Chosen 
One, re-enacted an ancient sacrifice of individuality to social reproduction.  The rioting 
audience, like the circle of elders, insisted that artistry must serve communal continuity –
the only difference was that Stravinsky’s audience had repressed its awareness of the 
violence of social reproduction.  As the Chosen One’s fatal dance ensured the return of 
fertility to the earth, so The Rite’s opening-night riot gave the ballet a distinctly modern 
kind of immortality – the kind conferred when an artwork is rejected by the Salon or 
seized and burned by customs officers. 
Primitivism also promised to transcend an anxiety-ridden historical moment. The 
primitive is the variable product of a process that Michael Bell has called “a projection by 
                                                 
28 See Le Bon, La psychologie des foules (1895), as discussed in Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis 
of the Ego (1921), trans. James Strachey.  Norton: New York, 1959, pp. 9-11. 
29 “The survivals of savage passion serve to remind us how thin is the veneer of our own civilization, how 
easy it is to drop back to the moral level of the ape.” Anonymous, “The Mystery of Cruelty,” Nation 28 
May 1908, p.483; quoted in Crawford, Robert. The Savage and the City in the Work of T.S. Eliot, Oxford 
University Press: 2000, p.61. 
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the civilized sensibility of an inverted image of the self.”30  Primitivism fantasized an 
opposite to contemporary (Western) civilization in order to describe the fate of the 
individual in the modern world.  For primitivists, the civilized man is weak, dependent 
upon technologies and systems he cannot comprehend, alienated, and prey to false 
desires; the primitive is strong, self-reliant, and finds immanent meaning in his 
environment, and – crucially – authentic. If it is correct to characterize modernity – as 
Brian Hale has done – as a period of epistemological crisis, 31  from the dissipation of 
religious faith to the advent of cultural relativism, then one could predict that modernists 
projected the primitive in response to that crisis.  
Precisely because of his unselfconsciousness, the primitive has long enjoyed a 
privileged epistemological status; he was a figure to turn to in case of doubt.  In ancient 
Athens, barbarians – slaves and foreigners – could be tortured to produce evidence in 
adjudicatory proceedings.  If produced by torture, slaves’ testimony was of greater 
probative value than that of Athenian citizens. Citizens were tainted by their capacity to 
reason; they might calculate that lying was worth the risk.32  The barbarian, guided by 
nothing but the instinct of pain-avoidance, was guaranteed to speak the truth—under the 
right conditions.  The primitive, whether as cannibal or as noble savage, is also a 
favourite figure of philosophical argumentation, from Locke to Hobbes, Montaigne to 
Rousseau.  In the early twentieth century, even those who disagreed most vigorously with 
primitivism’s claims employed the primitive this way.  Ortega y Gasset believed his 
                                                 
30 Bell, Michael. Primitivism. Methuen: London, 1972, p. 80. 
31 Brian McHale’s term. 
32 As the orator Demosthenes argued to a jury, “wherever slaves and free men are present and facts have to 
be found, you do not use the statements of the free witnesses, but you seek to discover the truth by applying 
torture [basanos] to the slaves.”  Demosthenes 30.37, quoted in Page duBois, Torture and Truth, 
Routledge: New York, 1991, pp. 49-50. 
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contemporaries looked “upon their own time as superior to preceding ages,” whereas the 
“most usual thing has been for men to dream of better times in a vague past, of a fuller 
existence.”  To prove it, he cited not only the “‘golden age’, as those taught by Greece 
and Rome have it,” but “the Alcheringa of the Australian bushmen.”33   
The primitive’s status as an unselfconscious source of truth took on particular 
importance in an era when subjectivity itself seemed open to question. Thus Conrad 
explained why he had decided, in writing The Nigger of the Narcissus, that Singleton 
should not be an educated man: “he was simple and great, like an elemental force … 
nothing could touch him but decay … Would you tell such a man, Understand that thou 
art nothing, less than a shadow, more insignificant than a drop of water in the ocean… 
Would you?”34  Singleton’s repose is simultaneously a mark of ignorance and of 
greatness; Conrad, somewhat aggressively and guiltily, refuses to tell Singleton the truth 
that would plunge him into the constant, anxious guardedness of modernity—where, as 
Yeats wrote, “the best lack all conviction, and the worst are full of a passionate 
intensity.” 
The rise of anthropology cemented the primitive’s elevated epistemological status 
even as it exacerbated the modern crisis of cultural relativism.  (Clifford writes that the 
increasing importance of anthropology in the early twentieth century was a “response to 
[an historically] unprecedented overlay of traditions.”35)  At the turn of the century, 
anthropology was largely a comparative project that sought to catalogue similarities 
                                                 
33 Ortega y Gasset, J.  Revolt of the Masses, W.W. Norton: New York, [1930] 1963, p. 29. 
34 Conrad, letter to Graham, quoted in Levenson, Michael.  Modernism and the Fate of Individuality, p. 33. 
35 Clifford, Predicament of Culture, p. 9.  Clifford identifies “surrealist ethnography” as a kind of short-
lived, utopian response to that predicament. “A modern ‘ethnography’ of conjunctures, constantly moving 
between cultures, does not […] aspire to survey the full range of human diversity […]. It is perpetually 
displaced […] a form both of dwelling and of travel in a world where the two experiences are less and less 
distinct.” (Id.) 
11 
 
across cultures, epitomised by James Frazer’s comparison of fertility myths in The 
Golden Bough.36  The anthropologist’s disciplinary method was to direct a series of far-
flung informants – the “man on the spot,” such as missionaries and colonial 
administrators – to conduct ethnographic research.  The “armchair” anthropologist would 
then collect, compare and categorize the results.  Conclusions could be checked against 
evidence in other ethnographic reports, as well as in histories of ancient societies.37   
Comparative anthropology promised nothing short of identifying the essence of 
human culture.  If certain mythic tropes were found across all primitive cultures, 
anthropology could identify the lowest common denominator in primitive cultures 
through time and space – a claim of the type later taken up by Northrop Frye and 
“archetypal” criticism.  By this method there could be built up a compendium of the 
essential characteristics of human structures of belief.   
The claims of comparative anthropology gradually gave way to Franz Boas’s 
recognition that certain beliefs and acts could only be analysed by reference to the entire 
meaning-system of the culture in question.38  Primitivists like TS Eliot refused to admit 
the failure of Frazerian anthropology—its promise was too appealing. In 1922, the same 
year as Eliot’s The Waste Land – highly indebted to Frazer – was published, the co-
director of a mental institute in Heidelberg published a study entitled The Artistry of the 
Mentally Ill.  Its author, Hans Prinzhorn, claimed that by following the method of cultural 
                                                 
36 See discussion in the following chapter. 
37 Clifford cites E.F. Wilson, A.C. Haddon, and Baldwin Spenser as examples of such men on the spot. 
Clifford, op. cit., pp. 26-28. 
38 See discussion in the following chapter.  For this reason, Boas (and, later, Malinowski) insisted that 
“participant observation” was a necessary aspect of anthropological work.  The first example of first-hand 
“fieldwork” by anthropologists themselves was Boas’ Torres Straits expedition of 1898. Street, The Savage 
in Literature, p. 16. 
12 
 
anthropology it had uncovered a universal truth.39  Its starting point was the often-
remarked “resemblance of pictures [created by the insane] to those done by children and 
primitives.”40 The similarity of their artifacts indicates some underlying similarity 
between the insane, the child, and the primitive; the only thing they had in common is 
that they have not been shaped by any civilizing influence.  Their artworks, therefore, 
cryptically represent the very forms and processes of the human mind.  By studying the 
artworks of these uncivilized groups, the critic should be able to derive meta-aesthetic 
criteria that could be applied to judge all works of art.  In Prinzhorn’s view, modern 
civilization is beginning consciously to close the circle of self-knowledge, insofar as 
modern artworks are beginning to resemble those of the unselfconscious primitive and 
“our mental patients.”   
Some pursued this logic to argue that the primitive’s savage needs had to be met 
rather than suppressed in his modern descendants.  If certain human urges manifested 
themselves throughout history, they must simply be accepted and room must be made for 
their social expression, lest they erupt destructively.  Things might fall apart if 
civilization lost touch with primitive myths and rituals, because only these ancient, 
irrational, powerful forces were capable of structuring a society of increasingly atomised 
individuals.41 The sine qua non of social existence, argued Bronislaw Malinowski, was 
                                                 
39 The book never sold well outside Germany, however. 
40 Prinzhorn, Hans. The Artistry of the Mentally Ill. A Contribution to the Psychology and Psychopathology 
of Configuration. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1972, p. 4. 
41 Emile Durkheim felt compelled to examine how it was possible that modern society was holding together 
at all.  Traditional societies, he argued, were glued together by “mechanical solidarity”: the “universal, 
uniform practice” of a set of unquestionable rules.  The individual did the same work, on the same 
schedule, and lived according to the same dogma as his fellows.  Modernity, by contrast, is characterized 
by the division of labor and a centrifugal emphasis on individuality.  Yet the individual’s inability to meet 
his needs without others’ labor means he “depends upon” them “in the same measure that he is 
distinguished from them,” with the State representing the entire resulting system of “organic solidarity.”  
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the shared sense of the meaningfulness of life, and as culture became suspect and religion 
fell into a disorderly retreat, society might well begin to disintegrate. Religion provides 
society with those “indispensable pragmatic figments without which civilization cannot 
exist.” Malinowski asked his readers to engage in “work for the maintenance of the 
eternal truths which have guided mankind out of barbarism to culture, and the loss of 
which seems to threaten us with barbarism again.” Law and science might satisfy 
individuals' material needs, but religion and culture provided the sine qua non of social 
existence: meaning.42 Primitivists took up the challenge of producing “figments” and 
“eternal truths” with alacrity. 
Primitivism provided artists with an attractive thesis.  Superficiality and 
inadequacy were the characteristics both of mass culture and of high-brow artistic 
production.  The civilized individual found ample distractions available to him but 
nothing that could answer his deep needs.  In such a milieu, the true artist was alienated 
and isolated. Primitivism promised that an artist of sufficient courage could flourish if he 
abjured popular styles and based his art on the exploration of something deeper, which 
“civilization” had left unsullied.  If the artist could bear the scorn of the philistines, the 
theory of primitivism would underwrite his efforts to create a new style.  The crowd 
might view his works as crude, idiosyncratic or even degenerate, but primitivism would 
validate his stylistic eccentricities as representing valuable rediscoveries. Anthropology 
showed that primitive societies throughout history had produced artworks of profound 
                                                                                                                                                 
To primitivists, the perpetuation of such an elaborate structure of interdependency, which required that 
each individual maintain his awareness of the benefits he derived from his small place, was tenuous at 
best.Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson. New York: Free Press, 
1960 [1893], pp. 226-29. 
42 Malinowski, Bronislaw. “The Foundations of Faith and Morals,” in Malinowski and the Work of Myth, 
ed. Ivan Strenski, Princeton University Press: 1992, pp. 131, 133-34. 
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spiritual significance. The primitivist artist who reached deeply into himself could re-
attune himself to an ahistorical, human essence that was uncontaminated by modernity.  
He might even be able to recreate the vital social role played by the artist-shamans whose 
artefacts and practices fulfilled their societies’ spiritual needs. 
 
2.  An aesthetic of identity crisis 
 
 With mischievous exactness, Virginia Woolf traced the origins of British 
modernism to “on or around December 1910,” the date of Roger Fry’s Post-Impressionist 
show (in which Gauguin and other primitivists’ work figured prominently).  The French 
art-world had turned toward the primitive around five years previously.  Gauguin’s 
interest in Breton peasants, Tahitian tiki figures, and Javanese temple sculptures would 
seem a tortuously eccentric path for others to follow.  Yet in just over a decade, artists 
from Vlaminck and Matisse to Picasso were fixated on the diverse variety of “primitive” 
objects they encountered in curio shops and in the Musée d’Ethnographie du Trocadéro 
(“Le Troca”) – where such objects had been available for decades.43   
A combination of various historical and aesthetic changes seem to underlie the 
surge of interest in the primitive. In the 1850s and 60s, French colonialist policy sought 
out easily-defended “points d’appui” – islands or ports – with an eye to controlling sea-
lanes.  By the 1890s, when Gauguin left for Tahiti, “caution was thrown to the winds” 
and French expansionism reached a “fevered pitch.”44  But “the most important reason” 
for the surge of interest in primitive artefacts, according to William Rubin, the curator of 
                                                 
43 Rubin, “Modernist Primitivism: An Introduction,” ‘Primitivism’ in 20th Century Art, p. 11. 
44 Aldrich, Robert.  Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion, Palgrave (European Studies 
Series): New York, 1996, pp. 87, 94-96. 
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a MoMA exhibit on primitivism, “had to do with a fundamental shift in the nature of 
most vanguard art from styles rooted in visual perception to others based on 
conceptualization”.45  Rubin singles out a Picasso collage in which the empty sound hole 
of a guitar is represented by a projecting cardboard tube.  Rubin traces this innovation to 
an African mask Picasso saw in Le Troca, which similarly represented the eyes as 
projecting hollow cylinders rather than as sunken cavities.46  Picasso’s representation of 
negative space with the guitar collage was an inspired theft; several other scholars have 
noted the importance of the simple planes of the masks in the Troca’s collections for 
cubism. 
Without discounting the attraction of ethnographic artifacts as inspirations for 
innovation at a time when artists were moving from representative to conceptual art, this 
argument obscures the fact that Le Troca’s masks were not just interesting for their 
planes and projections; they were redolent of exotic lands and savage peoples.  
Primitivism’s founding father is usually identified as an unsuccessful former stockbroker, 
Paul Gauguin.47  In 1891 he travelled to Tahiti, declared himself a “barbarian,” and made 
a fourteen-year-old girl named Pau’ura his mistress.48  Although Gauguin’s motto was 
the command, “be mysterious,” French audiences would have been well-prepared for 
certain aspects of his work, due to its intersections with the discourse of decadence. 
Gauguin’s interest in fantasy, his desire to escape modern civilization, and his fascination 
                                                 
45 Goldwater observes that a much of the African and Oceanian artworks subsequently recognized for their 
artistic qualities were already in “the principle museums” (e.g., in Leipzig and Paris) in 1888. Artistic 
recognition did not come until 1904-05, and official recognition of primitive art’s artistic qualities lagged 
until after the first World War.  Primitivism in Modern Art, p. 8.  
46 Clifford, James, The Predicament of Culture, p. 135. 
47 E.g., in Robert Goldwater’s standard work, Primitivism in Modern Art, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge: 1986 (enlarged edition; first edition 1938), p. xv. 
48 Gauguin’s fantastic “journal,” Noa Noa, is inscribed to “Téhura”; her name is variously spelled Pahura or 
Tahura.  Gauguin’s second Tahitian mistress, Mari-Rose, is often forgotten. 
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with corruption led contemporaries like Mirbeau and Pissarro to view Gauguin as a 
decadent artist not unlike Baudelaire.49 Both men, for instance, used similar tropes to 
eroticize and exoticize their mistresses.  Baudelaire’s “Black Venus” poems, published in 
1857, focused on his “quadroon” lover Jeanne Duval, by whose “Parfum exotique” he 
was inspired. Gauguin’s Tahitian journal, Noa Noa, was named for Pau’ura’s 
“fragrance,” which he elsewhere described as a “parfum vivant des bois.” 
Gauguin could be caricatured as “decadent” – he contracted syphilis and 
abandoned his wife and five children for a series of Tahitian mistresses – but the 
decadent and the primitivist pursued different goals. David Weir characterizes decadence 
as involving a “passive anxiety regarding future change” and a sense that “the barbarian 
ha[d] become history’s agent”; the decadent gave himself “the passive, yet theatrical role 
of scapegoat or sacrificial victim.”50  The primitivist, by contrast, disavowed theatricality 
(often with theatrical flamboyance) and sought the role of the un-self-conscious 
barbarian.51  As compared to decadence, primitivism is both more defensive in its 
anxieties about the artist’s social role and more aggressive in justifying his existence; it 
appropriates the primitive as an ancient, unassailable origin of the artistic self. To 
Baudelaire, Jeanne Duval’s African ancestry prompted him to reveries of decay, animal-
                                                 
49 Mirbeau, for instance, wrote of his “savory and disquieting mixture of barbaric splendor, of Catholic 
liturgy, of Hindu reverie, of Gothic imagery, of obscure and subtle symbolism.”  Perloff, Nancy, 
“Gauguin’s French Baggage: Decadence and Colonialism in Tahiti,” in Barkan and Bush, eds., Prehistories 
of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism, Stanford University Press: 1995, p. 
243. 
50 Weir, David.  Decadence and the Making of Modernism.  University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 
1995, pp. 6, 12. 
51 T.S. Eliot, who bemoaned the “chaos of contemporary life,” created a narrator who seems to hover 
between a decadent and primitivist sensibility: the hyper-sensitive Prufrock realizes that, under certain 
artificial lighting conditions, the arms of fashionable women who “come and go, talking of Michelangelo” 
are covered in an eerily brutish “light brown hair”.  
17 
 
like femininity, and sexual exploitation.52  He did not need to justify those reveries by 
claiming they were hers, or to go see the real Africa whence his fantasies derived.  The 
decadent flaneur was able to savor whatever swam into his ken; he had the freedom “of 
being, at will, both himself and other people.”53  Gauguin, conversely, claimed he had 
renounced Paris for the mysterious, immanently meaningful world Pau’ura represented.  
Gauguin sought to generate the primitive other within himself.  Pau’ura was the “Voix 
des Secrets,” a portal to the numinous through whom Gauguin “enter[ed] into mysteries 
which hitherto remained inaccessible to me.”  Thus inspired, he claimed to “have gone 
far back, farther back than the horses of the Parthenon […] as far back as the Dada of my 
babyhood, the good rocking-horse.”54 Decadence and primitivism each seemed to 
combine alienation with jouissance, but the decadent play of textualities and surfaces, its 
acknowledgment that desire is mediated and imitative, seems to give way, with 
primitivism, to the fetishization of mystery, depth, and identity. 
As Gauguin’s need to inhabit Pau’ura’s world and renounce his own indicates, 
primitivism was an aesthetic built on an identity crisis.  Primitivism insists on the 
primitive’s uncouth beliefs and practices, not as objects for anthropological explanation 
or as indicia of backwardness, but in a process of juxtaposing them to their civilized 
analogues with the goal of highlighting unsettling commonalities. Primitivism’s objective 
has been defined as “maintaining the strangeness of the unfamiliar,”55 but it also insisted 
on the uncanny familiarity of the strange. Primitivist artworks sought to demonstrate that 
                                                 
52 See Sharpley-Whiting, T. D. Black Venus: Sexualized Savages, Primal Fears, and Primitive Narratives 
in French. Duke University Press: Durham, 1999, pp. 62-70. 
53 Nicholls, Modernisms: A Literary Guide, University of California: Berkeley, p. 17. 
54 Gauguin, Paul.  The Intimate Journals of Paul Gauguin, trans. Van Wyck Brooks. London: Heinemann, 
1931, p. 22.  
55 Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art, p. 5. 
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the savage persisted within the civilized, where he should have disappeared. To the extent 
that the primitive is an inverted self-image, the unsettling appeal of primitivism lies in the 
suggestion that the primitive other also exists deep within the civilized self as its truth or 
essence.  An artwork that “suggests … a genuine rapprochement between the primitive 
and the civilized” is not truly primitivist56 ; but neither is an artwork that suggests these 
categories are utterly distinct.  Primitivism depends on juxtaposing them; the primitive is 
not “other” so much as it is uncanny.  
By revealing the hidden identity of the civilized with its primitive analogue, 
primitivism exploded the dominant narrative of progress according to which the primitive 
has been surpassed, rendered obsolete, or renounced in favour of civilization’s 
alternatives.  Bows and arrows were long ago replaced by guns, and, as demonstrated by 
an exhibit at Oxford’s Pitt-Rivers Museum – founded in 1884 to demonstrate “the 
evolution of ideas”57 – guns have since improved, from wheel-locks to flint-locks to 
breech-loading rifles.  But a primitivist would note that even today, there are people who 
try to defend themselves against machine-guns with bows and arrows, and men with 
machine guns who can only be described as savage.58   
In Heart of Darkness, the perpetrator of the most barbarous atrocities is Mr. 
Kurtz, a man to whose making “all Europe contributed.”  Kurtz does not become a 
savage after ceasing to be the man who wrote a report for the International Society for the 
Suppression of Savage Customs.  The report was a camouflage, a papering over of the 
                                                 
56 For Michael Bell, such works “begin to invite a different term such as ‘romantic.’” Primitivism, p. 81. 
57 According to the museum’s website, available at http://www.prm.ox.ac.uk/collections.html#main, 
accessed on January 4, 2007. 
58 Such, for instance, was the message of the Parliamentary report on the excesses of Leopold II in his 
private demesne, the Congo Free State.   
19 
 
savagery innate to Kurtz, “the Society,” and society itself.  There was no rupture or 
discontinuity, merely an un-concealment.  Recognizing this continuity leads Marlow to 
crisis, for if civilization’s claims of altruism and progress are lies, it is the “good” man’s 
identity that is threatened.  Marlow lies to Kurtz’s “Intended” about the true nature of her 
fiancée, and justifies the lie as compassionate; a small evil is done in service of a greater 
good.  Yet Marlow cannot but recognize that his justification has become inextricably 
intertwined with the horror perpetrated in the Congo, where Belgium’s king oversaw the 
slaughter of between five and twenty million people in the name of progress and 
civilization.  How can Marlow justify sparing the Intended, who lives within a society 
corrupted by Leopold II’s murderous greed, the discomfort of the truth?  After his brush 
with “the horror,” Marlow no longer trusts his own, ostensibly chivalrous motives; the 
idea that noble ends might justify the means is tainted by crimes against humanity. 
Marlow’s crisis seems overdone. Telling a nasty man’s fiancée what she wants to 
hear is, after all, distinguishable from killing people and sticking their heads on poles 
(Kurtz). But if Marlow’s crisis is somewhat bathetic, this may simply indicate Conrad’s 
determination to make sure Marlow had a crisis, and the fact that he found primitivism’s 
inversion of the civilized / savage opposition to be the best method of producing one. 
Primitivism’s attempt to throw the discourse of progress into crisis overlaps with 
some of the claims of contemporary psychoanalysis, which perhaps gave additional 
resonance to primitivism.  Writing in 1930, Freud compared human psychic development 
to the process of evolution, on the basis that primitive forms in both areas surprisingly 
continue to survive over time.  Evolutionary theory, he wrote, proposes that “the most 
highly developed species have proceeded from the lowest; and yet we find all the simple 
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forms still in existence today.  The race of the great saurians is extinct and has made way 
for the mammals; but a true representative of it, the crocodile, still lives among us.”  The 
survival of the primitive original alongside its more complex, advanced descendants is 
even more evident “in the realm of the mind.”  In the psyche, “what is primitive is so 
commonly preserved alongside of the transformed version which has arisen from it that it 
is unnecessary,” in Freud’s view, “to give instances as evidence.”59  It is not clear 
whether Freud is referring to the development of the individual mind or to that of the 
human psyche in general, but any confusion only heightens the suggestive power of the 
argument.  Drives dating from the earliest history of the human species continue to 
flourish within the civilized individual.  Just as the fraternal members of the “primal 
horde” wanted to murder their father to end his oppressive monopoly on sexual objects, 
so the twentieth century boy wants to kill his father.60  The only difference is that the boy 
does not (usually) carry out his desire.  And as the horde, astonishingly, proclaimed as 
law the very prohibition it had once detested, so the boy must internalize the father’s 
prohibitions to emerge from this crisis as a socialized adult.   
Freud’s version of Haeckel’s thesis that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny61 could 
be called the primitivist developmental narrative.  According to the discourse of progress, 
humanity continuously comprehends and surpasses itself, yet according to Freud the boy 
not only re-enacts the ancient Oedipus myth, but he re-experiences the birth-pangs of 
                                                 
59 Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents, trans. James Strachey, Norton: New York, p.16. 
60 Primitivism could be seen as a rejection of the law of the father.  Gauguin rejected the law of his father-
in-law, who had supported him in Paris, for the charms (charms which, according to Price, were coded as 
sexually perverse) of his Tahiti mistress.  Similarly, the proliferation of anti-traditional primitivist groups 
such as Der Blaue Reuter, Die Brucke, and others shows a fraternal solidarity that recalls Freud’s 
hypothesis of the primal horde.   
61 Haeckel’s claim that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” continued to be influential even though 
Haeckel admitted that he forged some of his data, including illustrations purporting to show that human 
embryonic development paralleled that of “lower” species.  
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civilization itself.  The primal patricide is the starting point of human history, yet the 
ancient battle must be fought anew even today.  The horde’s taboo on sex with any 
woman within the same “totem clan” initiated the practice of exogamy or tribal 
intermarriage, without which humanity would still be confined to isolated, inbred 
settlements.62  The boy’s horror of incest, as he emerges from the Oedipus complex, 
recapitulates that move.  What is more, the boy’s Oedipal victory is hardly assured; and 
even if he triumphs, his battle-wounds may continue to fester as neuroses throughout his 
life.  At any moment, he may be confronted with the very desires to which the basest 
savage succumbed eons ago.  As Conrad ominously observed, “the mind of man is 
capable of anything, for all the past is in it, and all the future.”   
 As comparative anthropology argued from evidence of common beliefs and 
practices across disparate non-western societies, the “fact” that the same savage 
characteristics are found not in primitives and just beneath modern man’s civilized veneer 
was taken to indicate that they are ineradicable. Primitivism adduced the supposedly 
essential nature of these traits as an argument for why civilization needed to revalue its 
values: civilization merely overlays and attempts to repress human characteristics that it 
finds unpleasant.63 
                                                 
62 Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics [1913], 
trans. James Strachey. Norton: New York, 1989. 
63 A text that inferred from a primitive trace that the work of civilization was incomplete, might be called 
“crude” primitivism; a more “advanced” primitivism would show that the supposed work of civilization or 
progress was itself a continuation of some primitive trait. This formulation may seem static – was 
primitivism unchanging? – and simplistic – who is this “civilized subject”?  It was not the case that 
primitivism continued to shock every new viewer or reader.  Rather, a taste for primitivism developed.  Part 
of this taste was the ability to sense how shocking a given artwork would be to the “typical” or “bourgeois” 
viewer – a man quite different from the viewer himself.  Instead of being shocked by the primitive, 
someone with a taste for primitivism finds that his self-conception is strengthened by it. 
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Primitivists claimed that civilization’s failure to eradicate the primitive could be 
verified by the unsettling, invigorating experience of viewing primitive artefacts.  Typical 
is an art collector’s memory of his wild surmise, on first looking into Africana: 
[On entering the gallery,] I felt a strange excitement mixed with anxiety.  This 
sensation, which mixed pleasure and pain, I have never forgotten.  Although I did 
not know what was happening to me, I recognized it as a powerful, even 
overwhelming experience, the quality of which I could not define […].64 
 
On the one hand, pleasure: the primitive artefact liberates the modern individual, shows 
him long-forgotten modes of himself.  On the other hand, pain: the powerful artefact 
destabilizes the accustomed boundaries of self and other and pierces through the 
superficial accretions of civilization to speak to a long-suppressed inner self.  The 
vocabulary of “pain,” being “overwhelmed,” etc. indicates that primitivism was a close 
relative to what T.S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf would call “impersonality”: the stripping 
away of contingent individuality in, by and for the work of art.65  The primitive object 
communicates with the viewer’s “impersonal” self, as it were, by undercutting his 
accreted, civilized identity, whether he will or no.  As the collector states: 
I had no knowledge of or information about the background of African art. […] 
The plastic aspects of African works ‘spoke’ to me without my knowing about the 
coordination of those exciting shapes. […] Only now do I realize that I 
approached these art works from the phenomenological point of view, i.e. without 
any presuppositions or information. 
 
                                                 
64 Segy, Ladislas. African Sculpture Speaks.  Da Capo: New York, 1975 (4th Ed.), p. 3. 
65 The locus classicus of impersonality is Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent.”  Eliot describes the 
ideal poet as one through whom tradition speaks and whose speech reconfigures the way tradition is 
perceived.  Other instances of the impersonal aesthetic include, for instance, D.H. Lawrence’s fantasy about 
the end of humanity in Women in Love; Stephen Daedalus’s theory (in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man) that the artist stands behind his handiwork, “invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his 
fingernails,” and Joyce’s statement that Finnegan’s Wake will keep the professors busy for two hundred 
years; or Woolf’s visions of the artist’s task as representing the showers of atoms that score the brain at 
every moment in “Modern Fiction.”  
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The collector insists that the cultural milieu in and which the artefact was produced is 
irrelevant to its appreciation; it was precisely his ignorance that enabled him to 
experience the artefact so powerfully, and at some level to share the point of view of its 
primitive creator.  
It has been said that avant-garde movements make aggressive demands of the 
viewer, requiring a “sympathetic attitude” as a prerequisite without which the artworks 
produced in their name will be incomprehensible, much less enjoyable.66  The viewer of a 
primitivist painting might well have sensed that the artist had designs on him.  Picasso’s 
portrait of Gertrude Stein (1906), for example, represents her face as a stylized mask – 
based on an African original in the collections at Le Troca – and thus emphasizes non-
identity precisely where the viewer expects to find a realistic representation of the sitter’s 
face, and more specifically, her eyes, which are absent.  There is no face behind the mask 
– the eyes are simply black holes – suggesting that the mask is her face.  Picasso’s 
portrait seems to play on Stein’s famously inscrutable writing style, which promised 
meanings only to play with expectations.  Just as Stein’s aesthetic games meant that one 
could no longer expect to see through representations to reality, in her portrait, there are 
no eyes to act as the windows of the sitter’s soul, and the mask’s non-eyes reverse the 
viewer’s gaze. 
 Even more aggressive than such artworks was the claim that the modern viewer 
wanted to be disturbed in this way.  Ezra Pound claimed that modern artists were “witch 
                                                 
66 “The primary problem with avant-garde obscurity is not ignorance or the need for more education, but 
the ‘psychological’ boundary of mutual hostility… For those who can assent, even in principle, the most 
arduous asperities will be surmountable … [but] it is only after being made possible by factors of calling 
and attitude that interpretation is made easy by education and familiarity …” Poggioli, The Theory of the 
Avant-Garde, p. 154.  
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doctors” whose time was come to reclaim their rightful, masterful place in society.67 
Auguste Macke felt there was an essential human desire to be dominated by powerful 
artworks, noting that even “in our complicated and confused era we have forms that 
absolutely enthral everyone in exactly the same way that the fire dance enthrals the 
African or the mysterious drumming of the fakir enthrals the Indian. […] At the movies 
the professor marvels alongside the servant girl.”68  Primitivist artworks would fulfil the 
need to be mastered and to marvel. 
Primitivism claimed that its direct, unconscious appeal to the viewer was 
validated by the viewer’s response to it – if he responded powerfully, it was because his 
inner primitive had been awakened – and by the need to save the individual from his self-
destructive attachment to his modern, civilized subjectivity.69  From the primitivist’s 
point of view, the inhuman machinery of social reproduction was stifling the depth and 
vitality of his very experience for a variety of so-called good reasons.  If primitivism was 
the imitation des primitifs, imitating them promised an escape from the social 
requirement of imitation itself – the rational, hollow conformism that made modernity a 
Weberian “iron cage” for its subjects.  He would perhaps have approved Nietzsche’s irate 
observation that originality seemed to generate an immediate and thoughtless “echo,” in 
the form of “critique” – even though “the moment before [he viewed the new artwork or 
read the new book] the critic did not so much as dream of the possibility” of what was 
                                                 
67 “The New Sculpture,” The Egoist, 16 Feb. 1914; quoted in Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p. 74. 
68 “Masks,” The Blue Rider Almanac, quoted in Colin Rhodes, Primitivism in Modern Art, p. 40. 
69 See Patrick Joyce’s The Rule of Freedom for a Foucauldian argument that the “discourse of freedom” 
was “deployed” during the late 19th and early 20th centuries to justify “the extension of governmentality” 
ever deeper into individuals’ private lives. 
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being attempted.70  Primitivists declared a rebellion against this “burden of 
sophistication,” and set out to “regain a sense of seeing with the uneducated gaze of the 
savage.”71  The savage’s unsophisticated artworks were a symbol of his freedom, defined 
as the depth of his valuation of his own lived experience. “Negro art has reawakened in 
us,” wrote a curator in 1914, “a sensibility obliterated by an education which makes us 
always connect what we see with what we know.”72  Primitive art, which imitated 
nothing but the artist’s vision, rebuked the “civilized” requirement that individual 
experience must be stylized to be acceptable.  Worse yet, the process of civilization had 
led people to mistake their genuine needs.  Whereas the beneficiaries of modern 
civilization are “buried under a multitude of parasitical, non-essential desires,” in 
primitive cultures “the basic, fundamental and essential drives of life” continue to find 
expression.73   
 
3. Primitivism’s problems: promise of renovation, reality of retrenchment 
 
 Notwithstanding the primitivist emphasis on the buried, repressed survival of 
savage traits in civilized man, a common primitivist trope referred to the primitive as 
absent or tragically lost.  T.S. Eliot claimed that with Ulysses, which incorporated the 
structure of the Odyssey into the novel form, Joyce had discovered a “mythic method”.  
By juxtaposing the quotidian story of Bloom to the epic of Odysseus, Joyce used the 
Homeric poem as a kind of negative space: Ulysses coheres by constant, mock-heroic 
                                                 
70 Untimely Meditations, II, quoted in Kittler, Friedrich, Discourse Networks 1800 1900, Stanford 
University Press: 1992, p. 179. 
71 Leo Stein, quoted in Sally Price, Primitive Art in Civilized Places, University of Chicago Press: 1989, p. 
33. 
72 Marius de Zayas, African Negro Art [1916, written to complement the author’s 1914 exhibit in New 
York City], quoted in Rhodes, Primitivism in Modern Art, p. 13. 
73 Paul Wingert, Primitive Art (1962), quoted in Price, Primitive Art in Civilized Places, p. 32. 
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reference to the mythic worldview that modernity had lost. Joyce’s innovation, Eliot 
claimed, made literature out of the “chaos” of contemporary life.74 (Who better than the 
always-disappearing, pre-historical primitive to represent modernity’s obsession with 
history, the nightmare from which Stephen Dedalus was trying to awake; the wreckage 
surveyed helplessly by Benjamin’s angel, blown backwards out of paradise?) But 
primitivism’s method also operates by representing the primitive as absent, or at best 
disappearing; he is always the Last of the Mohicans. 
Gauguin felt he had already missed the last of the Tahitians, finding in their place 
Christianized people dressed in cloth produced by European factories.  “It was all over – 
nothing but civilized people left … To have travelled so far only to find the very thing 
which I had fled!  The dream which led me to Tahiti was cruelly contradicted by the 
present: it was the Tahiti of the past that I loved”.75  In subsequent paintings and carvings, 
Gauguin’s source for Tahitian myths and beliefs was not Pau’ura or any living “native 
informant”, but a book that had been published in Paris in 1837, over a decade before his 
own birth.  Increasingly his paintings conformed to that imaginary past rather than the 
present.  In “Women on the Beach,” from 1891, one woman is dressed in traditional garb, 
and a second in clothes provided by missionaries; in a nearly identical painting of 1892, 
the second woman’s missionary clothes have disappeared, replaced with traditional 
clothing.76   
                                                 
74 Eliot, T.S., “Ulysses, Order and Myth,” Dial LXXV (1923), pp. 480-83.  Eliot’s review of Ulysses has 
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directs the reader to interpret it in the light of the ancient myths surrounding vegetation rituals and fertility 
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Romance.    
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76 Rhodes, Primitivism, pp. 71-72. 
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The long-past nature of the primitive had an important benefit: it rendered the 
primitivist artist the public’s only means of access to the primitive. Gauguin’s over-
writing of the Tahitians he saw with their ancestors meant that the “real” Tahiti lived on 
only in his own imagination.  There is a certain imaginative violence in this overwriting.  
As colonialism disposed of the lives, labor and lands of subject populations, so 
primitivism appropriated their cultures, which had become fashionable once they were no 
longer threatening. Susan Sontag compared Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda films 
with her photography book on a Sudanese tribe, The Last of the Nuba, where “the 
stripped-down primitives, awaiting the final ordeal of their proud heroic community, their 
imminent extinction, frolic and pose in the hot clean desert.”77  
The primitive’s lamented disappearance, often represented as a result of an 
inevitable historical progression, also obscured the present violence being done to him in 
the name of progress.78.  The fascination with primitive societies was prompted by a 
desire for examples of organic, natural, unmediated forms of social organization (as 
opposed to the alienation and artificiality seen to characterize civilized society).  This 
fantasy of the natural primitive society (projected onto the undifferentiated “tribes of 
central Africa” or “the South Sea Islanders”) was blind to the social re-engineering then 
occurring in many of the newly-colonized societies of Africa and Oceania.  Those 
cultures were being aggressively reshaped to suit the needs of the colonial Powers during 
the land-grabs of the 1890s and 1900s.  And as Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm have 
                                                 
77 Sontag, Susan. “Fascinating Fascism,” New York Review of Books, February 6, 1975. 
78 A recent example is the appropriation of an Australian Aborigine’s painting by that country’s treasury in 
the 1970s.  When the artist, Malang’, was informed that his work had been reproduced on the Australian $1 
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documented, this aggression was often cloaked through the “invention of tradition” as a 
means of legitimizing political and cultural power.79  The invention of tradition was 
exercised most thoroughly in the colonies, where there was the greatest immediate need 
for securing local adherence to unprecedented structures of power.  Parts of several 
African societies, Ranger writes, were completely restructured, a project helped along by 
the “manipulation … [of] reified [local] customs … as a means of asserting social 
control.”80  By the 1920s, several “primitive” African leaders themselves had begun 
inventing their own traditions.81  Primitive customs became the very opposite of the 
natural, organic social facts that tradition is supposed to represent. The desire to recapture 
the power that mythic narratives and fetishized artefacts were believed to exert upon the 
primitive mind resonates disturbingly with fascist ideas that individual self-interest stood 
in the way of social vitality and should be subverted by an appeal to the subconscious.82  
A deeper problem is primitivism’s constitutive irony – that despite its seemingly 
radical critique of civilization, primitivism reinforced rather than interrogated many 
conventional, dehumanizing ideas of non-Western peoples. 83  Primitivism viewed every 
single non-Western person as a manifestation of “the primitive” in a self-absorbed project 
of discovering the primitive within the Western, bourgeois self.  As Chinua Achebe 
observed, Heart of Darkness was ostensibly an indictment of Belgian rapacity in the 
                                                 
79 See their “Introduction” to The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger.  
Cambridge University Press: 1983 
80 Ranger, Terence, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in The Invention of Tradition. 
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Congo and the hypocritical colonialist mantras of civilization and progress. Yet in 
Achebe’s view, Conrad trips so badly that the point Heart of Darkness actually makes is 
that a black African savage is lurking (tragically) within each of us.  Conrad is harshly 
critical of “civilization” and finds a kind of eternal, ontological truth in “savagery,” but 
the novella is nonetheless racist.  It reduces all the peoples of the Congo, even the peoples 
of Africa, to their blackness, which turns out to refer merely to the qualities that white 
Europeans don’t like to see in the mirror.  Marlow, despite his empathy with King 
Leopold’s victims and his revelation that “progress” is humbug, is adrift in a sea of racist 
hogwash.  His melancholy is a disguised form of egotism; an overarching racial 
distinction continues to shore up his self-image.  He wants to have his cannibal and eat 
him, too. 
While the primitivist sees himself as a man purging himself of civilization’s 
clogging inauthenticity and freeing the deeper man within, his behaviour seems to 
indicate a familiar, shallow self-interest. Gauguin’s voyage to Tahiti in 1891 was 
intended, in a sense, to tell the story of an artist’s rejection of civilization and his embrace 
of “barbarianism.” Yet critics have identified other motivations.  In 1889, Gauguin, along 
with his then-friend van Gogh, visited the Paris Exposition.  That state-sponsored fantasy 
was staged to entice ambitious, frustrated, or troublemaking citoyens to support the 
Empire by leaving for the colonies.  As portrayed at the Exposition, the natives of those 
colonies were so immiserated and backward that they would gratefully welcome 
newcomers as ambassadors of France’s historic mission civiliatrice.  The letters in which 
Gauguin described his plans to move to Tahiti contain passages taken verbatim from 
Exhibition pamphlets – extolling the low cost of living in the South Pacific, the docile 
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character of the natives, and so on – and these tropes turn up in his later descriptions of 
Tahiti as well.84  Gauguin even managed to win a small amount of governmental 
financial support for his Tahitian voyage.   
Primitivism did not demand of its practitioners any particular ethnographic 
knowledge.  Just as japonisme was ignorant of much of Japanese art and culture,85 
primitivism was far removed from the vast global and historical array of arts, cultures and 
peoples it claimed as its inspiration. Such knowledge was beside the point, which was 
that primitive cultures, in their timelessness, connection to nature, spirituality, and so on, 
were manifestations of the same primitive essence. By 1914, the Parisian cognoscenti 
were using the term “primitive art” interchangeably with “art nègre,” with the result that 
Inuit, Aztec and Javan artefacts were all referred to as “black”.86 Artists who paid too 
close attention to the inscrutable details of non-Western artefacts – the nitty gritty of 
alterity – were derided as mere “taxidermists”.87  Partly for this reason, many primitivists 
did not find it necessary to leave Europe.  Karl May’s best-selling Westerns are perhaps 
the most famous example of a representation of “native” cultures that was innocent of 
any experience of them.  Ernst Kirchner, a member of the Brücke school and the painter 
of primitivist canvases like Negro Couple (1911), experienced “the primitive” solely in 
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the form of performers at “the circus, Wild West shows and exhibitions at the zoological 
gardens” in Dresden.88     
 Artists like Kirchner intended their art to embrace and exalt “the primitive” as a 
symbol of individual freedom, to demonstrate the idea that primitives, unlike “us,” had 
not lost X, were free of Y, and really knew how to Z.  While a more searching critique of 
“civilization” might have been possible if primitivism had paid attention to the unique 
values expressed within discrete non-Western cultures, primitivists were not only 
interested in social change.  They claimed a shocking affiliation with the savage and the 
exotic in order to set themselves apart from the crowd.  Embracing the primitive was a 
way to declare one’s freedom from dominant fine-arts traditions, from bourgeois taste: a 
way of “making a difference” between one’s own –ism and the rest.89 Ironically, from 
their ostensibly radical position, primitivists seemed to choose their battles against 
civilized society so as to ascend its ladders. 
The irony that primitivism camouflaged a promise of retrenchment in rhetoric of 
renovation and revolution was as conspicuous in the consumption of primitive artifacts as 
in the production of primitivist art. A person capable of appreciating primitive art signals 
that he has attained a unique level of sophistication. One actually derived pleasure from 
realizing that one’s norms and values were culturally contingent, and comprehended the 
artefacts of semi-conscious, remote tribesmen.  The belief that civilization was superior 
to savagery was replaced with the belief that, by appreciating savage artefacts, one was 
personally more civilized than the mass of one’s compatriots.  The commonly-
emphasized eroticism of primitive artworks provides an example: according to interviews 
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with Parisian art dealers in the 1980s, the best-selling primitive objects were “those that 
are strongly sexed,” particularly “Papuan figures with erect penises.”  Price argues that 
this emphasis derives from the fact that “sexuality is the vehicle par excellence for the 
expression of deviance from mainstream cultural norms, and primitives are, from a 
Western perspective, culturally deviant.”90 One who can appreciate “strongly sexed” 
primitive objects should have little to fear even from Freudian analysis.  Freud himself 
possessed a famous collection of primitive figurines, although apparently none stood out 
as particularly Papuan.91  
The art market gave a similar ironic twist to the supposed power of primitive art 
to scourge away the false accretions of civilized personality when it subsumed 
anonymous primitive artists to the famous modernists who “discovered” them.  For 
instance, a newspaper advertisement for a MoMA exhibition of primitivist art juxtaposed 
one of the mask-faces from Picasso’s Demoiselles d’Avignon with the anonymous 
sculpture in the Trocadéro museum that inspired it.  Price argues that the ad reverses the 
hierarchy usually associated with originals and copies: the value of the anonymous, 
original African artwork derives from its having been “chosen” by Picasso, whose 
paintings sell for tens of millions of dollars, and not vice versa.92 
Primitivism’s appeal was bound up in its promise of cultural authority. Picasso 
was a notorious tease about primitive influences on his work; he variously encouraged 
rumours that he had “African blood,” and at other times denied that he had even seen any 
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African art before painting Les Demoiselles d’Avignon.93 When Picasso first discussed 
what he had found in the Trocadéro’s galleries in 1907, he claimed that “Men had made 
those masks and other objects for a sacred purpose, a magic purpose, as a kind of 
mediation between themselves and the unknown hostile forces that surrounded them, in 
order to overcome their fear and horror by giving it a form and an image.”  It was 
precisely this fearful, threatened quality that attracted him.94  Yet when he was later asked 
about his large (and apparently “mediocre”) collection of African and Iberian statuary, 
Picasso quipped, “L’art négre? Connais pas!”95  He viewed such artefacts, that is, as a 
standing reserve on which he could draw for formal innovations. The artist’s embrace of 
the primitive’s self-erasure threatened to be interpreted as a dependence that might 
actually erase the value of the primitivist artist. Paul Klee found that the first Blue Rider 
exhibit exemplified the “primitive beginnings in art,” which was praiseworthy, since “the 
more helpless” the artist, “the more instructive” his artwork in “reforming today’s art.”96  
Later, Klee rejected the primitivist label: “If my works sometimes produce a primitive 
impression, this ‘primitiveness’ is explained by my discipline, which consists of reducing 
everything to a few steps.  It is no more than economy; that is the ultimate professional 
awareness, which is to say the opposite of real primitiveness.”97 
Primitivism’s fascination with the other is inseparable from a desperate concern 
for the self. The flip-side of the proposition that civilized man did not know himself, that 
a savage other lurked within him like Mr. Hyde within Dr. Jeckyl, was that a civilized 
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person had hidden depths.  Frank Kermode argues that the turn of the century’s 
“immense revaluation of primitive images” was triggered by the belief that these 
“primitive, external foreign objects … corresponded to what Freud called the ‘internal 
foreign territory’.”98  At the very moment it seemed to be opening the self outward, 
primitivism could serve to shore up the ego.  Gestures and tropes appropriated from non-
Western cultures were a kind of vaccine for the civilized ego’s self-doubt: primitivism 
weakened the otherness of the native and inoculated the bourgeois subject, who emerged 
more secure in his sense of superiority.  Surely primitivists were the heirs of Rimbaud, 
the poet turned arms-dealer who illustrated his radical insight, “I is another,” by 
identifying with the African “children of Ham” at the moment they were being invaded 
by Europeans: “The whites are landing. The cannon!”99 
And yet even for Picasso, the primitive also represented anxiety and the desire for 
authenticity.  Picasso’s transformative encounter with some of the artefacts in “Le Troca” 
in 1905 led to a series of paintings – a portrait of Gertrude Stein, self-portraits, and in 
1907 Les Demoiselles d’Avignon – in which faces are represented as African or Iberian 
masks.  Paintings such as Les Demoiselles depended upon the contemporary discourse of 
“the primitive” for their very meaning.  The faces of three of the five “demoiselles” 
(prostitutes) are derived from Iberian and African masks, and thus incorporate the 
popular association of primitives with sexuality.  Picasso, for whom the painting may 
have been a “brutish reaction” to Matisse’s idyllic Le Bonheur De Vivre (1906),100 
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prompts the viewer to ask what the European aesthetic tradition suppressed, and how 
such a tradition could be adequate. The importance of this question may be seen in the 
fact that Picasso incorporated his own sexuality into the painting.  In an early version of 
the canvas, Picasso himself appeared as a brothel patron, while in the final version, this 
figure becomes another of the demoiselles, all of which have been painted with mask-
faces.101  From merely paying a visit, Picasso comes to identify with the scene.102 
 
 
4. The criterion of authenticity  
 
Primitivism is in many ways easy to condemn, yet its embrace of a sceptical, 
“ethnographic attitude” (in Clifford’s phrase) towards all cultural values, including one’s 
own, seems to be grasping for a way to express what Habermas says is the “de-centering 
of subjectivity” at the centre of modern ethics. Without losing sight of its implication in 
violence and the fact that its promise to renovate the self was often hypocritical, 
primitivism nonetheless elaborated an aesthetic that seemed to “make the world possible 
for art,” as Eliot put it, at a time of crisis.  According to the primitivist criterion of 
authenticity, artistic production was both involuntary – unselfconscious, psychically 
necessary, and attributable to an internal, primitive “other” – and in some sense 
objectively valid. 
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The primitive artist’s production was not a matter of choice, taste, or ambition, 
but necessity.  Théophile Gaultier had proclaimed that “nothing is beautiful unless it is 
useless; everything useful is ugly, for it expresses a need, and the needs of man are 
ignoble and disgusting, like his poor weak nature.”103  For Gauguin and his heirs, the 
appeal of the savage artist was precisely the psychic and social necessity of his art as a 
source of meaning to his community.  Picasso said he “had found [his] way” when he 
realized that in primitive societies, art played the role of propitiating the terrors of the 
natural world. Oscar Wilde found it harder and harder to live up to his blue china, but the 
primitivist was trying to return to a time when the fetishized object really was alive. T. S. 
Eliot saw in a Chinese vase a “moving stillness,” and he placed this insight in a poem that 
he hoped would, with his other works, re-introduce spiritual contemplation to modern 
society.  
 The primitive’s drive to create art was existential. Whereas modern man suffered 
the acedia that prompted Nietzsche’s comment, “he who is bored with his life should risk 
it,” the primitive found the world literally alive with spiritual meaning. But primitivists 
did not claim merely that the savage artist’s animist beliefs were a form of 
unselfconscious connection with the natural environment.  The savage was seen to live a 
life of terror which gave to his artworks a darkly appealing urgency as manifestations of 
the vital instinct of self-preservation. 
The somewhat Hobbesian theory that the primitive lived a life of fear found its 
most influential expositor in the Viennese critic Wilhelm Worringer.  Worringer’s 
Abstraction and Empathy – a best-seller when published in 1908 – claimed that unlike the 
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mimetic tradition of Western civilization, primitive art showed an “urge to abstraction” 
that expressed the “great inner unrest inspired in man by the phenomenon of the outside 
world.”  Civilization had mastered nature, and so civilized artists could afford the 
“empathy” with the external world that realistic mimesis required.  Primitives, by 
contrast, could not even recognize the possibility that their relationship with nature could 
be technologically mediated.  The external environment was ineluctably uncontrollable.  
The fear of nature gave the primitive “an immense spiritual dread of space” itself.  Space 
or “extension” is, first, the quality that “links things one to another,” and this 
interrelationship thwarts the primitive’s attempts to control anything; second, the abstract 
concept of extension “is the one thing which it is impossible to individualize,” which 
thwarts the primitive’s attempt to comprehend it through his usual cognitive method, 
personification.  It followed from this dread of space that in primitive sculpture, “all 
endeavour was therefore directed toward the single form set free from space.” Worringer 
saw all primitive art as exemplifying “closed form”: representational images that were 
nonetheless abstracted from their environment.104 
The fear and disorientation with which Worringer diagnosed the primitive were, 
perhaps, not terribly far to seek in Vienna in 1908 (or so Worringer’s suicide might 
indicate).  It seems plausible to view part of primitivism’s appeal in terms of a response 
to (and projection of) a widespread sense of threat, of being overwhelmed. What the 
natural environment was to Worringer’s primitive, the corrupting or distracting 
simulacrum of modern mass culture was to modernists like T.S. Eliot, who fretted that 
the unprecedented “flood” of “books being published by and for the present generation” 
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presented “a huge obstacle” to “critical consciousness”.105  Wyndham Lewis anxiously 
demanded that “a space must be cleared, all said and done, round the hurly burly of the 
present,” in which “no man can reflect or create …”.106  To J. A. Symonds even that 
might have been impossible, given the lack of any stable reference point in a world where 
“nothing can stand still … [and] all must vary, must progress or retrograde.”107 
But the appeal of Worringer’s thesis about the primitive artist’s fear and anxiety 
was not merely that it offered modernist artists a kind of emotional analogue to their 
feelings about modernity. The popular idea that primitive artists were virtually compelled 
to produce their artworks suggests that artists embraced primitivism because they found it 
difficult to justify their desire for aesthetic pleasure and their ambition for aesthetic 
production. This unease may be seen in theories that true art was produced almost 
involuntarily, as if the artist were coerced by his drives and innocent of wanting to 
produce art for the market. Kandinsky’s criterion, while selecting art to include in The 
Blue Rider in 1911, was that the works should have been “formed through an inner 
necessity.”108 It is as though artists projected their ambitions onto the figure of the 
primitive, thereby enabling themselves to identify anew with those ambitions, and more 
fervently than before. 
Primitive artworks, and by extension the work of modern artists who could 
channel their inner primitives, were not authentic merely because they were produced out 
                                                 
105 Eliot, “Christianity and Literature.”  
106 Lewis, “Essay on the Objective of Plastic Art in Our Time” (1922), Wyndham Lewis on Art, p. 233. 
107 Symonds, Stella Fregelius (1906, p. 289), quoted in Griffith, J.W., Joseph Conrad and the 
Anthropological Dilemma: Bewildered Traveller. Clarendon: Oxford, 1995, p. 6. 
108 Kandinsky, “On the Question of Form,” quoted in Rhodes, Primitivism and Modern Art, p. 56 
39 
 
of necessity or inner compulsion, but because these artworks were uniquely objective 
records.   
In 1931, the French Mission Dakar-Djibouti was launched with the purpose of 
obtaining (often looting) African artefacts for the new Musée de l’Homme in Paris.  A 
comparison between the records of the Mission and of a prior French adventure is 
illustrative of the significance that primitive objectivity took on in modernity. In 1798, 
Napoleon invaded Egypt.  His army was accompanied by an “Institut,” a scientific task 
force intended, Said writes, to “put Egypt into modern French,” to “render it completely 
open, to make it completely accessible to European scrutiny”.109 The Institut’s triumph 
was the publication of the Description de l’Egypte: twenty-three enormous volumes, 
every page of which is a square meter in size, which contained “everything said, seen and 
studied” during the occupation.  
A greater contrast to the Description than the fragmentary, agonised journal 
entries of Michel Leiris, the official secretary of the Mission Dakar-Djibouti, would be 
hard to imagine.  Leiris’ entries were longest when the Mission bogged down in Ethiopia, 
which was never colonized and remained an obstacle to authority.110  Far from aspiring to 
Enlightened omniscience, Leiris wrote, “I’d rather be possessed than study possessed 
people, have carnal knowledge of a ‘zarine’ rather than scientifically know all about 
her.”111  Elsewhere, when Leiris muses, “My boots are muddy, my hair long, my nails 
dirty.  But I enjoy this filth,” James Clifford observes that by an “excess of subjectivity, a 
kind of objectivity is guaranteed – that (paradoxically) of a personal ethnography.  The 
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realist imagination, fabricator of the vraisemblable, is refused in favour of an impossibly 
sincere record of the real: perceptions, moods, facts.”112  By identifying with the 
primitive’s perceived objectivity, primitivists could take their own inner urges as quasi-
objective facts. 
Leiris seems to exemplify Kermode’s thesis that modernists sought out primitive 
artefacts as “external foreign objects” that corresponded to the Freudian “internal foreign 
territory.” The modern subject’s desire to go on expeditions that would retrieve primitive 
artefacts derived not so much from an Enlightenment desire to classify and taxonomize, 
as from the a sense that he could achieve an adequate identity only by seeking to identify 
with the most remote, bizarre and opaque productions of the other.  The primitivist 
wanted to “discover” primitive artefacts within himself. 
The primitive was in direct contact with his natural environment and produced 
myths and artifacts unselfconsciously in response to that contact. As the unreflexive 
creator of his own culture, he was innocent of the modern subject’s need to make and 
justify cultural choices; his productions were direct, unmediated representations of his 
states of mind. His process of production was innocent of base motives – it was 
determined by inner necessity rather than by the imitative demands of the art market – 
and the artifacts he produced took on a kind of objective glow. The primitive’s 
unselfconscious, psychologically necessary, direct and unmediated representations 
represented the desirable paradox of authentic art. 
This primitive objectivity was highly appealing at a time of increasing distrust of 
explanations and glosses, and an empiricist desire to let facts speak for themselves. James 
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Frazer insisted in each new edition of his The Golden Bough that he had abstained from 
interpreting the ethnographic materials collected therein, and had merely organized them 
according to certain obvious similarities between diverse beliefs and rituals.  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein hoist Frazer on his own petard, claiming that he was too intent on 
explanation: “one reason why the attempt to find an explanation is wrong is that we have 
only to put together in the right way what we know, without adding anything, and the 
satisfaction we are trying to get from the explanation will come of itself.”113  This ideal 
recalls Benjamin’s Arcades Project, which he planned as a book consisting of “six 
hundred quotations, systematically arranged,” with minimal commentary; or the project 
announced by the anthropologist Evans-Pritchard, in his “Introduction” to Man and 
Woman among the Azanda, of writing a book of anthropology comprised solely of 
quotations.114  Clifford finds the presentation of haphazardly arranged primitive artefacts 
without an explanatory narrative in a contemporary museum, Paris’s Le Troca, where the 
visitor confronted a “jumble of exotica” that lacked any “coherent scientific 
contextualization,” and in a contemporary Parisian journal, Documents, whose organizing 
principle Clifford terms “ethnographic surrealism.”115 
A similar example may be seen in the list that opens August Macke’s essay, 
“Masks”:  
A sunny day, a cloudy day, a Persian spear, a holy vessel, a pagan idol and a 
wreath of everlasting flowers, a Gothic cathedral and a Chinese junk, the bow of a 
pirate ship, the word ‘pirate’ and the word ‘holy,’ darkness, night, spring, the 
                                                 
113 Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. A. C. Miles, Brynmill: 
Retford, 1979, p. 2e. 
114 Clifford, The Predicament of Culture, Harvard: Cambridge, 1988, p.47. 
115 Clifford argues that the collapse of Documents and the birth, three years later, of Minotaure (an art 
review) marked the same fault line as Jacques Riviere’s complete reorganization of the Musée Trocadero’s 
collections when he closed it down and opened the well-lit, well-organized Musee de l’Homme. Clifford, 
Predicament of Culture, p.135. 
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cymbals and their sound and the firing of armored vessels, the Egyptian Sphinx 
and the beauty spot stuck on the cheek of a Parisian cocotte.116  
 
Macke’s list, brimming with the heterogeneous and the unfamiliar, rejects hypotaxis and 
hierarchization.  It also uses primitivist rhetoric to intimate the need for aesthetic 
revolution as a revolution of perception: “The cast bronzes of […] Benin in West Africa 
[…] the idols from the Easter Islands […] the cape of a chieftain from Alaska  [… etc.] 
speak the same powerful language as the chimeras of Notre Dame and the Tombstones in 
Frankfurt Cathedral.  Everywhere, forms speak a sublime language right in the face of 
European aesthetics.”117  The pre-modern Europeans who built Notre Dame and the 
Frankfurt Cathedral were un-afflicted by “civilization.”  The similarity of their fantastic 
grotesques to artifacts from Africa, Alaska and Oceania, reveal that “civilization” is not 
an expression of universal truths, but a deviation from them. 
Primitivism claimed that it had the answer to the modern desire for a mode of 
perception that would provide individuals with an objective point of view, based on its 
assertion that unselfconscious primitive peoples perceived facts objectively.118  By 
inhabiting a primitive point of view, it might be possible to see the world as it is instead 
of as one had been taught to thinks about it.  The primitive bushman, according to Roger 
Fry, perceived objects with the immediacy of a high-speed camera, and could recreate 
images of running animals that look crude to us only because we lack that ability to 
                                                 
116 The Blaue Reiter Almanack, ed. Wassily Kandinsky and Franz Marc, Viking: New York, 1974, p.83. 
117 Id., 89. 
118 Similarly, Douglas Mao notes that “a standard piece of Victorian advice on child-rearing was to make 
one’s child a collector,” citing advice to parents to “encourage Tom to make a museum … of his wonderful 
curiosities… you may make a philosopher of him.” The intention was for Tom to learn the skills of 
nomenclature and organization, and derive pleasure from inductive reasoning. Julia McNair Wright’s The 
Complete Home (1879), quoted in Douglas Mao, Solid Objects. Princeton University Press: 1997, p. 28.  
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perceive without preconceptions.119  The child, Kandinsky claimed, retains the 
primitive’s “natural ability to absorb the thing as such,” so that “in the child’s drawing 
the inner sound of the subject is revealed automatically.”120  Artists saw in primitive 
unselfconsciousness a remarkable, unmediated circuit between perception and artistic 
creation. 
Primitivism required the artist to produce an internal division; his life must be 
torn between impersonal drives and actions and the responsive action of recording them, 
despite the pain and bewilderment they may cause.  This internal division reproduces the 
characteristics of alienation – when the point of primitivism is to achieve the opposite – 
but the primitivist’s internal division marks him as authentic.  
 
5. Primitivism in Anglo-American Modernist literature 
 
 As a movement that emphasizes immediacy, the short-circuiting of rationality, 
and an aesthetic of authenticity, primitivism’s promise made it valuable for modernist 
authors as well. Among others, T.S. Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, and Virginia Woolf adopted 
primitivism and struggled with its inherent contradictions.  None of these writers fully 
overcame primitivism’s inherent contradiction: it purported to advocate for progressive 
social change but relied on reductive fantasies of “primitive” peoples.  Yet all three 
authors balanced this contradiction to some extent by the primitivist insistence that the 
inadequate modern subject must open herself to the strange, the other, if she was to gain a 
chance to break free of inauthentic modes of life.  
                                                 
119 See Chapter 3. 
120 Kandinsky, “On the Question of Form,” quoted in Rhodes, Primitivism, p. 56. 
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At various points in their careers, the discourse of primitivism and its criterion of 
authenticity structured these authors’ analysis of their cultural predicament – whether the 
culprit was social fragmentation, repression, or patriarchy – and their understanding of 
their aesthetic projects – including Eliot’s theories of poetic imagination and his and 
Woolf’s ideas of the importance of “impersonality.”  Primitivism also directly affected 
these writers’ novels, poetry, criticism and other writings, from their choice of themes 
and settings (from Lawrence’s Mexican fantasias to Woolf’s first novel, set in the 
Amazonian jungle), to the ways it enabled them, despite sometimes intense anxiety about 
their public reception, to open their texts to opaque, inexplicable passages that primitivist 
aesthetics justified as markers of authenticity. 
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T.S. Eliot’s Impersonal Primitivism 
 
Identifying with the supposed traits of “primitive” peoples involves a certain self-
dramatizing flamboyance – from Paul Gauguin’s representations of his life in Tahiti121 to 
Josephine Baker’s nightclub performances in Paris.  Many of T. S. Eliot’s readers would, 
perhaps, agree that “it is hard to imagine [him] dancing around the fire in a loincloth.”122  
The theatricality of primitivism jars against Eliot’s reputation as the “invisible poet”123 – 
an aloof modernist who insisted on the continuous sacrifice of individual personality to 
one’s art.   More recent appraisals of Eliot as the neurotic, calculating son of a brick 
manufacturer who plotted his ascent to the pinnacle of Anglophone letters, seem similarly 
inimical to the consideration of Eliot as a primitivist.124  Michael Bell sees Eliot’s deep 
and long-abiding interest in the primitive125 as a mark of “conscious primitivism”; to 
Bell, Eliot carefully used “primitive” symbols and ideas for their supposedly universal 
resonance and epistemological heft.  Michael Levenson sees in Eliot’s interest in 
anthropology and ethnography, a will to “assimilate, not to emulate, the primitive.”126  It 
seems there was no question of loincloths; if anything, Eliot put the “prim” into 
primitive.127 
                                                 
121 Most famously recorded in his partly fabricated “journal,” Noa Noa. 
122 Crawford, Robert. The Savage and the City in the Work of T. S. Eliot. Oxford University Press: 2000. 
123 See Hugh Kenner’s study of Eliot, The Invisible Poet, first published in 1959. 
124 See, for instance, Louis Menand, Discovering Modernism: T S Eliot in Context, Oxford University 
Press: 1987; Mark Manganaro, Myth, Rhetoric and the Voice of Authority, Yale University Press: 1995, and 
Lyndall Gordon, T S Eliot: An Imperfect Life, Norton: New York, 2002. 
125 It dating from at least 1913, when Eliot wrote a paper for the Harvard graduate philosophy seminar of 
Josiah Royce, on “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual.”  For a discussion, see Piers Gray, T S Eliot’s 
Intellectual and Poetic Development: 1909-1922, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982. 
126 Bell, Primitivism, pp. 71-72; Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p. 195. 
127 See Michael Bell’s chapter on “Conscious Primitivism” in Primitivism, Routledge: New York, 1968; 
William Harmon, “T S Eliot: Anthropologist and Primitive,” American Anthropologist 78 n.4 (1976), p. 
799ff., and “T S Eliot’s Raids on the Inarticulate”, PMLA (1976); Marc Manganaro, “Dissociation in the 
Dead Land: The Primitive Mind in the Early Poetry of T. S. Eliot,” Journal of Modern Literature (March 
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Ethnographers and anthropologists had been recording and analyzing “primitive” 
rituals, myths and social structures since the mid 19th Century.  Eliot frequently drew 
upon these accounts of primitive in his poetry and criticism.128  Yet from the 1920’s 
onward, rather than merely keeping up with the scholarship, Eliot actively resisted the 
emerging anthropological consensus about primitive social structures, and clung to the 
increasingly dubious theories of James Frazer.129  The claim that Eliot’s primitivism was 
“conscious” is strained.  By definition, primitivism involved a paradoxically conscious 
effort to unlearn civilized routines and to rediscover “primitive mentality.”130 “The 
people who can be material for art,” Eliot had written, “must have in them something 
unconscious, something which they do not fully realize or understand.”131 The figure of 
the primitive is an embodiment of that unconsciousness inside the artist, who must thus 
be at once visible and unknowable to himself. 
In Eliot’s hands, “the primitive” became a means to reconceive poetry and to 
justify the role of the poet in modernity, precisely because of the association of “the 
primitive” with excess, self-display and performance.  As I will discuss, primitivism 
revalued those qualities by associating them with authenticity. It thereby provided Eliot 
an escape from what he feared, early in his career, was to be the fate of poetry in 
                                                                                                                                                 
1986, pp.97-110) and “Beating A Drum In A Jungle: T. S. Eliot on The Artist as Primitive,” Modern 
Language Quarterly (Dec. 1986, pp.393-421); Robert Crawford, The Savage and the City in the Work of T. 
S. Eliot, Oxford University Press: 1987; and Ronald Bush’s essay, “The Presence of the Past,” in 
Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the Culture of Modernism, ed. Bush and Elazar 
Barkan, Stanford University Press: 1995. 
128 This Eliot used the primitive’s organic relationship to his society (or his Gemeinschaft) and to his 
natural environment as a criterion to judge the social function of contemporary art.  The figure of the 
primitive thus focused the modern subject’s radical alienation from primitive being in the world.   
129 See notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
130 See Levy-Bruhl’s La Mentalite Primitif, translated as How Natives Think. 
131 “Eeldrop and Appleplex II,” Little Review, September 1917, p. 19 (Berg Collection, New York Public 
Library).  This argument may not represent Eliot’s own view, since he assigned it to one character in a 
dialogue; but to say this is to recognize the dialogue as an aesthetic form that allows for authorial un-self-
consciousness, reconfirming the “character’s” point.  
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modernity: an activity condemned to irrelevance and limited to the mere mimicry of 
dated styles.  
The poet, Eliot moaned, “must borrow every changing shape / To find expression 
… dance, dance / Like a dancing bear, / Cry like a parrot, chatter like an ape.”132  When 
faced with the grim reality of modernity, the responsive attempt to be poetic, as it were, 
was merely ridiculous.  Eliot’s “Preludes” takes as its subject the attempt to imagine a 
poetry that would be adequate to modernity.  It is largely comprised of scenes describing, 
in matter-of-fact tones, the sordid, empty existence of lower-middle class characters.  The 
penultimate stanza, however, changes register; a moralizing voice intrudes, purporting to 
find meaning in these scenes of degradation: 
I am moved by fancies that are curled 
Around these images, and cling: 
The notion of some infinitely gentle 
Infinitely suffering thing.  
 
Such vague, moralizing escapism fails even to attempt to grasp the meaninglessness of 
modernity. It reveals nothing of the truth of its purported subject, modernity, and shows 
only that the poetic “I,” curled up amongst his fancies, is a fraud.  Abruptly changing 
register again, the poem concludes with a little manifesto of entropy: 
 Wipe your hand across your mouth, and laugh; 
The worlds revolve like ancient women 
Gathering fuel in vacant lots.133   
 
“Preludes” tries to make poetry out of the purported disavowal of the attempt to make 
meaning out of the ugly emptiness of modernity.  The moralizing penultimate stanza 
seems a straw-man, and the whole effort is perhaps not wholly satisfying. Yet the poem 
                                                 
132 “2. Portrait of a Lady,” from Prufrock and Other Observations (1917). 
133 “3. Preludes,” from Prufrock and Other Observations. 
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also presents itself, ambiguously, as a prelude, perhaps to some utterly bleak future, or 
perhaps to some future poetry that will do justice to that bleakness.   
Lionel Trilling characterizes modernity as an era in which artists confronted 
conflicting desires: to play aesthetic games, to establish contact with a mass audience, 
and to be “authentic”.134  The primitive, modernists had discovered, seemed to open a 
route to authenticity.  Wyndham Lewis’s assertion in BLAST (1914) that “the art instinct 
is permanently primitive” posits that the drive to produce art – the need for aesthetic play 
– is a rock in the stream of history.135  Far from being condemned to imitate styles, the 
modern artist could, if he acknowledged that the need to create art was essentially savage, 
encounter within himself a poesis that transcended modernity.  Primitivism signified a 
passion for – and even possession by – something deeper than contemporary fashions.  
Eliot claimed to be “certain that primitive art and poetry help our understanding of 
civilized art and poetry.” Primitive art not only explains the historical origins of that art 
and poetry, but shows that civilization cannot explain, on its own terms, the underlying 
needs that drive the subjects of modern society to continue to produce art.   
Avant-garde artists seized on primitivism as a way of “making a difference”136 
between their own and previous or competing artistic styles.  Lewis’s claim in BLAST 
was an attempt to distinguish Vorticism from Marinetti’s Futurism.137  Pound’s 
proclamation that the men of 1914 were the “heirs of the witch doctor,” come to reclaim 
                                                 
134 Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity. 
135 Gadamer, who argued that “the basis of aesthetics during the nineteenth century was the freedom of the 
symbolizing power of the mind,” asked, “Is the symbolizing activity not actually still bound today by the 
survival of a mythological and allegorical tradition?” Quoted in Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight, p. 191. 
136 Cf. James Clifford’s reading of Picasso’s use of “primitive” art to mark a radical break with the 
European tradition in The Predicament of Culture. 
137 This is Peter Nicholls’ argument about Lewis’ statement. Modernisms, p.174. 
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their rightful social place,138 was similarly intended to define an artistic group.  
Primitivism generated rhetorical authority by implying that, to its adherents, nominally 
aesthetic questions were matters of passionate, existential importance. Primitivism, in 
short, partook of the opposition between “art” and “commodity” that has been described 
as central to the “structure of modernism” --  an ironic structure.  Many artists adopted an 
“alienated” stance because doing so helped sell their work.139     
In primitivism, Eliot found a tactic that would enable him to perform authentically 
rather than performing on demand, and thus to re-imagine his relationship to an audience 
towards which he was profoundly ambivalent.  This is not to say that Eliot became a 
primitivist because primitivism was the road to literary success.  Eliot, often strapped for 
money,140 knew poetry was “a mug’s game”,141 yet he gave up a promising academic 
career and a safe job at a bank to write.  Primitivism involved a fantasy of escaping from 
the market’s values to forcefully confront a hostile audience.  “The war between [the 
artist] and the world is war without truce,” Pound wrote, and so the artist must act “like 
the Tahiytian savage … by craft and violence.”142  For Eliot, primitivism functioned as a 
shield and a sword: it defended him from charges of inauthenticity, and supported his 
claim that, despite himself, the subject of modernity must be reformed by art.   
 
                                                 
138 “The New Sculpture,” The Egoist (see below). 
139 Jensen, Robert. Marketing Modernism in Fin-de-Siècle Europe. Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 10. 
140 Ezra Pound went to some lengths to raise funds for Eliot, while also having to conceal his hand in two 
such “schemes” for fear Eliot would refuse the money. 
141 In The Use of Poetry and The Use of Criticism (Faber, 1933), p.154. 
142 “The New Sculpture,” The Egoist, 16 Feb. 1914; quoted in Levenson, A Genealogy of Modernism, p. 74. 
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1. Authenticity and Publicity  
Eliot was fascinated, and tortured, by the dynamics of knowing and being known.  
The threat of becoming a “patient etherized upon a table,” “pinned and wriggling on the 
wall,”143 seemed to haunt Eliot, and contemporaries perceived his manner and his poetry 
as cagey.  One critic compared trying to “understand Eliot” to trying to catch a “slithering 
sand-eel.”  Yet if he was repelled by the thought of being an object of attention he did 
nothing to hide his personal ailments – but rather the opposite, at least in his letters144 - or 
to moderate opinions others found idiosyncratic.  Less an avant- than a derrière-garde, 
Eliot fought the decline of the “English race” with an odd arsenal of poetry, plays, 
criticism, lectures, radio broadcasts, and a noisy conversion to “Anglo-Catholicism.”  
Insofar as theatricality, or what might be called an attentiveness to the public eye, 
is a component of primitivism, there is a sense in which this ex-banker’s seemingly-
incongruous claim to an affinity with the savage is characteristic. Gabrielle MacIntyre 
discerns intimations of Eliot’s own sexuality in “King Bolo’s Big Black Kween,” the 
fleshy, voracious heroine who “bursts on the scene” of his “Bolo and Colombo” 
poems.145  Eliot did not confine his provocations to blackface.  He rented a second 
London flat under an assumed name, and instructed guests to ask for “The Captain,” upon 
which Eliot was wont to appear, masked in a greenish, “corpse-like” face powder.146   
                                                 
143 “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” from Prufrock and Other Observations, 1917. 
144 Eliot’s letters, such as one to his mother of 6 Sept. 1916, show this to an almost comical degree: “We 
enjoyed our [vacation] immensely, and it did us both a world of good.  Unfortunately, Vivien had the ill 
luck to have a very bad attack of neuralgia last week.  … The [guest house] rooms were unused and the 
sitting room very damp; I think this protracted the neuralgia.  At any rate it gave us both mild attacks of 
rheumatism, mine in the left leg.  Hers is nearer to gout, which she gets in the feet.  … I hated to leave 
Bosham; it seems like a beautiful dream. … It is idyllic.” The Letters of T S Eliot: Volume I, 1898-1922, ed. 
Valerie Eliot, p. 150.  Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1988. 
145 Gabrielle McIntire, “An Unexpected Beginning,” Modernism / Modernity, April, 2002. 
146 Gordon, Lyndall.  T S Eliot: An Imperfect Life.  W W Norton: New York, 2002.  
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The relationship between Eliot’s primitivism, and his oscillations between 
provocation and anxiety, may be elucidated by his view that the modern reader had 
become too powerful.  This anxiety lies, for instance, behind Eliot’s unusual comparison 
of John Ruskin and F. H. Bradley.147 “Bradley’s books,” he wrote, “can never fall into 
[the] neglect that has [overtaken Ruskin’s] because they will never rise to [the level of] 
notoriety [Ruskin’s work] achieved; they come into the hands only of those who are 
qualified to treat them with respect.”148  Eliot’s later claim that “poetry must be difficult” 
is perhaps related to his admiration of Bradley’s thorny “technical philosophy” for its 
power to create a “qualified” audience.  At the same time, Eliot’s characterization of 
Ruskin as a kind of once-notorious, now-forgotten performer, a man briefly elevated and 
then deserted by a fleeting moment of public favor, is remarkable.  The same jittery tone 
appears in Eliot’s praise of Ethyl Levy, a contemporary “revue comedienne,” for her 
“aloof and impersonal” persona.  Levy is “indifferent, rather than contemptuous, towards 
the audience; her appearance and movement are of an extremely modern type of beauty.  
Hers is not broad farce, but a fascinating inhuman grotesquerie; she plays for herself 
rather than for the audience.”149 Bradley and Levy perform for themselves, but their 
exacting goal is a “modern type of beauty” that undermines distinctions between the 
beautiful and the grotesque.  What is striking here is Eliot’s fantasy that these performers 
may create, through their very disinterest towards their audience, a discerning audience, 
which will reward them with consistent fame. 
                                                 
147 Bradley was the subject of Eliot’s doctoral thesis at Harvard. 
148 “Francis Herbert Bradley,” in For Launcelot Andrewes: Essays on Style and Order. Faber and Faber: 
London, 1928, p. 69. 
149 “London Letter,” Dial LXX [June 1921], p. 688. 
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Reversing this fantasy, one senses that the source of Eliot’s anxiety was the 
audience’s disinterest toward the intentions of the artist.  Such an attitude was, perhaps, 
the result of the proliferation of competing artistic styles.  Modernity has been called 
“perhaps the [first period], in all the history of art, to be characterized by a complex 
stylistic pluralism rather than by the simple hegemony of a unique and superior style”.150  
Far from endorsing such heterogeneity (as, say, an opportunity for consumer choice), 
Eliot viewed it as the product of ignorance and alienation.  “There never was a time, I 
believe, when those who read at all, read so many more books by living authors than 
books by dead authors; there never was a time so completely parochial, so shut off from 
the past.”151  The modern reader, drowning in the narcissistic deluge of modern 
publication, had lost sight of the very nature of reading as an atemporal experience of the 
past.  To Eliot, reading was not a relationship between reader and text so much as a 
“feeling of profound kinship, or rather of a peculiar personal intimacy, with … a dead 
author.”  This “secret knowledge, this intimacy, with the dead man” is, moreover, “an 
indubitable claim to distinction,” for the reader alone “can call [him]self [the] friend” of 
the dead man after “many years or centuries” of popular misunderstanding.152  Yet Eliot 
also describes this intimate experience as “sudden” and uncontrolled; it “is certainly a 
crisis.”  The power in this relationship belongs to the dead author, not the reader.  That 
the writer exercises such fantastic power beyond death strikes one as a wish fulfillment, 
                                                 
150 Poggioli, The Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 180. 
151 Essays Ancient and Modern, Faber and Faber: London, 1936, p.108. 
152 “Reflections on Contemporary Poetry,” Egoist IV [July 1919]. Compare “Portrait of a Lady” (in 
Prufrock and other Observations [1917]): “So intimate, this Chopin, that I think his soul / Should be 
resurrected only among friends / Some two or three, who will not touch the bloom / That is rubbed and 
questioned in the concert room.” 
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prompted by Eliot’s sense of the modern writer’s irrelevance and impotence, not to 
mention his difficulty in distinguishing himself from the rest of the mob of scribblers. 
Eliot declared that “a writer’s subject matter is racial,”153 and so, in Eliot’s 
fantasy, was his audience.  If the writer, ideally, was the voice of a racial collective, then 
implicitly his social role was natural and unquestionable.  It was natural for the reader, as 
a member of the same race, to see himself in the writer’s books, and to turn to them to 
understand himself.  But the modern reader is the product of a politics and an economics 
that generate social fragmentation through the production of heterogeneous wants.  
“Individualistic democracy has come to high tide,” Eliot laments, “and it is more difficult 
today to be an individual than it ever was before.”154  The subject of this social centrifuge 
is led to believe that his only goal is self-satisfaction, when in fact he is merely an alloy 
of desires produced by external forces, alienated from the cultural identity that should 
have been his racial birthright.  Social and cultural fragmentation made modernity an 
heroic time for criticism, in Eliot’s view, since informing the public of how and what to 
read might help put Humpty Dumpty together again.155  But a cracked society was hardly 
auspicious for poetry.  The alienated reader assumes the right to interpret at will; he is 
ignorant of the “racial” conventions which should unconsciously guide him and lacks the 
deference to the poet those conventions would create.  In such a fragmented social 
context, not only poetry but anyone presuming to write it was subject to scrutiny.  
Prufrock’s fear of being “pinned” was not unreasonable. The modern reader’s very 
                                                 
153 “Turgenev,” The Egoist, 4 Dec. 1917, p. 167. 
154 “Religion and Literature,” Essays Ancient and Modern, Faber and Faber: London, 1936, p. 108. 
155 Eliot presumably had his own fragmented epoch in mind when he argued that “the most important 
moment for the appearance of criticism … is the time when poetry ceases to be the expression of the mind 
of a whole people.”  The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, p.22. 
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ignorance was threatening; he could be expected, for example, to miss allusions and 
misinterpret the allusive text, wresting its interpretation from the writer’s control.   
Moreover, modernity had witnessed the rsise of certain styles of inquiry – 
particularly psychology (“such as it is,” in Eliot’s phrase), ethnology, and anthropology156 
– whose “formulated phrases” were powerfully objectifying.  The subject of such inquiry 
was rendered speechless; he was incapable of negotiating any adjustment of his status.  
The Confessions of Zeno (1923), for instance, are not confessions at all.  A psychoanalyst 
steals his analysand’s memoirs, publishes them, and prefaces them with the threat that 
Zeno, who “seemed to feel intense curiosity about himself … little knows what surprises 
lie in wait for him, if someone were to set about analyzing the mass of truths and 
falsehoods which he has collected here.”157  Psychoanalysis’s invention of the 
unconscious, its blueprint of the ego’s self-defenses, its demand for the analysand to 
produce free association and dream narratives – these steps were unprecedented in their 
aggression.  The modern subject had to answer for the thoughts and feelings of a grossly 
enlarged, unrecognizable version of itself.158  To artists, the combination of this style of 
inquiry with the simmering, widespread fear of cultural “degeneration”159 created the 
                                                 
156 “Psychology (such as it is […]), ethnology, and The Golden Bough [a text of comparative anthropology] 
have concurred,” Eliot claims, “to make possible what was impossible even a few years ago,” namely, the 
“mythical method” Joyce had discovered in writing Ulysses.  Such statements indicate that Eliot’s attitude 
to the social sciences, rather than to the primitive, should be characterized as “assimilative.”  (A charge 
discussed in the first section of this chapter.) 
157 Italo Svevo, The Confessions of Zeno (1923), trans. Beryl de Zoete (Vintage: New York, 1989), p.vii. 
158 Eliot writes that “The [ordinary man] falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have 
nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking” (“The 
Metaphysical Poets,” in The Sacred Wood and Other Essays, p. 127?).  It seems that this list is a product of 
free association; and yet even in this innocuous example, there is a resistance to identifying Eliot’s own 
unconscious as the source.  Rather, this list is the product of the poetic sensibility somehow saved from the 
“dissociation of sensibility” that has set in since the Jacobean era. 
159 Max Nordau’s book of the same name represents a kind of fin-de-siecle backlash against the 
efflorescence of avant-garde movements.  Nordau’s own masculine, Nordic name demonstrates the same 
anxiety – he changed it from the more agrarian and temperate “Sudfeld.” 
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threat that their aesthetic efforts would instead be misread in aggressively pathologizing 
terms.   
Eliot’s primitivism was, in part, a response to his view of modernity as a situation 
in which the author lacked social relevance, and where any attempts to regain it invited 
misunderstanding, attack, and even ridicule.   
“Poetry begins, I dare say, with a savage beating a drum in a jungle,” Eliot wrote, 
and he argued that the origins of poetry inform true poets even in modernity, such that 
“the poet is older than other human beings”.  The poet is obliged to do his homework; he 
must be “aware of all the metamorphoses of poetry that illustrate the stratifications of 
history that cover savagery”.160  But more than this, he must be able to delve beneath his 
civilized personality down to the savage bedrock of his art. His reward for doing so was 
that he would speak from an inner, personal voice that was also the voice of the human 
artistic impulse itself; he would exist both outside and inside civilization.  He might even 
receive the veneration due to those who are “older” than their contemporaries.  
“The Waste Land’s” allusions to “the primitive” help elucidate Eliot’s strategy, as 
they indicate that “The Waste Land” is simultaneously a poem and a manifestation of the 
meaning-system of primitive rites and beliefs.  Legions of readers have followed the lead 
of these allusions, which suggest that primitive ritual may be the key to decoding the 
poem’s meaning.  But as some critics have also pointed out, these allusions also send 
another important, perhaps surprising signal: that the poem is not the result of Eliot’s 
desire to be poetic.  What shapes the poem, in other words, is not an individual writer’s 
                                                 
160 These quotes are taken from, respectively: “Tarr,” Egoist, Sept. 1918, p. 106; The Use of Poetry and the 
Use of Criticism, Faber: 1933, p. 155; and a review of The Path of the Rainbow: An Anthology of Songs 
and Chants from the Indians of North America, ed. G.W. Cronyn, Athenaeum, Oct. 17, 1919, p. 1036.  
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stylistic goals, but the primitive drives that link him to his culture and, indeed, to Culture 
itself.  By coding its aesthetics as primitive, the poem creates an alibi for Eliot, helps shift 
interpretive attention from him back to the poem, and structures that interpretation on its 
own terms.   
A useful entry point to my argument is Louis Menand’s “symptomatic” reading of 
the poem.  It is almost impossible to tell, in Menand’s view, if the poem was actually an 
attempt at poetry, or something more like a psychological symptom.161  As he represents 
“The Waste Land,” with its multiple languages, arcane quotations, cryptic allusions, and 
discontinuities, the poem does not merely resist interpretation: it seems to oscillate 
between being a poem – something that attempts to be poetic in ways a reader would 
recognize – and being a mere nondiscursive behavior or action.  For an instance of the 
latter, Menand interprets the fact that “The Waste Land” was published with Notes to 
itself – which suggests that one needs secondary sources to understand it – as an 
admission of the poem’s inability to express its own meaning. The tone of the Notes is 
authoritative, but this only highlights, by way of contrast, the fragmentation of the 
poem’s narrator, who not only needs the Notes to help explain what he means, but “who 
cannot distinguish what he intends to reveal about himself from what he cannot help 
revealing.”162 Yet this apparent loss of control over its meaning, in Menand’s view, is the 
                                                 
161 Eliot’s fondness for discussing aesthetics in terms of formulae and catalysts betrays his eagerness to 
appropriate science’s legitimacy. Eliot also annexed psychology to “The Waste Land,” Menand argues, but 
in a rather different way.  (See, e.g., the “suggestive analogy” of “the [catalytic] action which takes place 
when a bit of finely filiated platinum is introduced into a chamber containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide.”  
“Tradition and The Individual Talent,” Sacred Wood (Dover: Mineola, NY, 1998 [1920]), p.30. Similarly, 
Ulysses “has the importance of a scientific discovery”; Joyce’s imitators are like “the scientist who uses the 
discoveries of an Einstein”. “Ulysses, Order and Myth,” Dial Vol. LXXV (1923), p. 482-83.) 
162 Menand, Discovering Modernism: T S Eliot and His Context (Oxford University Press: New York, 
1987), p. 90. 
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key to the success of “The Waste Land”: in fact, the poem “makes meaning out of its own 
(inadequate) attempt to explain itself.”163   
The poem’s problems, Menand argues, are a symptom not of the poet’s 
breakdown but of the culture in which he wrote, where the “nineteenth century 
metaphysics of style”164 had been exploded.  In Eliot’s early 20th century, a style was just 
a style, superseded by contemporary reality; and yet the poet could do nothing but imitate 
one style or another in his attempt to capture that reality.  The fragmentation of “The 
Waste Land” avoids this crisis by purposefully, preemptively enacting it.  The poem’s 
fragmentation indemnifies Eliot from the charge that his goal was merely to achieve a 
stylistic, poetic result – to write something “literary” – and yet at the same time, the poem 
was, of course, Eliot’s poem.  Making meaning out of fragmentation is testimony to 
Eliot’s singular genius at capturing modernity.  As Menand comments, “Eliot appears 
nowhere, but his fingerprints are on everything.”165  Macavity’s not there, but only 
Macavity could thus have absented himself.  
What this reading of “The Waste Land” captures is Eliot’s preemptive nomination 
of his poem – and potentially, himself – as a target of interpretation.  A strong 
interpretive attitude must be brought to bear simply to make sense of the poem.  There is 
no single coherent narrator to whom the reader might defer.  Certainly the poem does not  
invite the unconscious, “racial” interpretation whose demise Eliot, rather innocently, 
                                                 
163 Menand, Discovering Modernism, op. cit., p. 89. 
164 Id., p. 91.  Menand sees Eliot’s own ideal in his description of Ulysses as “a gigantic culmination of an 
old [epoch].”  Joyce has the “distinction… of having, in a positive sense, no style at all.  I mean that every 
sentence Mr Joyce writes is peculiarly and absolutely his own; that his work is not a pastiche; but that 
nevertheless, it has none of the marks by which a ‘style’ may be distinguished.”  Eliot’s essay appeared in 
the Nouvelle Revue Francaise, on 1 Dec 1922; and was translated as “Contemporary English Prose” when 
it appeared in Vanity Fair vol. 20 (July 1923), p.51.  Quoted in Menand, op. cit., p. 92. 
165Id.  
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would later mourn: while it is not clear what such an interpretation would look like, it 
seems unlikely to be prompted by such startling passages as, e.g., “And bats with baby 
faces in the violet light / Whistled, and beat their wings / And crawled head downward 
down a blackened wall”.  The poem forces the reader to become a diagnostician.  (Rather 
than symptomatic, this move might also be called masochistic, as it aggressively tweaks 
expectations to provoke a desired, aggressive response.166)   The breakdown of a coherent 
voice in “The Waste Land” steals a march on the threat that the reader will either ignore 
or aggressively misinterpret it, by preemptively naming the reader as hermeneutically 
aggressive,167 then sitting back and waiting for his response.   
An example may help to indicate the way primitivism advances Eliot’s 
preemptive or symptomatic strategy.  As noted, Menand adduces “The Waste Land’s” 
Notes as an instance of Eliot’s fragmentation of the poetic voice.  It is not incidental to 
Eliot’s strategy of fragmentation that the Notes focus on primitive myth and ritual – 
primarily the “vegetation ceremonies” described in James Frazer’s The Golden Bough 
and the fertility-cum-Grail myths elucidated in Jesse Weston’s From Ritual to Romance.  
In this respect the Notes follow a familiar pattern.  Several works of 19th Century fiction 
featured an editorial voice which drew attention to the narrator’s ignorance of primitive 
cultures, and which emphasized their mysterious nature.  H. Rider Haggard’s adventure 
novel Allan Quatermain featured footnotes which supplemented and challenged the 
narrator’s interpretations of “native rites.”168 Similarly, while discussing an ancient 
                                                 
166 This definition follows Gilles Deleuze’s treatment of masochism in Coldness and Cruelty (Verso: 
London). 
167 According to Menand, “The Waste Land” imitates a contemporary theory of degeneration.  Discovering 
Modernism: T S Eliot’s Intellectual Context, p. 91. 
168 Street, Brian. The Savage in Literature: Representations of ‘primitive’ society in English fiction, 1858-
1920, Routledge and Kegan Paul: Boston, 1975, p. 179. 
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African sculpture, the narrator of Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mines exclaimed, “all I can 
do is to describe it as it was, and the reader must form his own conclusion.”169 By 
breaking down the narrator’s authority, Haggard not only attributed to the reader a 
gentlemanly, anthropological knowledge, but interpellated him, as it were, into to the 
dark, unsolved mystery of the primitive. 
In “The Waste Land,” the narrator’s breakdown marks the presence of the 
primitive within the text.  The poem’s “symptoms” are to be read as citations or distorted 
enactments of primitive rites.  The apostrophe to “Stetson,” for instance, is to be 
interpreted as a distorted survival of the ancient belief (described in Frazer and Weston) 
that human sacrifice could bring about fertility in the natural world:  
‘That corpse you planted last year in your garden  
Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?  
Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?  
Oh keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men,  
Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!’   
Such passages may be rather grotesque or opaque170 but their anthropological gestures 
towards the primitive ensure that the reader will perceive them as meaningful.  
  
2. Primitivism, Fragmentation and Authenticity 
Eliot did not want to be seen as a man of his time.  “Whatever may have been the 
literary scene in America between the turn of the century and 1914,” he claimed, “it 
remains in my mind a complete blank … the only recourse was to poetry of another age 
                                                 
169 Wordsworth Classics (Ware, Hertfordshire, 1998 [1890]), p. 188. (My emphasis.) 
170 Scholars have identified this beast’s referent in a Jacobean tragedy. 
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and poetry of another land.”171  Eliot may have been posing, but the pose resonates with 
the attitude that good poetry was possible only if its production was shielded from and 
uncorrupted by what might be called, awkwardly, bad modernity. The price of 
authenticity is that the poet must demonstrate his own fragmentation – as discussed 
above, Eliot’s “The Waste Land” confronts the need to justify poetry by suggesting that it 
is indeterminably the result of either an attempt at poesis or of some non-aesthetic, 
uncontrollable behavior.  Seen in this context, primitivism represents the culmination of a 
method that Eliot had been pursuing since his early poems. 
In Eliot’s early poems the narrator is represented as the subject of involuntary 
mental processes.  His mind is occupied by the “twisted things” that “the memory throws 
up”; his very “soul [is] constituted” by “the thousand sordid images” which it “watches 
the night revealing.”172  Both the original perception being recalled, and the act of 
remembrance – not unlike Proust’s memoire involuntaire – are beyond his control.  This 
passive, spectatorial status guarantees that the narrator’s own desires and goals are not 
playing any role in the production of the material that comprises the poem.   
While there is nothing overtly primitivist about Eliot’s insistence, in these early 
poems, on the uncontrollable content of the narrator’s mental life, that insistence may 
reflect contemporary philosophical discussions of the primitive.  These discussions linked 
the primitive’s supposed irrationality to the immediacy of his perceptions. Henri Bergson, 
whose lectures Eliot attended in Paris in 1910, had distinguished two “selves,” one that 
experiences without analyzing, and one that analyzes without feeling.  “We have been 
                                                 
171 Quoted in Weir, David. Decadence and the Making of Modernism. University of Massachusetts: 
Amherst, 1995, p. 175. 
172 “Rhapsody on A Windy Night”; “Preludes (III)”, in Selected Poems, pp. 25, 23. 
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misled into neglecting the true testimony of the first self,” he wrote in Time and Free Will 
(1898), “because we have been cowed by the factitious authority of the second.”173  In his 
early poems, Eliot applies Bergson’s preference for the “first self” to suggest that, rather 
than shying away from reality, the poems were being constructed by it, as by a kind of 
trauma.  The poems reduced the role of the rational, analytical “second self” to 
registering the automatic operations of memory – in which, like a bad film strip, one 
cliché succeeds another and none contains any meaning with which the subject may 
identify.  Indeed, Eliot wrote, the only way one’s “self-possess[ion]” can “flare up for a 
second” is if one predicts the next cliché in the sequence, so as to be able to say that, at 
least, “This is as I had reckoned,”174 or, with Prufrock, “I have known them all already.” 
The advantage Eliot gains is that the narrator’s very helplessness in the face of his 
historical moment enables an authentic poetics, for his poem is an unmediated 
representation of the “twisted,” “sordid” world that has seared his mind.175 
Eliot’s primitivism refines this technique of authenticating artistic performance, as 
it signifies not only that the content of the poem is unmediated, but that its source is 
uncontaminated by the present.  The primitivist poet, by demonstrating that his mental 
life is out of his control, also performs the fact that his conscious, civilized individuality 
                                                 
173 Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. Pogson. London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1910, p. 129.  For a discussion of Bergson’s influence on Eliot, see also Menand, 
Discovering Modernism, pp. 33-34. 
174 “Portrait of a Lady,” Selected Poems, op. cit., p.20. 
175 Such a poetics recalls Woolf’s image, in “Modern Fiction,”  of a “shower of atoms scoring the brain” of 
the author.  It also fits with Renato Poggioli’s argument that avant-garde aesthetics relies on a “polemical 
… deformation” of received literary styles.  The Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Gerald Fitzgerald. 
Belknap / Harvard: Cambridge, 1968, p.180.   Crawford, similarly, characterizes “The Death of St. 
Narcissus” as Eliot’s attempt “to burn off the page the polite saintliness of an exhausted way of life, 
replacing it with a savage rite.” The Savage and the City in the Works of T.S. Eliot, p. 80.  
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has been possessed by an uncanny, primitive self.176  In “Portrait of A Lady,” for 
example, the narrator finds himself lost “among the windings of the violins / And the 
ariettes / Of cracked cornets.”  Trapped in this banal hell, he senses something stirring 
involuntarily within him: “inside my brain a dull tom-tom begins / Absurdly hammering 
a prelude of its own”.177  The “tom-tom” is inside the poet – indeed, it is a repetition of 
Eliot’s own first name – and yet the repetition also creates a moment of difference.   It 
recalls the powerfully “fatalistic” drum in “Rhapsody On A Windy Night,” but it is also 
merely “absurd.”  This internal drumbeat – which also echoes Eliot’s claim that poetry 
begins “with a savage beating a drum in a jungle” – teeters between intentional, aesthetic 
drumming and the mere, mindless action of hammering.  It belongs to the protagonist, yet 
it is nonetheless inscrutable and uncontrollable. 
The primary features of the poet’s inner primitive are that it is a powerful force 
and that it retains its otherness despite the attempts of the poet to identify with it.178  Eliot 
argues that a good poet must have an “auditory imagination,” which he defines as “a 
feeling for syllable and rhythm, penetrating far below the conscious levels of thought and 
feeling, invigorating every word; sinking to the most primitive and forgotten, returning to 
the origin and bringing something back, seeking the beginning and the end.”179  The poet 
has an internal diving-bell; but once he has descended to the bottom of himself, he does 
not find “meanings in the ordinary sense,” but the atemporal rhythms that are constitutive 
                                                 
176 The process is similar to Joyce’s claim (in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man) that working up 
material into art, and paring oneself down to invisibility within the artwork, are the same process.   
177 Robert Crawford notes that, in the poem’s drafts, the tom tom first appears not as “dull,” but “droll,” 
then “strong,” then “male.”  The Savage and the City in the Works of T S Eliot (Oxford University Press, 
1987), p.72. 
178 The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, p. 155. 
179 UPUC, p. 119. 
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of poetry and even language itself.180  At bottom, “the poet” is nothing but this primitive, 
rhythmic template.  The primitivist poet who steps onto the modern cultural stage is 
therefore propelled by an energy far deeper than himself; he has, as it were, an alibi.181  
Generally speaking, primitivism promised that by acknowledging one’s inner 
primitive, one could create an “authentic” selfhood, which would function as the 
foundation for a new beginning in art, life, and ultimately society.  In Eliot’s hands, 
primitivism melded into his somewhat ascetic theory of impersonality.  In 1919, Eliot 
argued in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” that the artist must be engaged in “a 
continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more 
valuable”: namely, the racial / cultural “Tradition” of which he is an imperfect 
representative.  A similar logic drives Eliot’s praise, also in 1919, of Wyndham Lewis’ 
Tarr: 
The artist, I believe, is more primitive, as well as more civilized, than his 
contemporaries, his experience is deeper than civilization, and he only uses the 
phenomena of civilization in expressing it.  Primitive instincts and acquired habits 
of ages are confounded in the ordinary man.  In the work of Mr. Lewis we 
recognize the thought of the modern and the energy of the caveman.182  
 
Lewis’ energetic insistence on the primal and essential enables him to “express” a unique 
“experience” that is “deeper than civilization.”  The judgment that “civilization” is 
secondary to Lewis’ individual experience may seem inconsistent with Eliot’s verdict 
that “Tradition” trumps individuality, but there is a deeper affinity. What Lewis 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 Admittedly, such gestures toward the primitive may seem like portals to the deepest recesses of the soul, 
or like so much stage makeup. As a set of iterable gestures, primitivism was a mask of depth.  And since 
the primitive represents a sort of lowest common cultural denominator, everyone’s inmost savage by 
definition looks much alike.  As August Macke riddled in “Masks,” a kind of primitivist manifesto, “the 
exterior of the form of art is its interior.”  “Masks” (1912), reprinted in The Blaue Reiter Almanac, ed. 
Wassily Kandinsky and Franz Marc, trans. Klaus Lankheit (Viking: New York, 1974), p.85.   
182 The Egoist, Sept. 1919, p.106 (emphasis in original). 
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“expresses” is more profound than the “acquired habits” that constitute his own 
personality. 
It follows that Lewis’ self-expressions are above reproach. Lewis the primitivist is 
forgiven his theatrics183 because he has demonstrated a loss of self-control, which 
signifies the presence in him of the essential primitive energy that, in most cases, 
modernity has repressed.  Eliot claims that Tarr “is only in part a novel; for the rest, Mr. 
Lewis is a magician who compels our interest in himself; he is the most fascinating 
personality of our time rather than a novelist.”184  We are “compelled” by Lewis because, 
paradoxically, it seems he is not consciously responsible for actions which are 
mysteriously resonant with our own deepest needs.  In the “Tradition” essay, Eliot 
defines the poet’s Herculean task as synchronically embodying the essence of his entire 
culture. Similarly, Lewis is not defined by his historical moment, but has something of 
crucial importance to say to it, because he is “older than” his contemporaries. 
Eliot’s primitivism offered to deflect attention from the artist’s psychology while 
also representing it as something deep and universal.  The importance Eliot attached to 
these benefits may be seen by comparing his praise of Lewis with his criticism of 
Shakespeare.  Eliot’s best-known aesthetic theory is perhaps that of the “objective 
correlative,” which he defined as “a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events” as 
represented in a literary work.  If those objects “correlate” to a particular emotion, it will 
                                                 
183 Ronald Bush argues that “normally, [Eliot] finds [the] lack of connection to inner life appalling.  But 
part of him, during special moments, is able to enjoy” that lack, “’consciously and keenly’,” as a 
“spectacle. These moments ‘are of very great usefulness to dramatic verse.’ They allow the poet to swell 
out his language by incorporating [otherwise rejected] styles.…  More importantly, they allow the poet to 
render a certain kind of non-sentimental ‘awareness’—an awareness of the human need to create and 
sustain an artificial self.” Primitivism extended this “special moment” to the “enjoyment” of an inner 
“spectacle” that was, precisely, non-artificial. T S Eliot: A Study in Character and Style (Oxford: 1984), p. 
30. 
184 The Egoist, op cit., p.106. 
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be triggered in the reader; the author will have discovered the emotion’s “formula.”185  
The artist’s proper aim is not to “express” his own emotions, but to produce art that 
produces emotions in turn, with the ideal ratio between an artistic representation and its 
correlate emotion being 1:1.  Eliot elaborated this theory, ostensibly, to explain why 
Hamlet is unsatisfactory.  Shakespeare’s play fails to please, Eliot argues, because “we 
perceive [it] to be superimposed upon [the] much cruder material [of previous versions of 
the story] which persists even in the [play’s] final form.”186 Hamlet failed to sublimate 
“the efforts of a series of men” to reshape the old story that had been handed down to 
Shakespeare.  Eliot similarly senses the hidden presence of “some [private] stuff that 
[Shakespeare himself] could not drag to light.”  Shakespeare should have sublimated the 
efforts of previous writers, and should have dragged his own emotional stuff into the light 
for scrutiny, before ever staging the play. 
It is in precisely these circumstances that primitivism pays dividends.  The 
primitivist artwork succeeds not despite but because it retains such unfinished material; 
primitivism positively values that which the author cannot objectify.  If Hamlet’s rawness 
fails to be aesthetically pleasing, it is not because Eliot demanded that all writers live up 
to Joyce’s standard and become invisible behind their texts (disinterestedly “paring their 
fingernails”).  The “problem” with Hamlet, instead, is that Shakespeare strained to 
achieve a perfect, finished surface when his materials called for a primitivist aesthetic.187  
                                                 
185 This “formula,” which is vastly more affective than descriptions of emotional states, recalls the 
metaphor of the “platinum catalyst” for turning emotion into art that Eliot described in “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent.”   
186 This material was the work of previous authors, who had inherited the same revenge-tragedy plot that 
eventually culminated in Shakespeare’s play.  “Hamlet and His Problems [1920],” The Sacred Wood and 
Major Early Essays (Dover: Mineola, N.Y., 1998), p.55. 
187 This parallels the logic of Eliot’s pragmatic defense of relativism as “conscious neglect” to Norbert 
Weiner: “one has got to neglect some aspects of the situation, and what relativism does… is to neglect 
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In Eliot’s analysis, it seems that Shakespeare’s efforts smack of self-protective 
suppression, rather than the self-abnegating acceptance of his obscurely powerful raw 
materials.  By contrast, Eliot praised Lewis’ Tarr precisely for retaining evidence of the 
“energy” of its composition.188   
Three years after the Hamlet essay, a book review entitled “The Beating of A 
Drum” elaborated this shift in Eliot’s position.  Again discussing Elizabethan drama, 
Eliot now argues that when a literary work is based on a prior text, then not just the 
“form” but “the nature of the finished product (‘finished,’ of course, is relative) is 
essentially present in the crude forerunner.”189 A primitivist perspective enables Eliot to 
prize the awkward and unpolished, the (un)finished product that represents both its crude 
forerunner and the artist’s attempts to “finish” it.190   Residual evidence of the artist’s 
labor or effort is an indicator of the difficulty of his materials and thus, their value.191 
Eliot’s primitivism justified the production of heterogeneous artifacts and prized 
the “failure” to impose a single coherent surface or style.  On the same grounds, Eliot 
also justified the artistic impulse itself as a primitive drive for which the artist could not 
be held responsible: if the artist’s need to produce the artwork can be described as 
                                                                                                                                                 
consciously where realism protests that there is nothing to neglect, and idealism that it has neglected 
nothing.” Letters of TS Eliot, ed. Valerie Eliot (Harcourt Brace: NY, 1988), 6 Jan 1915, p.80. 
188 In Eliot’s praise of Tarr, as well, the figure of the primitive fuses Lewis’ conscious thought with an 
organism driven by instinct, in an exuberant embrace of raw sensation: “[i]ntelligence … is only a part of 
Mr. Lewis’ quality; it is united with a vigorous physical organism which interests itself directly in sensation 
for its own sake” (Egoist 105).   
189 A review of Olive Mary Busby’s “Studies in the Development of the Fool in the Elizabethan Drama.”  
Nation and Athenaeum, Oct. 6 1923, p.11-12. 
190 Like Levi-Strauss’s definition of myths in “The Structural Study of Myth,” the artwork, to Eliot, both 
“retains” (diachronically) and “represents” (as ahistorically, eternally valid) a kind of corpus of cultural 
knowledge. 
191 Primitivism valorizes the unfinished product which retains the primitive material, but also gives the poet 
liberty to base his art on the creation of an aesthetic derived from that material itself. Henry Moore later 
said that his goal was to see the artwork already present but hidden within the raw material, and then 
simply to clear away the excess. 
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unconscious, that artwork may be said to be justified as psychically necessary.  “The arts 
developed incidentally to the search for objects of talismanic properties,” Eliot asserts, 
finding that art “in its more primitive forms [had] very practical magical purposes—to 
avert the evil eye, to cure some disease, or to propitiate some demon.”192  The modern 
reader has lost the sense that art is necessary because art has lost these functions.  This 
loss in turn opened up room in which to rationalize the need for artistic expression.  “An 
unoccupied person, finding a drum, may be seized with a desire to beat it; but unless he is 
an imbecile he will be unable to continue beating it, and thereby satisfying a need (rather 
than a “desire”) without finding a reason for so doing.”193  Seeing through such post-hoc 
reasoning, Eliot reminds us that artistic production is a function of something intrinsic to 
the human organism, something pre-existing individual rational choice.  The need for art 
cannot be rationally explained, and that is its value.  One has not chosen art, either as a 
producer or a consumer, but has been compelled to it by an unnamable drive. 
 
3. The Meaningfulness of the Primitive  
Eliot’s primitivist strategy of signifying authenticity by dividing the poet into an 
uncontrolled interior process and a recording consciousness – “inside my brain a dull 
tom-tom begins” – is successful only insofar as the strange, interior process is itself seen 
as a site of meaning.  That meaningfulness, ironically, derives from the view that the 
“primitive mentality” was non-ratiocinative.   
                                                 
192 Criterion 2 (1923/24), review of The Growth of Civilization and The Origin of Magic by W. J. Perry, p. 
490; “The Social Function of Poetry.” 
193 “The Beating of a Drum,” Nation and Athenaeum (6 Oct 1923), p.12. 
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“The savage” of the 19th Century lacked any meaningful interiority whatsoever 
because he was incapable of interpreting his own history and culture.194 Such a primitive 
was easily objectified. Edward Burnett Tylor, the “father of [English] anthropology,” 
took the step of subjecting primitive cultures to quantification by applying statistics to 
their study.195 With the rise of ethnography in the early 20th Century, however, the 
objectifying gaze had begun to turn inward.  The discipline, in James Clifford’s view, 
transformed the “cultural predicament” of modernity into a positive goal: “to see culture 
and its norms—beauty, truth, reality—as artificial arrangements susceptible to detached 
analysis and comparison with other possible dispositions.”196  Ironically, the primitive’s 
lack of reflexive knowledge of the contingency and relativity of his beliefs made him the 
object of nostalgic envy.197     
Anthropologists conjectured that the mental life of primitives was driven by 
images: intensely felt, intuitive, and unafflicted by the artificial mediations of reason.198   
According to T. E. Hulme, these qualities are precisely what was needed to renovate 
modern poetry.  Poetry, to Hulme, “is a compromise for a language of intuition which 
would hand over sensations bodily,” and as such should be a language of “images,” for 
                                                 
194 Cf. E B Tylor: “The lower races, wanting documentary memorials, loose in preserving tradition, and 
ever ready to clothe myth in its shape, can seldom be trusted in their stories of long past ages.”  The 
absence of historical records means we cannot “write the course of culture in its lower stages.”  Primitive 
Culture (Peter Smith: Gloucester, MA, 1970 [2nd ed., 1873]), p. 39. 
195 Tylor’s Primitive Culture (1st ed., 1871) claimed that “the statistical method,” which its founder Quetelet 
had applied to discrete social phenomena like suicide and murder, was applicable to the entire spectrum of 
behavior. 
196 Clifford, The Predicament of Culture (Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1988), p. 119.  This thesis 
fits well with Ronald Bush’s argument that Eliot’s early poetry betrays a fundamental distrust of being 
betrayed by any given emotion (“The Pathology of Rhetoric,” Ch.2 of T S Eliot).  One could expand Bush’s 
point to say that Eliot’s worldview is not so much skeptical as grounded in a belief in the inadequacy of any 
belief system over an extended period of time. 
197 For a history of the rise of anthropology as an academic discipline, c.f.  M. Harris, The Rise of 
Anthropological Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). 
198 See, e.g., Lévy-Bruhl, How Natives Think. 
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these comprise “the very essence of intuitive language.”199  Modern poetry that could 
recreate primitive mental processes would thus have the capability of producing feeling 
immediately through words – rather like the objective correlative.  Such poetry might 
reclaim for modern subjectivity the ability to experience thought as feelings.  Primitivist 
poetics overlapped a good deal with the qualities that Eliot claimed the metaphysical 
poets exemplified before history, essentially, took a wrong turn with modernity.  Today, 
“the [ordinary man] falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have 
nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of 
cooking.”200  For modern man, one thing follows another, whereas the metaphysical poet 
– and, I argue, the primitive – experienced ideas and sensations simultaneously as 
“forming new wholes.” 
In Eliot’s view, then, the primitive enjoyed his non-rational mentality as a 
privilege.  There was, further, a profound nexus between the meaningfulness that the 
primitive experienced in his daily life and the fact that his world was opaque and 
mysterious rather than an object of analytical probing.  The real is irrational and the 
irrational is real, whereas the inauthenticity of modernity derives from the fact that the 
logical, transparent world science has created is so manipulable and understandable as to 
be meaningless.  Eliot thus claimed that “the natives” of a certain “unfortunate 
archipelago are dying out principally for the reason that the ‘Civilization’ forced upon 
                                                 
199 The essays were published in The New Age in 1909.  See Menand, op. cit., p. 34. 
200 The Sacred Wood and Other Essays. London: 1920 [Dover reprint, 1989], p.127.  This theory recurs 
decades later in Eliot’s thought, although the relevant Queen has changed: “The history of every branch of 
intellectual activity provides the same record of the diminution of England from the time of Queen Anne.  
It is not so much the intellect, but something superior to intellect, which went for a long time into eclipse; 
and this luminary, by whatever name we may call it, has not yet wholly issued from its secular 
obnubilation.” The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, p. 62.   
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them has deprived them of all interest in life.  They are dying from pure boredom.” The 
moral is that,  
when every theatre has been replaced by 100 cinemas, when every musical 
instrument has been replaced by 100 gramophones … when applied science has 
done everything possible with the materials on this earth to make life as 
interesting as possible, it will not be surprising if the population of the entire 
civilized world rapidly follows the fate of the Melanesians.201 
 
Encountering a man-made object that was created only to give one a pleasurable 
sensation, virtually without the necessity of one’s own effort, is not a meaningful 
experience.  The products of civilization have, as it were, “the look of roses that are 
looked at.”  The unfortunate natives are being forced into a prefabricated world in which 
they, like Prufrock, will have known it all already.  Unlike us, however, the “native” 
Melanesian is not yet inured to the death of the inexplicable difficulty of reality,202 of 
which he himself is exemplary, and so he is dying out. 
Eliot’s critique of “civilization” applies not only to cinemas and gramophones but 
to anthropology itself.  As a scientific discipline it promises to create meaning through its 
explanatory power, but explanation destroys the meaningfulness of the thing explained.203  
Anthropology to Eliot was rather like psychoanalysis to Karl Krauss: the disease of 
which it purports to be the cure.  “A number of sciences have sprung up in an almost 
tropical exuberance which undoubtedly excites our admiration and the garden not 
                                                 
201 “London Letter,” Dial 73 (Dec. 1922), p.663, citing “The Depopulation of Melanesia” by W. H. R. 
Rivers (whom Eliot calls a “psychologist”). 
202 In fact, Rivers’ argument about native depopulation was not based on technological progress, but on 
“the abolition of head-hunting by the British [colonial] Government.” “T S Eliot: Anthropologist and 
Primitive,’ American Anthropologist 78 n.4 (1976), p. 799. 
203 Though he viewed anthropology’s claims to scientific status as dubious—“you must postulate your own 
attitude and interpret your so-called facts into it, and how can this be a science?”—Eliot ultimately 
concedes, “And yet there is the material, and there must be a science of it.”  The concession is telling just 
because it admits human behavior to have the status of “material” (“Primitive Ritual” [1913], quoted in 
Gray, Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development, p. 134).  Eliot’s view that “it is perhaps the supreme 
difficulty of criticism—to make the facts generalize themselves” (“Philip Massinger,” The Sacred Wood, 
p.71), is similarly expressive of a paradigm demanding inductive methods of inquiry.   
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unnaturally has come to resemble a jungle.  Such men as Tylor, and Robertson Smith, 
and Wilhelm Wundt, who early fertilized the soil, would hardly recognize the resulting 
vegetation.”204  The ironic metaphor implies that instead of the actual jungle, modernity 
is left with a simulacrum, as scientific discourse has begun to replace reality.   
Primitivist poetry thus has an excellent alibi, for it represents a desperately-
needed attempt to break the interpretive fantasy that holds sway over the modern 
imagination.  The goal is not explication, but the reinvigoration of meaning; in a sense, it 
is anthropology in reverse.  Primitivism whets the reader’s anthropological appetite for 
knowledge, and invites the modern reader’s aggressive hermeneutics, but then converts 
this desire into an appreciation of the meaningfulness of opacity.  Eliot’s call for a 
“Return to the Sources”205 is a call for a poetry that creates meaning by both tempting and 
foreclosing interpretation.   
The allusions in “The Waste Land” exemplify the way Eliot set this idea to work.  
Levenson, studying the poem’s drafts and revisions, noted that Eliot tended to replace 
allusions to relatively recent artistic works, with allusions to works at a greater cultural 
and temporal remove.  An epigraph from Conrad is exchanged for one from Petronius; an 
allusion to Henry James is replaced by a reference to Middleton.  Whereas the poem’s 
original title, “he do the police in different voices,” was taken from Dickens, “the waste 
land” refers to the Grail myth, which in turn derived from vegetation rituals, and Eliot (as 
a reader of Frazer) may have taken these to be the origin of culture itself.206  Eliot pushed 
                                                 
204 “Euripides and Professor Murray” (1920), The Sacred Wood, p. 43.   
205 “The maxim, Return to the Sources, is a good one.”  “War-Paint and Feathers,” Athenaeum, 17 Oct. 
1919, p. 1036.  Hereafter “War-Paint.” 
206 A Genealogy of Modernism, p.203.  And compare “The Beating of A Drum,” where Olive Busby’s 
“Studies on the Development of the Fool in the Elizabethan Drama” is criticized for not tracing his origins 
far enough: the fool in Lear, Eliot angrily claims, “can hardly be classified as the ‘comic servant’”: he is “a 
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his poem towards the unfamiliar and the long-past, moving from “literary” allusions to 
citations of myth.  The point of doing so is revealed by the process of revision itself: the 
fact that Eliot was, indeed, able to find more and more remote cultural artifacts with 
which to make the same points and evoke the same feelings.  The power of the primitive 
is that his cultural artifacts uncannily parallel those of contemporary society, and can be 
traced to analogues throughout history.  By its continued survival the primitive suggests 
that there exists an ahistorical essence to or truth about humanity.  The poet who can 
grasp this truth, rather than recoiling from what it represents (“the horror,” according to 
Kurtz), has understood “not only the pastness of the past, but also its presence.”  If, as 
argued previously, the primitive’s non-ratiocinative mentality allows it to grasp the 
present moment immediately and accurately, that mentality also transcends time – which 
was presumably a relief for a poet who had “measured out my life with coffee spoons.”  
Thus “The Waste Land’s” use of the Grail legend precisely as an infertility myth, 
suggests that the primitive mind was capable of giving meaning even to the sense of 
spiritual dryness with which modernity was afflicted.   
Eliot credits Joyce with discovering the means to apply this insight to literature, 
via his “continuous parallel between contemporaneity and antiquity.”207  As Ulysses 
demonstrated, this “mythical method” was capable of making the “futility and anarchy” 
of contemporary life “possible for art,” as he would recall at a performance of 
Stravinsky’s Rite of Spring (“the effect was like Ulysses…”) and an exhibition of 
                                                                                                                                                 
possessed; a very cunning and very intuitive person, he has more than a suggestion of the shaman or 
medicine man.” (p.11) 
207 “Ulysses, Order and Myth,” Dial LXXV, 1923, pp. 480-83. 
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Picasso’s primitivist paintings.208  And yet there is an enormous difference between 
Joyce’s and Eliot’s investment in the primitive. For Joyce, the Odyssey was a known 
quantity, chosen because it would be understood to present an ironic contrast to modern 
life.   
By contrast to Joyce, for whom Homer’s own values are less important in their 
own right than in their utility as an ironic framework through which to view modernity, 
for Eliot, the task of creating a continuous parallel between modernity and mythical 
narratives was a far more grave affair: not a formula at all, but an almost spiritual project.  
Like Ulysses, “The Waste Land” also uses “the mythical method” for its ironic power, 
but the poem is agonized by the desire to retrieve the primitive mentality expressed in 
myth.  The poem sees that mentality as an ideal in which humanity, ignorant of its 
ignorance, effortlessly imbued the external world with meaning so profound as to be 
eternal in human culture.  To reach the savage, the poet descends to “the bottom of the 
abyss” in himself, where he finds “what few ever see, and what those [few] cannot bear 
to look at for long ….”209  By citing the unspeakable one creates a parallel between it and 
everyday language, between the savage drumbeat and the degraded word, imbuing the 
latter with a meaningful resonance.  At the same time, the agon of “The Waste Land” is 
its sense that it is impossible for the modern subject to think his way back into primitive 
                                                 
208 “London Letter,” Dial LXXI (Oct. 1921), p. 452.  At the time, Picasso and Stravinsky’s primitivism 
associated them precisely with license and sexuality.  Eliot was thus surely unique in praising Stravinsky’s 
ballet for being “a form as strict as any old one, perhaps stricter”; and few others claimed that “cubism is 
not license, but an attempt to establish order” (“London Letter,” Dial LXXI (Aug. 1921), p. 215).  Eliot’s 
literary criticism overshadows his art criticism, but in addition to Picasso, he informally reviewed “an 
exhibition… at the Goupil Gallery” in a letter to Mrs. Jack Gardner (founder of Boston’s Gardner Museum) 
on 4 Apr. 1915.  Eliot noted that Lewis exhibited works, as did Gaudier-Brzeska and Jacob Epstein, and 
said the latter’s “wood statues … give something suggesting the vigor of a central African image.” Letters, 
p.94. 
209 The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, p. 111. 
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mentality.  It is impossible to know whether DA means datta, dayadhvam, or damyata; 
but perhaps, if we listen to what the thunder says... 
A brief examination of the poem’s use of nonsense syllables may clarify this 
point.  After ekphrastically representing “the change of Philomel” as an artwork, Part II 
adds that “other withered stumps of time / Were told upon the walls.”  These tales are the 
myths whose meanings have been lost, which have been reduced to subject matter for 
decadent art adorning the walls of a boudoir, just as Shakespeare has metamorphosed into 
“that Shakespeherian rag” and Michelangelo has decayed into the subject of women’s 
idle talk as they “come and go.”  Once upon a time, entire cultures felt the meaning of 
these myths; now, they are an unconscious expression of individual alienation. 210  What 
is striking is that the Philomel myth itself gives a new kind of meaning to the process by 
which modernity has lost access to the truth.  A draft version of the poem explicitly 
associates these “tales, from the old stumps and bloody ends of time” with the stump of 
Philomel’s tongue, incapable of telling tales because it was torn out at the root so she 
could not accuse her rapist.  The problem of modernity is not simply a species of cultural 
amnesia, but the refusal to acknowledge the primitive darkness of our hearts.  Myths 
would name us, speak to our primitive natures, implicate us, just as Philomel would name 
her rapist; but “humankind” defends itself against this self-knowledge with repressive 
violence. 
                                                 
210 As Grover Smith notes, the “Waste Land” uses myths “of thwarted questing and fruitless psychological 
initiation”, not of lost fertility or eventual salvation.  “The Structure and Mythical Method of The Waste 
Land” (1983), rpt. In The Waste Land, ed. Harold Bloom (Chelsea House, NJ: 1986), p. 102. 
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For all its “rhythmical grumbling,”211 the poem is haunted by guilt after the 
Philomel scene, until the irruption, 100 lines later, of “Twit twit twit / Jug jug jug jug jug 
jug / So rudely forc’d. / Tereu.”  From the meaningless “twit,” to the allusive, 
Elizabethan “jug,” to “Tereu,” the onomatopoeia traces an arc of increasing antiquity.  
The final word almost names the rapist and the myth’s origin, but it is cut short by one 
unpronounceable letter, leaving the merely songful “Tereu.”  150 lines later still, the 
consequence is another metamorphosis, as the nightingale’s song echoes in the hermit-
thrush’s “Drip drop drip drop drop drop drop” and the rooster’s “Co co rico co co rico”.  
In the waste land, at night, these songs tempt us by representing the water and dawn 
which we seek in the future, but which we have buried and forgotten.   
The poem’s ending is structured by the repetition of another nonsense 
monosyllable, “DA … DA … DA.”  Like “Tereu,” “DA” is a truncated, secret word.  
According to the Hindu myth, gods, demons and men interpret the word differently, as 
Datta, Dayadhvam, and Damyata.  Again, the ancient myth seems to contain the modern 
subject’s dilemma: his inability to interpret the primal word that promises the answer to 
that very dilemma.  The only possibility seems to be to make a leap of faith, by accepting 
whatever mythic “fragments” that one’s culture has managed to “shore” up despite one’s 
ignorance of their original meaning.  From guiltily acknowledging a similarity to her 
rapist, the poem thus comes around to identifying with Philomel – the singer of nonsense 
who nonetheless knows it to be imbued with meaning – as it asks, “Quando fiam ceu [uti] 
chelidon” (When shall I become like a swallow?).   
                                                 
211 As Eliot later characterized the poem. 
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Moderns, like Madame Sosostris (with her Tarot deck) and Stetson (with his 
“planted” corpse), can only dumbly mime the actions and formulae which, once upon a 
time, were imminently meaningful.  Nonetheless, the fact that even the isolated, ignorant 
modern individual returns to ritual, indicates that primitive forms of behavior are pre-
conscious and innate, even now.  What is crucial is the claim implicit in the poem’s 
opening lines, in which an eternal consciousness is cruelly awakened to modernity, which 
is that these primitive rhythms and meanings are innately meaningful and meaningfully 
innate.  Beneath the poem’s many “voices,” one authentic and ancient voice, trapped 
within time, has access to an atemporal truth, which awaits the return of fecundity and 
would prefer to keep life in a state of suspended animation until then.  The poem figures 
this voice in the Sibyl at Cumae, who withers eternally but cannot die, and especially in 
Tiresias, who has “foresuffered all” the misery and absurdity modernity has to offer.  
The fact that this poem, spoken through the mouth of Tiresias and loosely 
structured via an ancient fertility myth, resonates so strongly with the crisis of modernity, 
shows that the only way to comprehend even the unprecedented failure of modernity is 
through the mythic forms created by our earliest forbearers.  The poem’s paradox is thus 
that the emptiness of modernity can be represented through ancient myths and primitive 
rituals, at the same time as the mentality and social order associated with those myths and 
rituals are precisely what modernity lacks.  The ancient or primitive mentality was a 
totality within which the malaise of alienation and isolation, dryness and sterility, had its 
place, whereas with modernity the malaise has broken all other structures and occupied 
the field of mentality and perception, with only momentary irruptions of a distantly 
remembered alternative. 
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4. The Inexplicability of the Primitive 
Eliot saw the primitive as a means of justifying poetry as the result of 
uncontrollable drives which were essential to art and which remained constant throughout 
human history.  Similarly, he felt primitivism made modernity possible for art by setting 
up a continuous parallel between modernity’s quotidian surface and the mythic forms and 
primitive rites that it ignorantly re-enacted.  The crucial feature of the primitive for the 
poet was its uncontrollable nature and its fragmentation of his identity.  Similarly, the 
primitive had to remain inexplicably mysterious if it was to function as a source of 
obscure meaning for the tissue of clichés that comprised modern life. 
More precisely, the primitivist walks a fine line between representing the 
primitive as comprehensible and incomprehensible, something with which one might 
seek to identify and something abhorrent.  Eliot’s view of the primitive resonates with the 
ideological representations of tribal peoples prevalent at the turn of the 20th Century.  Eric 
Cheyfitz argues that the metaphorical project of imperialism is to designate as foreign 
that which it seeks to dominate.212  This ideology led to representations of Native 
Americans as peoples who, despite their “foreignness,” were nonetheless subservient 
subjects of American government – an idea blessed by the Supreme Court’s oxymoronic 
holding, in 1823, that Native Americans comprised “domestic dependent nations.”  By 
the time of Eliot’s young adulthood, the “Indian Wars” had ended (in 1898) and the 
“Indians” confined to shrinking reservations – including one on the outskirts of Eliot’s St. 
Louis.  America thus exported the ideology of the domestic frontier overseas.  The 
                                                 
212 Eric Cheyfitz, The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from The Tempest to Tarzan 
(University of Pennsylvania: Philadelphia, 1997), p. xiii. 
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Roosevelt Administration wanted to annex the Philippines.  In order to convince voters 
that Filipinos needed American civilization, in 1904 the Administration put several dozen 
Igorot tribesmen on display at the St. Louis World’s Fair.  Ironically, the government so 
over-played the “savagery” of the Igorot that the popular press began to doubt whether an 
American force could possibly accomplish its civilizing mission.  Subsequently, 
instructions came from Washington that the savages “be clothed more fully,”213 at which 
point the Igorot became ill in the heat of the Missouri summer.  Eliot, who had attended 
the Fair with his father, avidly followed the affair in newspaper clippings. 
Published in a school newspaper, 214 Eliot’s earliest stories show the influence of 
these historical currents, as they imitated “Westerns” and adventure tales of young 
colonialists.215  The adventure tale, as a genre,216 intended its young readers to internalize 
their civilizing mission.  The savage existed in the present tense,217 and Africa and its 
inhabitants were portrayed as a test of a man’s character.  But the Western was indifferent 
to the white boy’s burden218 and the education of future colonial administrators.219  If the 
                                                 
213 Ronald Bush, “The Presence of the Past,” in Prehistories of the Future: The Primitivist Project and the 
Culture of Modernism, ed. Bush and Elazar Barkan (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1995), passim. 
214 This was the Fireside, a publication of the Smith Academy of St. Louis.  Crawford, p. 26. 
215 The generic species were related closely enough for Western tropes to migrate back into the adventure 
tale, and Eliot recognized the affinity, as other of his early stories move effortlessly to settings like 
“Matahiva” and “the Tanzatatapoo Islands.” Crawford, The Savage and the City, p. 32.      
216 The adventure tale is thus instrumental even in its fantastic misrepresentations of “the native.”  Edward 
Said argued, analogously, that the fantasies of British Orientalism were always couched as useable 
information.  Orientalism, p. 206. 
217 Thus the stories sought to give the impression that they were true to the author’s personal experience. 
The anthropologist Andrew Lang, in 1891, wrote that if “there has … arisen a new taste for exotic 
literature… [it] is only because men of imagination and literary skill have been the new conquerors, the 
Corteses and Balboas of India, Africa, Australia … All such writers…have … seen new worlds for 
themselves.”  Essays in Little, 1891, quoted in Brian V. Street, The Savage in Literature, p.11 (my 
emphasis). Lang co-authored several books with H. Rider Haggard. 
218 See Brian V. Street, The Savage in Literature: Representations of ‘primitive’ society in English fiction 
1858-1920 (Routledge and Kegan Paul: Boston, 1975) for a review of the primitive in Victorian fiction.  
The civilizing mission entailed all the signs of racial superiority, including health and manliness.  The 
decadence of primitivism can be seen, by contrast, in the way its interest in atavism subverts ideas of racial 
health (as seen, e.g., in Max Nordau’s Degeneration.) 
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Native American had been successfully “civilized,” the question of his political 
rehabilitation would have arisen.  In the Western, the savage was confined to a nostalgic 
past.220  Cheyfitz argues that “the failure of dialogue, figured as a genetic inability in the 
other, rather than as a problem of cultural difference, is the imperial alibi for 
domination”.221  But once the “Indian” has been domesticated, the primitivist is free to 
seek out that difference in order, somewhat decadently, to savor it.  
By 1919, Eliot had come full circle from his youthful stories, for he acidly 
lampooned popular representations of the primitive as a “romantic Chippaway [who] 
bursts into the drawing room.”222  By contrast, the serious writer is “the first person to see 
the merits of the savage, the barbarian and the rustic, [and] … the last person to see the 
savage in a romantic light.”  To protect the primitive, Eliot indulges a fantasy in which 
any author who desired access to ethnographic data would first be required to show his 
security clearance.  “The poet and the anthropologist both want to be provided with these 
data,” writes Eliot, “and they are the only persons whose desires should be consulted.  
[They] will be the last people to tolerate the whooping brave … as a drawing-room 
phenomenon”.  The loss of the savage’s Otherness is an index of the feminization of 
popular literature—a field evidently still dominated by Hawthorne’s “damned mob of 
scribbling women.”  Eliot’s identification with the primitive derives from his desire for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
219 Mayne Reid—whose The Boy Hunters Eliot imitated in several early stories—was an Irishman, and a 
German, Karl May, was a wildly successful writer of Westerns.  Reid, in turn, had been influenced by such 
colonial adventure classics as Ballantyne’s The Coral Island.  See Crawford, The Savage and the City in the 
Works of TS Eliot (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987) pp. 23-25. 
220 In 1893, even before the West had been “won,” Frederic Jackson Turner was lecturing on “The 
Importance of the frontier in American history.” Quoted in The Expansion of England: Race, Ethnicity and 
Cultural History, ed Bill Schwartz (Routledge, NY: 1996), p.2. 
221 The Poetics of Imperialism, p. 16. 
222 “War-Paint and Feathers,” Athenaeum 17 October 1919, p. 1036. (Review of George W. Cronyn, ed., 
The Path of the Rainbow: An Anthology of Songs and Chants from the Indians of North America.) 
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figure whose hermeneutic difficulty would be respected even by the mass market.  When 
Eliot recommends a cleansing regime of ethnographic research, it is not because he hopes 
the ethnographers will learn the truth about the “Chippaway,” but because such a method 
will show how little we know of him.223 
One need not accuse Eliot of being an imperialist to see a functional similarity 
between his insistence on the difficulty or otherness of the primitive, and the ideological 
uses of the savage as an excuse for expansionism.  The figure of the primitive was a kind 
of rhetorical lever, the fulcrum of which was the claim that the primitive was foreign or 
other in ways that the speaker alone could comprehend.  In Eliot’s case, this involved not 
imperialism but a pitched battle with anthropological explanations of the primitive.   Eliot 
read widely and deeply in anthropology and ethnography,224 but his profit on it was that 
he had learned to curse those disciplines for purporting to “know” the primitive.  What 
was crucial about the primitive was its persistent presence and its persistent 
inexplicability.  
At the Sorbonne, Eliot attended the lectures of Bergson and also those of the 
anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.225  Lévy-Bruhl’s topic was the universality of 
animism – the belief that the material world coexisted (in a continuous parallel) with a 
spiritual realm – among primitive societies.  Lévy-Bruhl argued that in attempting to 
account for the phenomena he attributed to animism, other anthropologists had 
mistakenly assumed a similarity between their own mental processes those of primitives.  
                                                 
223 Eliot was also adverse to another clichéd trope, which represented the primitive as charmingly, 
surprisingly civilized.  Cf., e.g., the ironic bite in his comment, “If the Bhikku Silacana’s information is 
quite unbiased, the primitive Shan tribes are undoubtedly more civilized than ourselves.”  Eliot, “Recent 
British Periodical Literature in Ethics,” International Journal of Ethics, Jan. 1918, p. 276. 
224 C.f. the discussions in Gray, Manganaro, and Crawford, op cit. 
225 Levenson, Michael.  That same year saw the publication of Levy-Bruhl’s Les Fonctions mentales dans 
les sociétés inférieures (soon translated as How Natives Think), which Eliot later read.   
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He took as an example E. B. Tylor’s scenario in which a primitive has a dream of 
traveling, but discovers on waking that his body has remained stationary.  The “savage 
philosopher,” Tylor claimed, trying to account for this, “probably made [his] first step by 
the obvious inference that every man has two things belonging to him, namely, a [bodily] 
life and a [spiritual] phantom”.226  The primitive “probably reasoned about death” in the 
same way, until the hypothesis of bodies existing apart from spirits developed into a 
system of belief, according to which changes in the physical world could be explained by 
reference to the actions of the spirits of the dead.   
To Lévy-Bruhl, the phrase, “savage philosopher,” is an oxymoron.  Tylor had 
simply assumed that primitives shared what Eliot would call our “more or less 
consciously rational inventing of theories to account for experience.”227  By contrast, 
Lévy-Bruhl announced that animism is not a logically coherent belief system, but an 
aspect of a mentality wholly discontinuous from our own.  The “native” is characterized 
by a “pre-logical,” “mystical” mentality228 that is ruled by the “law of participation”: “the 
fundamental belief … that object, being, and phenomena can be … both themselves and 
other than themselves,” as for instance the primitive’s belief that he is his totem and 
himself simultaneously.229  To Lévy-Bruhl, the primitive is not an individual apart from 
the world or a subject apart from his thoughts.   
Eliot cited Lévy-Bruhl’s theory of a “pre-logical” mentality from 1916 onward, 
and the theory of modern man’s rejection of the “law of participation” has been traced as 
                                                 
226 Primitive Culture [1871], quoted in Gray, Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development, p. 115. 
227 Id. 
228 How Natives Think, p. 3; quoted in Manganaro 1986, p. 98. 
229 Along with the law of participation, primitive mentality also followed the law of “collective 
representations”: inherited ideas that are universally shared, and to which the native is bound by “respect, 
fear, adoration and so on.” Ibid., p. 61; quoted in Manganaro 1986, p. 99. 
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an influence on Eliot’s own cultural theory, in particular his diagnosis of the “dissociation 
of sensibility” afflicting modernity.230  “Perception was an undifferentiated whole” for 
the primitive, but a “thought” is no longer an “experience” for us.  But Eliot’s use of 
Lévy-Bruhl went beyond the assimilation of his theories.  Eliot so endorsed Lévy-Bruhl’s 
critique of Tylor that he turned its premise – the radical otherness of primitive mentality – 
against its author.  In “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” a philosophy seminar 
paper written three years after the Sorbonne lectures, Eliot criticizes Lévy-Bruhl for 
“invent[ing] an elaborate ‘prelogism’ to account for the savage’s [mentality], where it is 
not certain that the savage, except so far as he had mental processes similar to our own, 
had any mental processes at all”.231  Eliot is not arguing for a return to Tylor, but saying 
that the question of mentality can never be answered.  Tylor falsely identified his point of 
view with the primitive’s, and despite himself Lévy-Bruhl does the same. 
Eliot invalidates any claim to qualitative knowledge of primitive mentality, but 
simultaneously affirms that such knowledge is the only kind worth having.  Eliot noted 
that primitive rituals were deemed important, according to the theory of “social 
evolution,” because they would help us understand religion in modern society.  The first 
step must be to ask what primitive rituals mean.  Yet there is no way scientifically to 
achieve such an understanding.232  In order to ask what primitive rituals mean we must 
ask to whom they are meaningful.  Thus we confront the insurmountable difference 
                                                 
230 Certain ethnographic accounts mention a failure of the “law of participation” that Lévy-Bruhl calls 
“dissociation,” when “what we call a natural phenomenon tends to become the sole content of perception to 
the exclusion of other [spiritual] elements” (ibid. 31; quoted in Manganaro 1986: 100).  Manganaro argues 
that Eliot took this negation of pre-logicality as the closest we can come to identifying with the primitive 
mentality. 
231 Josiah Royce’s Seminar, p.74 n.24. 
232 “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” quoted in Gray, Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development,  p. 
108. 
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between the primitive mentality and our own.  Even if our own religion descends directly 
from primitive precursors, we cannot recapture what primitive rituals mean by reasoning 
backward from our own point of view, because our point of view on religious matters is 
already completely bound up within a culture that will inevitably distort our 
interpretations.  Eliot quoted Bradley on this point: “The flower cannot know the bud.”233 
Nor can the flower ask the bud, because the bud itself doesn’t know.  In the 
“Introduction” to his mother’s poem, Savonarola, in 1926, Eliot argued that “no 
interpretation … of a rite could explain its origin.  For the meaning of the … acts is to the 
performers themselves an interpretation; the same ritual remaining practically unchanged 
may assume different meanings for different generations of performers; and the rite may 
have even originated before ‘meaning’ meant anything at all”.234  Rituals were not 
invented with meanings in mind, but are behaviors repeated to the point of having 
meanings gradually attached to them.  Eliot blocks off the remaining possibilities one by 
one.  We cannot know the primitive mentality directly.  “The primitive life” is “immersed 
in practice and incapable of the degree of speculative interest necessary for the 
constitution of an [ideational or mental] object,” whereas we “have no direct (immediate) 
knowledge of anything” or any means of retrieving primitive “practice.”235  Nor can we 
even construct a theory of primitive mentality, because “mental states [e.g. happiness] as 
such can never be objects of attention … it is impossible to say what is left when you 
abstract from a mental state its reference [e.g. what has made one happy].”236    
                                                 
233 Id., quoted in Gray, Eliot’s Poetic and Intellectual Development. 
234 Quoted in Josiah Royce’s Seminar, p. 73 n.23. 
235 Quoted in Walter Benn Michaels, “Philosophy in Kinkanja,” p. 176.  In Michaels’ reading of Eliot’s 
thesis, “there is once again a radical discontinuity between the primitive’s world and ours, a discontinuity 
which suggests that it may be in principle impossible to pass from the primitive’s world to our own” (ibid.).   
236 Quoted in Michaels, p. 181. 
84 
 
Eliot insisted that the scientific claims of anthropology were fraudulent.  Where 
science must be based on the inductive method of “generalization from the facts,” 
cultural questions necessarily involve the meaning of the cultural practices involved. 
When the question of meaning arises, it is impossible to separate facts from our 
interpretation of them because we project definitions before engaging in fact-based 
scientific induction.  In sociology, Émile Durkheim attempted to avoid the problem by 
investigating how groups behaved, isolating “social facts” that can be known 
objectively.237   Durkheim offers as an example the relationship between an increase in 
suicide rates and a fall in rates of religious belief.  Eliot counters that when the question is 
the meaning of primitive religious rituals, statistical analysis is useless. “Suicide is a 
social behavior in a rather different sense from the participation of a social group in a 
spring or harvest festival…. You must take into account the internal meaning: what is a 
religious phenomenon for example which has not a religious meaning for its 
participants?”238  Only facts will do; yet a science of religion based on facts alone is 
nonsensical.   
It is worth dwelling on Eliot’s insistence that the flower cannot know the bud 
because, if taken seriously, it would make primitivism impossible.  As Eliot argues that 
we can have no objective knowledge of the primitive, he also closes off that wordless, 
subjective knowledge of the inner savage that was primitivism’s sine qua non.  One 
suspects, in other words, that he does not really mean it, and indeed there is a strange 
inconsistency in his claim that the primitive is unknowable.  His insistence on 
                                                 
237 The Rules of Sociological Method p.20, quoted in Gray, Eliot’s Intellectual and Poetic Development, p. 
125. 
238 Id., pp. 125, 127. 
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distinguishing “between a fact and an interpretation”239 in the context of primitive belief 
is at odds with the pragmatic idea of factuality he cultivated in his thesis and 
elsewhere.240  A fact need not be defined in terms of objective reality.  It is simply “an 
ideal construction” that “has its existence within a sphere of … practical or scientific 
interest.”241  An example of Eliot’s epistemological pragmatism is his nomination of 
“human value” as a “standard” for evaluating the natural world.242   Although our 
situatedness within human societies means we cannot judge the “values” of other cultures 
objectively, our relationship to nature is different.243  In that context, our values, however 
particular or contingent, are as objective as they need to be. 244  Eliot does not ask if our 
relationship to other species is any less cultural than our relationship to other cultures.  
Why, then, is it unsound to apply our values to the interpretation of primitive rituals?  
Because they are human objects?  But Eliot has stripped them of any ability to enter into 
dialogue with their investigators.  Primitives are not only pre-linguistic, they are encased 
– according to Eliot – in a solipsistic thought-world lacking “external objects.”  The 
impenetrable primitive could not speak on his own behalf any more than an 
anthropologist could.  Whatever anthropology might claim, the primitive was not 
                                                 
239 “Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” quoted in Gray, id., p. 116. 
240 “Philosophy in Kinkanja: Eliot’s Pragmatism,” Glyph 8. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981. 
241 Quoted in Gray, id., pp. 117-118. 
242 Letter to Norbert Weiner, 6 Jan. 1915. Letters, p. 80. 
243 Pragmatic critique applies to artistic production as well as to scientific knowledge.  In The Use of Poetry 
and the Use of Criticism, Eliot claims to have no more right than any other person to say what his poem, 
“The Waste Land” means.  In this disavowal one may glimpse a pragmatist’s idea of the most crucial fact 
about any cultural product.  “The Waste Land” is a meaningful poem not insofar as it means anything in 
particular, but proportionally as more people than its author are talking about what it means.  
244 “There is a difference between natural and social evolution in that in the former we are able practically 
to neglect all values that are internal to the process, and consider the process from the point of view of our 
value, which is for our purposes conceived as outside the process… While to some extent in a social 
progress, and to a very great extent in a religious progress, the internal values are part of the external 
description” (Eliot’s thesis, quoted in Gray, id., p. 115). 
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recoverable.  Eliot warns anthropology not to discuss meaning and value, even as he 
affirms that meaning and value are the only game in town.245  
Only one anthropologist, in Eliot’s view, had found the key: James G. Frazer, the 
author of the comparative anthropological study, The Golden Bough.  Frazer’s genius was 
to provide each “fact” gleaned about primitive cultural practices with a comparative 
framework based solely on its formal properties (e.g. the fact that sacrifices tended to 
occur at the culmination of fertility ceremonies), which avoided the need for substantive 
interpretation.  Reviewing the third edition of the thirteen volume “book,” Eliot describes 
the evolution of Frazer’s comparative method as a “withdrawing in more and more 
cautious abstention from the attempt to explain”246 the rituals he documents.  
Comparatively exposing “the similarities and identities underlying the customs of races 
very remote in every way” is exciting precisely because it creates a new kind of meaning 
from the facts.247  Frazer’s inductively drawn, systematic framework shows that human 
culture takes a limited, discernable number of universal forms.  All societies include 
some of a finite number of initiation, fertility, and funerary rituals, and so on.248  Frazer 
                                                 
245 Walter Benn Michaels’ discussion of Eliot’s pragmatism argues that the thesis contains a projection of 
the limits of pragmatic knowledge, figured as primitive: “primitivism …cease[s] to be philosophy’s 
necessary hypothesis and become instead its nostalgic fantasy” (176). 
246 In “A Prediction in Regard to Three English Authors,” Eliot wrote of Frazer’s “stupendous compendium 
of human superstition and folly,” that “It is a work of no less importance for our time than the 
complementary work of Freud—throwing its light on the obscurities of the soul from a different angle; and 
it is a work of perhaps greater permanence, because it is a statement of fact which is not involved in the 
maintenance or fall of any theory of the author’s.  Yet it is not a mere collection of data, and it is not a 
theory” (quoted in Gray, id., 131).  Yet as Gray asks, given that Frazer can only give a formal account of 
the past, has he really, as Eliot claims, “extended the consciousness of the human mind into as dark a 
backward and abysm of time as has yet been explored”? (id). 
247 Brian Street argues that “the great appeal of works like The Golden Bough was that they provided a 
scheme into which interesting customs from exotic lands could be fitted… they were no longer to be 
merely described as savage or horrific, they were to be ‘explained’ by some theory”.  The Savage in 
Literature, p. 152. 
248 Quoted in Gray, id., p. 129. 
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provides Eliot the requisite picture of the human mind operating throughout history and 
space.  
Ironically, for an epistemological pragmatist, Eliot embraced Frazer at a time 
when his claims were being rejected by the anthropological community.  In 1896, Frans 
Boas published “The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology,” an essay 
that marked the death of armchair anthropology and became the touchstone of a school 
that argued for the necessity of going “inside” cultures to ask about their meanings. 
Frazer claimed that “one general conclusion” had emerged “from the mass of particulars” 
collected by ethnographers in the field: “the essential similarity in the working of the less 
developed mind among all races.”249 As Boas notes, Frazer assumed “that if an 
ethnological phenomenon has developed independently in a number of places its 
development has been the same … [i.e., that] the same ethnological phenomena are 
always due to the same causes.  This leads to the still wider generalization that the 
sameness of ethnological phenomena found in diverse regions is proof that the human 
mind obeys the same laws everywhere.”  But Boas argues that “even the most cursory 
view shows that the same phenomena may develop in a multitude of ways.”  
Anthropology’s only possible goal was to examine human cultural change in history, 
which entailed discovering the historical causes for the “development” of customs, 
beliefs, and rituals within a specific culture.250 It was time to awaken from the dream of 
delineating the characteristics of a universal and ahistorical human mind.251 
                                                 
249 Balder the Beautiful, v. I (Vol. XII of The Golden Bough, 3rd Ed.) (Macmillan: London, 1980 
[1913]),“Preface,” p.vi.   
250 Id. Clifford notes that Boas was the first to put his own theory into practice, in an expedition to the 
Torres Straits in 1899.  Predicament of Culture, p.26. 
251 Excerpt from Boas reprinted in High Points in Anthropology, ed. Paul Bohannan and Mark Glazer, 2nd 
Edn. (McGraw Hill: New York, 1998), pp.87-89. 
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Eliot does not discuss Boas.  He also seems to have ignored Malinowski, whose 
field-work in the Trobriand Islands methodologically applied Boas’ insistence that 
cultures be interpreted from within.  As Frazer himself wrote, “Dr. Malinowski lived as a 
native among the natives for many months together, watching them daily at work and 
play, conversing with them in their own tongue, and deriving all his information from the 
surest sources”.252  Yet this anthropological method is of no use to “the invisible poet,” 
for with participant-observation the anthropologist himself becomes a site of science.  
“Imagine yourself suddenly set down,” he intones, “alone on a tropical beach close to a 
native village, while the launch or dinghy which has brought you sails away out of sight. 
… I well remember … the first weeks; the feeling of hopelessness and despair after many 
obstinate but futile attempts had failed to bring me into real touch with the natives …”253  
In this mood, Malinowski might well have appreciated “The Waste Land,” but his classic 
study, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, published in the same year as “The Waste 
Land,” undermined Eliot’s primitivist project in its insistence that the Trobriands did not 
offer access to universal cultural forms, and that the ethnographer could only discover the 
meanings of Trobriand culture by plunging himself into its contemporary historical 
practice.  
Far from assisting the primitivist poet in his attempt to recreate his folk, Boas and 
Malinowski radically decenter both themselves and their own culture.   In terms redolent 
                                                 
252 J. G. Frazer, “Preface,” Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (Routledge: London, 1922), p.vii.  
Passing the torch to his younger colleague, Frazer himself admitted “it is true that the analysis of motives 
and feelings is logically distinguishable from the description of acts, and that it falls, strictly speaking, 
within the sphere of psychology; but in practice an act has no meaning for an observer unless he knows or 
infers the thoughts and emotions of the agent” (ibid. ix).   
253 Malinowski, “Subject, Method and Scope,” Argonauts, op. cit., p. 4. 
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of his understanding of culture as essential or racial, Eliot attacked field-work and 
participant-observation as misguided: 
[Cultural] understanding … is [either] abstract—and the essence escapes—or else 
it is lived; and in so far as it is lived, the student will tend to identify himself so 
completely with the people whom he studies, that he will lose the point of view 
from which it was worth while and possible to study it.… What we ordinarily 
mean by understanding of another people … is an approximation towards 
understanding which stops short at the point at which the student would begin to 
lose some essential of his own culture.  The man who, in order to understand the 
inner world of a cannibal tribe, has partaken of the practice of cannibalism, has 
probably gone too far: he can never quite be one of his own folk again.254 
 
As Manganaro points out, Eliot’s strict adherence to Frazerian anthropology creates a 
special role for the poet: he interprets the primitive to his folk.  Frazer’s and Eliot’s 
authority depended upon the distance between the primitive and the civilized, for that 
distance allowed them to interpret the former to the latter.255  Eliot claimed that the task 
of the social sciences was the reversal of Babel, “interpreting into one language an 
indefinite variety of languages”.256  Frazer exemplified this task precisely by his famous 
refusal to learn any of the languages whose speakers he was studying – so as to maintain 
his objectivity.257   
The gap between the comparative anthropologist and his individual sources was 
analogous to the gap between the recording consciousness and the savage behavior in 
which primitivism operated.  But what perhaps bears repeating is that Eliot embraced 
Frazerian anthropology, with its formal emphasis and its promise that the internal cultural 
meaning of primitive rites and myths was unknowable, because Eliot felt that such an 
                                                 
254 Notes Toward a Definition of Culture: Harcourt, Brace, [New York, 1949] 39-40; quoted in Manganaro, 
“Beating A Drum in A Jungle,” p. 419. 
255 See generally Myth, Rhetoric, and the Voice of Authority. 
256 Quoted in Gray, 133. 
257 Marc Manganaro, Myth, Rhetoric, and the Voice of Authority. Yale: 1995, p.33. 
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understanding of the primitive would enable him to re-instantiate those myths for his own 
age. Eliot seeks, in fact, to tap into what he sees as the power of these primitive mythic 
forms to act automatically upon the reader’s psyche. 
 
5. The Primitivist’s Happy Death  
Primitivism was more than a shield to protect the artist.  Eliot believed that the 
power of primitive tropes could reverse the threatening gaze of the modern audience.  A 
writer who had made contact with the inner primitive might achieve an automatic 
influence over the reader’s subconscious.  And that power was necessary to achieve the 
poet’s true calling: to reform his culture from one of splintered individualism to 
communal solidarity.  The attitudes expressed by Eliot’s primitivism, in other words, 
shade from the poet’s fear of cultural irrelevance and a hostile readership, to an altruistic 
desire to reform his culture for the reader’s own good, whether the reader approved or 
not.  The mark of such altruism is the inner struggle of the primitivist, for he was torn 
between his conscious, cultural identity and the primitive’s uncontrollable, inexplicable 
nature.  The artist whose work derived from this painful struggle, sought to interpret the 
primitive for the good of his fellow men. 
Such was the power of the primitive that it could be dangerous in the wrong 
hands.  Eliot detested Gertrude Stein because, while her writing was powerfully 
primitive, she had abdicated her social responsibility and simply allowed the primitive 
drumbeats to take over.  “There is something precisely ominous about Miss Stein … her 
work is not improving, it is not amusing, it is not interesting, it is not good for one’s 
mind.  But its rhythms have a peculiar hypnotic power not met with before.  It has a 
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kinship with the saxophone.  If this is of the future, then the future is … of the 
barbarians.”258  Paradoxically, a person who experienced the primitive could thereby 
become culturally powerful but also deracinated.  The power to be gained by descending 
to the primitive, for Eliot, entails the poetic responsibility to return to one’s own (cultural, 
racial) community.   
However, if modernity was bankrupt because it had elevated the individual above 
the community, the individual reader was unlikely to agree with Eliot’s prescriptions for 
reform.  Eliot’s criticism evinces a marked distrust of individual consciousness as tending 
to rationalize its own socially destructive force.  When Eliot stated, “I myself should like 
an audience who could neither read nor write,” his point was that the goal of art in 
modernity is not to be consciously appreciated, but to ameliorate desire itself until what is 
desired is that which produces social cohesion.259  Consciousness is a problem that the 
concerned artist must work around.  “The chief use of the ‘meaning’ of a poem,” in 
Eliot’s view, is “to satisfy one habit of the reader, to keep his mind diverted and quiet, 
while the poem does its work upon him: much as the imaginary burglar is always 
provided with a bit of nice meat for the house-dog.”260  Confronted by the house-dog, the 
poetic cat-burglar sneaks past the reader’s consciousness and removes the valuables that 
have distorted his desire.  Eliot thus demands a “return” to a primitive era before “the 
attempt to design and create an object for the sake of beauty become[s] conscious.”261  As 
he voiced this idea in a different context, “What I want is a literature which should be 
                                                 
258 “Charleston, Hey! Hey!,” (Review of Stein’s “Composition as Explanation,” etc.), Nation and 
Athenaeum (29 Jan 1927), p. 595. 
259 Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism. Faber and Faber: London, 1933, p. 152. 
260 The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, op. cit., p. 151. 
261 “War-Paint and Feathers,” Athenaeum, 17 Oct. 1919, p. 1036.  
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unconsciously, rather than deliberately and defiantly Christian”.262  Eliot’s primitivism 
and his Christianity share a preoccupation with the relationship between artistic 
production and social formation, and a preference in that context for the unconscious and 
collective over the conscious and individual.   
It is in this way that Eliot saw primitivism as a technique for the amelioration of 
modernity: for nothing less than striking the reader at his core would achieve it.  The 
power that primitive tropes offered to the artist was that they could directly affect the 
reader’s psyche – for, as Frazer had indicated, those mythic tropes expressed essential 
and atemporal human cultural needs.  A primitivist poem will “do its work” on the reader 
whether his conscious mind approves or not, by virtue of its resonance with his essential, 
inner needs.  Because the primitive “mentality persists in civilized man, but becomes 
available only to or through the poet,”263 the primitivist’s artworks will have the same 
relationship to their audience as the internal savage does to him.264  If the reader is 
powerfully influenced, even dominated by the writer, this is justified as the reassertion of 
the forms of social organization that are natural and proper to human life.   
The Cocktail Party, first performed in 1949 as “A Comedy”,265 represents this 
final twist in the story of Eliot’s primitivism, suggesting that he had arrived at a new 
appreciation of Frazer’s discovery of the unconscious universality of primitive forms.  
                                                 
262 “Religion and Literature” (1935), quoted in Carol H Smith, T S Eliot’s Dramatic Theory and Practice: 
From Sweeney Agonistes to The Elder Statesman.  Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1963, p. 22. 
263 The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism: Studies in the Relation of Criticism to Poetry in England 
(Faber and Faber, 1933: London) p.148 n.1. Eliot actually buttresses this point by citing it in the work of 
Emile Cailliet and Jean-Albert Bédé, anthropologists “who have done field work in Madagascar.”  
264 Eliot adduces low- and high-brow performers to prove that the ability to appreciate the primitive 
“essential” of art is universal: “It is the rhythm, so utterly absent from modern drama, either verse or prose, 
and which interpreters of Shakespeare do their best to suppress, which makes [Léonide] Massine [of the 
Ballets Russes] and Charlie Chaplin the great actors that they are, and which makes the juggling of Rastelli 
more cathartic than a performance of ‘A Doll’s House’.” Nation and Athenaeum, October 6 1923, p. 12. 
265 Carol H Smith. T S Eliot’s Dramatic Theory and Practice: From Sweeney Agonistes to the Elder 
Statesman.  Princeton UP: 1963, p. 147.   
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The play inverts “The Waste Land’s” strategy of highlighting its use of primitive 
narrative forms.  Far from explicit references in a set of Notes, the play keeps secret the 
ancient texts which it is reenacting.  As if conducting a secret experiment to determine 
the unconscious power of mythic tropes, Eliot was determined “to conceal the origins so 
well that nobody would identify them until I pointed them out myself.”266  The play’s 
source, as Eliot revealed two years later, was Euripides’ oldest surviving play, Alcestis 
(438 B.C.), and Euripides was known, in turn, to have borrowed from Greek mythology 
and folk tales.267  Alcestis offers herself as a sacrifice in the place of her husband 
Admetus, who has offended Artemis.  The next day, Heracles arrives as a guest, and eats, 
drinks and raucously sings as Admetus grieves in secret, graciously withholding his 
suffering and its cause from his guest.  Heracles, however, soon learns of Alcestis’ death, 
and in gratitude to Admetus, overtakes Thanatos and brings Alcestis back from the dead.  
Heracles presents her, veiled, to Admetus, who rejects her until he is convinced to lift her 
veil, whereupon he joyfully recognizes his wife.268  In Eliot’s retelling, as Smith has 
shown, Heracles becomes the physician Sir Henry, and Celia represents a combination of 
Alcestis and Christ. 
It is not quite clear what “work” Eliot intended this play to do “on” its audience. 
Eliot apparently used the play as a vehicle for ideas he had developed as a member of 
“the Anglo-Catholic intellectual movement,” which “sought to establish a social plan 
built around the unit of indigenous communities held together politically, ethically, and 
                                                 
266 Eliot, On Poetry and Poets, 1951, p. 91. 
267 Ancient Greek, Egyptian and even Roman society – Frazer’s starting point in The Golden Bough is the 
Aeniad – were referred to as “primitive” until well into the 20th Century. 
268 According to Smith, op. cit., p. 176. 
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spiritually by their geographic and religious bonds of kinship”.269  These ideas, as 
expressed by different characters, were that two routes to God were possible: the “Way of 
Affirmation,” which was “to affirm all things orderly until the universe throbbed with 
vitality”; the “Way of Rejection” was to “reject all things until there was nothing 
anywhere but He.”270  The fact that the play was a comedy may represent Eliot’s attempt 
to avoid the failure of The Family Reunion (1939), where the audience laughed at the 
play’s heavy-handed and incongruous religious interpretations of its own scenes, as well 
as his newfound recognition that serious messages could be imparted beneath a comedic 
surface.271   
An attentiveness to Eliot’s primitivism, moreover, draws attention to several 
parallels.  Heracles’ concealment of Alcestis’ identity resonates with Eliot’s concealment 
of his source.  The self-sacrifice of Alcestis, as well as Admetus’ selfless concealment of 
his own grief, seem to figure the self-denial of the poet, who was willing for his 
motivations in writing the drama to be misunderstood due to his altruistic desire to 
recreate the unconscious effect of the Greek drama (and of its mythic source) rather than 
to cite it explicitly for the audience’s intellectual gratification.  Heracles’ descent to the 
underworld is the secret journey of the poet, who finds and retrieves a primordial 
dramatic form to which, as Admetus to the veiled Alcestis, his audience is already, 
ignorantly, intimately bound.   
                                                 
269 Id., p. 159. 
270 Smith, id., p. 162, quoting Charles Williams, The Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy 
Spirit in the Church (rpt. NY: Meridian, 1956), pp. 57-8 
271 Eliot owed this insight, in Smith’s view, to S L Bethell’s book on Shakespeare and the Popular 
Dramatic Tradition, for which Eliot wrote the introduction.  Id. pp. 149-50. 
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As noted above, Eliot’s primitivism, like his theory of impersonality, attaches an 
aesthetic value to an artist’s self-surrender.  Indeed, if the poet follows a sort of 
primitivist regime of self-sacrifice and self-fragmentation, his poem will not only be 
“impersonal,” but it may even approximate the social function of the primitive ritual it 
seeks to emulate.  Primitivism thus serves to guarantee the poet’s disinterested altruism as 
a cultural agent, for the primitivist poem is not written by the poet, but by that essential 
thing within him that is continuous with his readers and his culture.  In his plays, Eliot 
seems strikingly drawn to the martyr, a person whose exit from life is, one might say, a 
form of community service.272  The death of these figures gives spiritual significance to 
the communities formed by, and left to cope with, their absence.  When, in The Cocktail 
Party, Celia dies the “happy death” as a missionary in to the “natives in Kinkanja,” the 
surviving characters are drawn together by her death because her self-sacrifice follows 
the form of Christ’s and Alcestis’.  And there is a sense in which the author of The 
Cocktail Party saw his own authorship as reduplicating that self-sacrifice for the same, 
community-forming purpose.   
In hindsight, it seems Eliot saw “The Waste Land’s” primitivism as far too 
concerned that the poem would be properly interpreted.  That concern, ultimately, was 
self-centered, for it was bound up with concern for the author’s own social standing.  If 
one takes seriously Frazer’s claim that primitive myths are universal and his implication 
that these forms are somehow essential to the psyche, there is little need to worry about 
how the reader consciously interprets one’s poetry and plays.  The primitivist may die 
                                                 
272 Reinforcing the theme is that Eliot’s martyrs die off-stage: Becket is thus murdered in Murder in the 
Cathedral; Harry exits in agony in The Family Reunion, never to return; and Celia in Kinkanja. 
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happy in the knowledge that, even if they were misinterpreted or ignored, his works have 
done their work.273 
                                                 
273 This chapter has not addressed primitivism’s basis: the idea that all non-industrialized societies were 
essentially the same. From this stereotype of sameness, primitivism circularly argued that the 
characteristics of primitive societies must be essential human characteristics, such that civilization harms 
itself in its attempt to repress them.  Given the dubious basis of primitivism’s “critique,” it is not surprising 
that Eliot could both praise artists as “primitive” and engage in racism.  His recurring character, Sweeney, 
features an “apeneck” and “gesture of orang-outang.” [Selected Poems: The Centenary Edition (Harcourt 
Brace: New York, 1988), pp. 36, 46.]  “King Bolo’s Big Black Kween” is a hypersexual woman who 
“bursts on the scene” in Eliot’s unpublished “Bolo and Colombo” poems.  In these instances Eliot seems to 
use the savage to satirize sexuality and the desire to be looked at, and thereby to disavow his own desires. 
[See McIntire, “An Unexpected Beginning.”]   Eliot’s primitivism involved a kind of repression-through-
racism.  Still, repression is less characteristic of primitivism than is identification. [See Marjorie Perloff, 
“Tolerance and Taboo: Modernist Primitivisms and Postmodernist Pieties,” in Prehistories of the Future, 
ed. Barkan and Bush, Stanford 2002.]  The primitivist discovered or produced savage traits within himself.  
Those traits were marks not of repression, but of the desire to desire authentically.  When Eliot argues that 
it is not “possible and justifiable for art to persist indefinitely without its primitive purposes”, he uses the 
discourse of the primitive to justify art as a response to a basic need. Eliot, review of The Growth of 
Civilization and The Origin of Magic by W J Perry, Criterion 2 (1923-24), p.490-91. 
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A Jungle of One’s Own: Primitivism in Woolf’s The Voyage Out 
 
When Virginia Woolf declared that “on or around December 1910, human 
character changed,” one of the catalysts she presumably had in mind was Roger Fry’s 
exhibit of Post-Impressionist artworks the month before.  The controversial show at 
London’s Grafton Gallery was the first time most of the Gauguins and Van Goghs on 
display had been seen in Britain.274  But perhaps Woolf’s pronouncement also recalls an 
event that immediately followed the exhibit: the Post-Impressionist Ball.  Woolf and her 
sister Vanessa “browned [their] legs and arms” with make-up, put on “indecent” 
costumes “made for natives in Africa,” and, “nearly naked,” appeared at the ball as 
“Gauguin Girls.”275 
This embodiment of the nubile, if not noble savage was Woolf’s second primitive 
performance that year. In February, she had joined a crew of friends and relations at a 
London costumer’s, where they donned gaudy clothes and turbans, and darkened their 
skin. They cabled to inform the HMS Dreadnought, moored in Weymouth, that the 
Emperor of Abyssinia and his royal entourage would be visiting the warship 
immediately.  Speaking gibberish and a few Swahili words learned from a dictionary they 
brought along, the “Abyssinians” duped naval officers into touring them around Britain’s 
most expensive piece of war materiel. One of the conspirators soon exposed the hoax, 
                                                 
274 Samuel Hynes argues that the Post-Impressionist show marked a moment at which England was opening 
up to continental influences after a period of aesthetic insularity.  Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind, 
Princeton UP: Princeton, NJ, 1969. 
275 Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf, Harcourt Brace: New York, 1997, p.287.  Lee quotes Vanessa Stephen, 
with whom Virginia appeared at the Ball.  Notwithstanding Vanessa’s geographical disinterest in writing 
that Virginia dressed up in African attire to appear as a Polynesian “Gauguin girl,” Gauguin was best-
represented artist at the Post-Impressionist show was Gauguin, with thirty-six paintings and ten drawings of 
Breton peasants and Tahitian “savages.” See Samuel Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind (Princeton: 
1968), Appendix D.   
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and Virginia’s name appeared in the newspapers, prompting admonishing letters from her 
family.276 
In the winter of 1910, Woolf was also engaged in a different kind of primitive 
performance: writing her first novel.  The Voyage Out (1915) is set in a fictional “tourist 
colony” on the mouth of the Amazon.  Woolf may be mocking the vulgarity of the 
popular fad of the primitive when she has the tourists loudly proclaim their love for 
“primitive carvings,” and “declare that the natives were strangely beautiful, very big in 
stature, dark, passionate, and quick to seize the knife” (VO 90).  One character literally 
embroiders a “tropical river” scene, complete with “naked natives whirling darts” (VO 
33).  Yet the Amazon really does “seem new and full of new forms of beauty”; the 
narrator shares the “dissatisfaction among the English with the older countries and [their] 
enormous accumulations” of history and art (VO 90).  And beyond aesthetic 
dissatisfaction, the tourists’ desire “to lose sight of civilization” (VO 173) springs from 
the grim recognition that civilization is corrupt.  London is “a circumscribed mound, 
eternally burnt, eternally scarred … a crouched and cowardly figure, a sedentary miser” 
(VO 18).  The British Empire has succumbed to the death-drive: while its poets praise the 
“magnificent qualities of British admirals” (id.), its power is dependent upon “sinister 
grey vessels … bald as bone … with the look of eyeless beasts seeking their prey” (VO 
69).   
The critique of “civilization” is a major feature of Woolf’s primitivism. The 
protagonist’s journey down the Thames and up a tropical river signals Woolf’s 
indebtedness to Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, which elaborated the thesis that civilization 
                                                 
276 Lee, Woolf, pp. 278-9. 
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and progress are self-serving illusions; that savagery can irrupt in any of “us” at any 
moment; and that even our seemingly progressive actions, like the “civilization” of the 
Congo, merely express our savagery and barbarism.  Marlow is driven to crisis when he 
sees that Kurtz has become far more brutish than the savages he proclaimed he would 
enlighten. It is not simply that Kurtz degenerated or “went native” in the Congo: his 
actions at the central station reveal the truth of the man and of his culture (“All Europe 
had contributed to the making of Kurtz”).  Kurtz pulls the rug from under the myth of 
progress, shattering the modern subject’s image of himself.  
The Voyage Out is similarly situated between critique and anxiety, but ultimately 
a comparison to Heart of Darkness reveals significant differences. In Conrad, it is the 
savage that is always already there, ineradicably within us; in Woolf, the thing we cannot 
escape is civilization itself, its dull routine, mealy-mouthed hypocrisy and patriarchal 
domination of any alternative discourse. Where Conrad collapsed the Congo and its 
inhabitants into “the horror, the horror” Kurtz found within himself, Woolf sees positive 
values in the alterity of the Amazon. 
The Voyage Out builds from an opaque jungle scene – often read as the 
protagonist’s first sexual experience – to her uncanny encounter with the women 
inhabitants of a “native village,” to her fever and death.  Several critics read the novel’s 
opacity and the heroine’s death as the result of Woolf’s early struggle to articulate a 
lesbian-feminist aesthetic, to renovate a genre still dominated by the “marriage plot,” and 
to face down her fears of censorship and a hostile audience. This reading forgets, 
however, that for Woolf, illness (as the removal of oneself from the daily social round) 
and death (as the extinction of the ego) may signify something beyond defeat and failure. 
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In my view, Woolf’s primitivism is the origin of her unique, radically critical aesthetic of 
impersonality, with its intense, plot- and ego-less attentiveness to fragmentary, 
momentary, lived experience.277 
 
1. Three Scenes 
 
At age 24, Rachel Vinrace, whose mother died when she was sixteen, is beginning 
to escape from an unnaturally extended girlhood.278 Her father, Willoughby, has business 
interests in South America and has made plans to travel there. Rachel’s aunt Helen, who 
will be joining Willoughby on the voyage, persuades him to bring the “girl” along as far 
as a “tourist colony” at the mouth of the Amazon.  He drops the two women off in the 
village of Santa Marina, where they settle into a villa.  They then join a tourist group on a 
trip upriver to see a “native village.” Among the group is Terence Hewet, a young 
novelist.   
En route to the village, Terence and Rachel strike out on their own into the jungle.   
With every word the mist which had enveloped them … melted a little further, 
and their contact became more and more natural.  Up through the sultry southern 
landscape they saw the world they knew appear clearer and more vividly than it 
ever had before. (281) 
 
Rachel’s senses open up in the jungle; the quality of her experience is heightened, more 
intense; the exotic, sultry landscape reveals a reality that she already “knew” but did not 
                                                 
277 Marianne DeKoven, in a nuanced analysis that compares The Voyage Out and Heart of Darkness, 
suggests Woolf was writing a traditional novel “under erasure”: seemingly succumbing to the patriarchal 
plot but defiantly showing that this plot is marked by a woman’s tombstone. But the somewhat abstract 
concept of writing under erasure suggests both repetition and a degree of ironic control, and thereby 
obscures the strange, unprecedented, opaque and even beautiful moments of the novel with which Woolf 
struggled.  DeKoven’s reading also elides the novel’s most striking feature: its primitivism.  Rich and 
Strange: Gender, History, Modernism (Princeton, 1991), Introduction; and see Ch. 5, passim.   
278 In early drafts of the novel, Rachel’s father brought “poor little goats” – presumably for their hides – 
from South America to England. As critics have noted, Woolf’s childhood nickname was “Goat.” 
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perceive clearly.  The jungle’s arousing intensity has to do with the fact that “natural” 
communication is possible there.  Once they are left alone, “every word” functions to 
clear away the mist between the young lovers. It suddenly occurs to Rachel, “This is 
happiness,” a feeling so new to her that she is “surprised at recognizing in her own person 
so famous a thing” (283).  Intensity of perception, natural contact, happiness: her life has 
been so stultified that Rachel first experiences these things in the middle of the Amazon.   
Rachel recognized happiness in the jungle, but she then has an experience that is 
overwhelming and unrecognizable, beyond the reach of any available discourse. 
A hand dropped abrupt as iron on Rachel’s shoulder; it might have been a bolt 
from heaven. ... She fell beneath it, and the grass whipped across her eyes and 
filled her mouth and ears. … Helen was upon her.  Rolled this way and that, now 
seeing only forests of green, and now the high blue heaven, she was speechless 
and almost without sense.  At last she lay still, all the grasses shaken round her 
and before her by her panting.  Over her loomed two great heads, the heads of a 
man and woman, of Terence and Helen…. She thought she heard them speak of 
love and then of marriage.  Raising herself and sitting up, she too realized Helen’s 
soft body, the strong and hospitable arms, and the happiness swelling and 
breaking in one vast wave.  When this fell away … and the sky became horizontal 
… and the trees stood upright, she was the first to perceive a little row of human 
figures standing in the distance. (283-84)279 
 
This scene begins abruptly and violently, but the language grows increasingly sexual. 
Helen rolls Rachel around; the experience makes her pant; Helen’s soft body seems 
connected to Rachel’s swelling, breaking sense of happiness. And as Helen overwhelms 
Rachel, so does the jungle: its grasses fill Rachel’s eyes, mouth, and ears.  Rachel ceases 
to exist as a being separate from her perceptions; she is overwhelmed to the point of 
being rendered speechless and senseless. Even more than the clarity and vividness with 
which Rachel and Terence perceive the jungle, Rachel’s intense experience with Helen 
                                                 
279 For an analysis of Woolf’s extensive rewriting of this scene and of its progression through numerous 
drafts, see DeSalvo, First Voyage. 
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virtually fuses her with her surroundings.  Where Rachel had previously been rather 
bemused by her own happiness, she no longer has the opportunity even to think.  This 
jungle scene, I will argue below, presages Woolf’s later theories of immediate experience 
and her aesthetic of impersonality.  
For all its strange violence, the scene describes immediate, authentic, 
overwhelming experience: precisely what is missing from civilized life.  And the scene 
also contains a sharp critique.  Moments after Helen provides Rachel with an 
unprecedented, speech-defying experience, Helen also betrays that experience by 
speaking to Terence of “love and marriage” over Rachel’s prone body.  Rachel is unable 
to represent her strange experience, much less defend or oppose it to the conventional 
discourses that overwrite it.  The row of little, monitory figures (the other tourists in their 
party) appears, to recall Rachel from her brief ecstasy to the world of social convention. 
The trio rejoins the tourist party and reaches the primitive village that was “the 
goal of their journey.” This third scene describes the transformation of the quaint 
primitive village into something uncanny and threatening: 
[T]hey observed the women, who were sitting on the ground in triangular shapes 
… But when they had looked for a moment undiscovered, they were seen …  The 
women[’s] … long narrow eyes slid round and fixed upon them with the 
motionless inexpressive gaze of those removed from each other far, far beyond 
the plunge of speech.… [T]he stare continued.  It followed them as they walked, 
as they peered into the huts … in the dusk the solemn eyes of babies regarded 
them, and old women stared out too.  As they sauntered about, the stare followed 
them, passing over … their bodies … curiously … like the crawl of a winter fly.  
As she drew apart her shawl and uncovered her breast to the lips of her baby, the 
eyes of a woman never left their faces, although they moved uneasily under her 
stare, and finally turned away, rather than stand there looking at her any longer… 
[feeling] like tight-coated soldiers among these soft instinctive people…. (284-85) 
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Opaquely, the native women seem to represent an alternative that Rachel has lost, now 
that her future has been defined for her as one of “love and marriage”.  Upon rejoining 
the tourist party, Rachel is subjected to the uncanny gaze of the native women, and feels 
the creep of “the winter fly,” mortality.  The reversal of gazes echoes an earlier scene 
when Rachel and Helen are walking, at night, toward the tourist hotel in Santa Marina.  
Rather than entering, they choose to remain outside in the dark, gazing invisibly at the 
brightly lit scene through the hotel windows.  The narrative voice is describing the scene 
from their point of view when a male voice suddenly announces, “Two women.”  It is St. 
John Hirst, a young man who has been leaning over the balcony of his room above, 
speaking to his roommate.  The narrative point of view shifts to Hirst, whose voice 
recalls the social order under which a gazing and unseen woman is a kind of outlaw, and 
the women flee, like natives, into the blackness of the jungle.  Analogously, when first 
looking upon the native women, the tourists occupy the invisible position of civilized, 
imperial subjects.  Yet a civilized woman who gazes upon the native woman as an object 
assumes the position of her own oppressor.  She cannot meet the native woman’s gaze 
lest the foundation upon which her own subjectivity is built crumble.  Unlike Rachel and 
Helen, made outlaws by a man’s voice, the civilized women spying on the natives are 
made to disavow their gaze by women’s eyes.   
I will argue that Woolf used primitivist discourse as a means of opening up her 
narrative to emphasize the value of unprecedented, prohibited, unrepresentable, 
overwhelming experience.  But before arriving at this conclusion we must address the 
fact that at some point on her upriver journey, perhaps during her uneasy encounter with 
the native women, Rachel contracts the tropical fever that kills her. 
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1. Rachel’s Death 
The tourists, after “looking for a moment undiscovered” at the native women, 
become objects, as the women’s “eyes slid round and fixed upon [the tourists] with the 
motionless inexpressive gaze of those removed from each other far, far beyond the 
plunge of speech” (284) – a strange locution suggesting that deathly submersion has 
become the only alternative to the (phallic?) invasive, dominant discourse of femininity.  
In her final, fatal hallucinations, Rachel becomes like the native women: beyond the 
plunge of speech – she sinks from “floating on top of the bed” to “far beneath” the 
Amazon River and the ocean (347).  As “the faces” of her caretakers grow distant 
“among the trees and savages,”  
she fell into a deep pool … which eventually closed over her head.  She saw 
nothing and heard nothing but a faint booming sound, which was the sound of the 
sea rolling over her head.  While all her tormentors thought that she was dead, she 
was not dead, but curled up at the bottom of the sea. There she lay, sometimes 
seeing darkness, sometimes light, while every now and then someone turned her 
over at the bottom of the sea. (341) 
 
This eerie passage – which brings to mind Rachel’s being rolled about the jungle 
clearing, but also Woolf’s own suicide by drowning – seems to reveal a preference for 
passivity and death; others’ efforts to help are useless and hurtful.   The transformation of 
caretakers into tormentors and of the protagonist into a passive submerged object 
indicates Woolf’s ultimate skepticism that within a community in which “it appeared that 
no one ever said a thing they meant, or ever talked of a feeling they felt” (37), 
autonomous individuals could grow or even survive. 
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The history of The Voyage Out certainly reveals Woolf’s hermeneutic anxiety. 
The novel went through ten or so drafts over roughly seven years (1908-1915). While 
still hoping that “one sentence still more or less follows another” at one point, a month 
later Woolf “had become convinced that it was pure gibberish.”280 The writing and 
publishing process apparently drove Woolf to one breakdown in 1913.  Ironically, her 
fears that the novel would be seen as the product of a deranged mind apparently 
contributed to a second breakdown two years later, on the day before publication.  She 
“became … violent and delusional …. She entered into a ‘state of garrulous mania, 
speaking ever more wildly, incoherently and incessantly, until she lapsed into gibberish 
and sank into a coma’,” and was transferred to a nursing home.281  It was as though 
Woolf’s symptoms first over-compensated for, then mimicked, and finally placed her 
beyond the reach of the uncomprehending readership she feared. 282 
The novel’s primitivism itself may reflect the complex fact that Woolf was 
anxious at the thought of public exposure and yet had a deep-seated need to express 
herself publicly. On the one hand, the view of some critics that Rachel’s death reveals a 
failure of nerve on Woolf’s part seems to conflict with that author’s performances on the 
Dreadnaught and at the Ball. By donning a primitive persona, Woolf gained a certain 
protection for herself even as she increased her ability to tweak the authorities and gain 
                                                 
280 The first quotation dates from December 1914, the second from January 1915.  Quoted in Louise 
DeSalvo, Virginia Woolf’s First Voyage: A Novel in the Making (Rowman and Littlefield: Totowa, NJ, 
1980), p. 108. 
281 DeSalvo, p. 109, quoting Quentin Bell, Biography, Vol. 2, p. 25. 
282 Coincidentally, Woolf’s doctor’s name was Savage.  A playful letter to Clive Bell, of 18 April 1911, 
hints at connections between illness, primitivism, and writing: 
I shall probably go… to Savages on Saturday.  I hope we shall start for France on the Monday … I 
mean to throw myself into youth, sunshine, nature, primitive art.  Cakes with sugar on the top, 
love, lust, paganism, general bawdiness, for a fortnight at least; and not write a line [of The 
Voyage Out.]  (Letters of Virginia Woolf, Vol. I, Letter 566.) 
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incognito access to places and behaviors otherwise off-limits.  Evading national-security-
surveillance on HMS Dreadnaught, Woolf disappeared in plain sight into the skin of an 
Abyssinian; when she bared her flesh at the Ball, it was the make-believe, darkened flesh 
of a “native.” Perhaps if Rachel Vinrace, the protagonist of The Voyage Out, had had her 
strange experiences with Helen in a Bloomsbury boudoir, the censors would have 
swooped, whereas the jungle setting gave her a certain license.283 Other modernists 
experimented with primitivist tropes, finding a certain freedom by revaluing the marginal 
and deviant.  Critics have argued that for some modernist feminists, the primitive “mask” 
became a means of self-fashioning: they represented their own “deviant” concerns and 
desires through the use of primitive personae.284  (Needless to say, this primitivist tactic 
of achieving expressive freedom looks like the dubious license of blackface.  Playing at 
being a Gauguin Girl was not a winning game for a feminist.285) 
                                                 
283 Leonard Woolf’s first novel, The Village in the Jungle, published in 1913 (a year after his marriage to 
Virginia), is based on his years in the Colonial Service in Jaffna, and contains several sexually-frank 
scenes.  Mark Wollaeger argues that The Voyage Out assumed its final form only after Virginia had read 
Leonard’s novel on returning from their honeymoon in 1913: she “had to think past her husband in order to 
get to Conrad.”  The Woolfs in the Jungle: Intertextuality, Sexuality and the Emergence of Female 
Modernism in The Voyage Out, The Village in the Jungle, and Heart of Darkness, MLQ: 2003 (64):1, pp. 
33-69.  
284 Robin Hackett has described, for instance, the interplay of racial marking, lesbian sexuality, and 
modernist aesthetics in Gertrude Stein’s re-writing of her first novel, Melanctha.  In Stein’s drafts, Hackett 
traces the development of a unique, modernist voice, which begins to speak when the novel’s protagonist 
metamorphoses from a white man to an African-American woman, while the love object remains the same.  
The drafts reveal Stein’s discovery that she could exploit the association of blackness with sexuality, 
irrationality, primitivity, even authenticity, to explore “deviant” themes.  Stein’s primitive “masking” of her 
narrator in Melanctha was, Hackett claims, “a revelation … a means of achieving” expressive freedom.  
Olive Schreiner, Sylvia Townsend Warner, and Willa Cather also “exposed lesbianism and female sexual 
autonomy … by manipulating figurations of blackness—by metaphorically giving female sexual autonomy, 
including lesbianism, African and African-American masks.” Robin Hackett, Sapphic Primitivism: 
Productions of Race, Class and Sexuality in Key Works of Modern Fiction (Rutgers University Press: New 
Brunswick, 2004).  See also, for instance, Michael North’s discussion of Stein’s primitivism, and of her 
primitivist collaboration with Picasso, in The Dialect of Modernism. 
285 Woolf herself was attuned, albeit imperfectly, to primitivism’s cannibalization of real difference. For 
instance, in The Voyage Out, Helen despises England because the English are “so ugly and so servile”, 
whereas in South America “the servants are human beings.  They talk to one as if they were equals” (VO 
96). That “as if” exposes Helen’s seeming cosmopolitanism as mere parochial snobbery. 
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Such a reading of the novel’s primitivism as an overdetermined symbol of 
Woolf’s anxiety and her revolutionary ambition seems partly accurate.  This reading 
would also fit fairly well with most readings of the death of her first novel’s heroine.  
Many critics see Rachel’s death as the result of a young writer’s struggle to write an 
aesthetically and thematically ambitious lesbian-feminist novel in the face of hostility and 
censorship, which other writers who attempted similar projects (e.g., Radcliffe Hall) 
suffered.  Post-Impressionism and the women’s suffrage movement were popularly 
regarded as symptoms of national decline, as diseases “infecting the manhood of the 
English and the purity of their women,” and on a more individual level, as indicators of 
“mental disorder.”286  Christiane Froula sees Rachel, a talented young pianist, as the 
potential heroine of a feminist Künstlerroman, whose story is overtaken by a dominant, 
patriarchal “marriage plot.” Woolf, Froula argues, found it impossible to tell the story of 
a young woman’s growing autonomy, intellectual and aesthetic achievement and 
emotional fulfillment without devolving into mere fantasy.287  Rachel is unable either to 
go forward into the inauthentic, alienating world of matrimony and social convention, or 
to return to the world of her girlhood. Stymied, Woolf sacrifices Rachel to a tropical 
fever; her death signifies Woolf’s failed struggle to free her text from novelistic 
convention.288   
                                                 
286 See quotations from Virginia Woolf, p. 273, quoted above.  See also p. 283: “The outrage of family and 
authorities over the Dreadnaught Hoax was remarkably similar in tone to the public outrage at an exhibition 
at the Grafton Gallery called ‘Manet and the Post-Impressionists,’ organized by Roger Fry.”  
287 Christiane Froula, “Chrysalis.” 
288 Other critics, unhelpfully, read Woolf’s primitivism as an unmediated reproduction of contemporary 
discourse.  “Virginia Woolf’s response to the primitive is arbitrary, ambivalent, troublesome, and largely 
ironic, embodying notions of the primitive associated with the ethnographic exhibition culture and with 
notions associated with avant-garde art.” “Virginia Woolf, Bloomsbury, and the Primitive,” in Virginia 
Woolf and Communities: Selected Papers from the Eighth Annual Conference on Virginia Woolf, ed. 
Jeanette McVicker and Laura Davis (Pace University Press: New York, 1999), p. 128. 
108 
 
Yet Rachel’s death of tropical fever bears a strong resemblance to the defining 
trope of a subgenre one could plausibly call feminist.  The fever that kills Daisy Miller 
vivifies Daisy Miller as a novel of social critique; her death condemns the heartlessness 
and hypocrisy of those who shunned her for being a “flirt.” By the time The Voyage Out 
was published, the trope had undergone almost post-modern permutations – notably in 
Edith Wharton’s “Roman Fever.”289  The death-by-fever of a young woman cannot be 
called prima facie evidence of Woolf’s struggle against the conventional marriage plot 
when it could equally reflect her choice to work within a genre. One meaning of Rachel’s 
death is the violent victory of a patriarchal plot over another, inchoate, feminist kind of 
narrative.  But this struggle is itself thematized within the novel—a novel behind which 
Woolf arguably stands, like Stephen Daedalus’ ideal artist, paring her fingernails.290 
While DeSalvo adduces the fact that Rachel’s death-scene was revised at least seven 
times as evidence of Woolf’s struggle and failure, this statistic could equally show that 
Woolf had long planned to kill off Rachel, and wanted to do a good job of it.291   
                                                 
289 Edith Wharton’s “Roman Fever” turns on the fact that the titular disease, rather than marking a fall from 
innocence, was already a known quantity to young women decades ago.  As young women, Wharton’s 
protagonists had plotted each other’s deaths by arranging nocturnal liaisons in malarial parts of Rome.  
Wharton reveals that James’ conceit in Daisy Miller – that the moralizing strictures of society destroy 
girlish innocence – was itself an ideological creation.  Daisy’s trope was given a more conservative turn in 
A Room With A View, which Woolf reviewed the year she began writing The Voyage Out.  Whereas Daisy 
falls in love with an Italian and dies, Lucy Honeychurch witnesses an Italian’s death and falls in love with 
an Englishman.  Like Rachel, Lucy is a talented pianist smitten with Beethoven’s late sonatas.  Both 
women struggle to affirm love and life in the face of convention.  The difference is that The Voyage Out 
has no Emersons to represent continuity between the Ango-Saxon intellectual tradition (Emerson père) and 
the Mediterranean embrace of bodily desire (Emerson fils).  The absence, in Woolf’s novel, of men like the 
Emersons who are both wise and sexy marks the absence of a collective in which “life and love” make 
sense.  Lucy finds these values in marriage, but Rachel’s engagement is the beginning of her fatal illness.  
(Forster would revisit the trope in the “Malabar Caves” episode of female sexual hysteria in A Passage to 
India.) 
290 Woolf’s theory of impersonality, which aimed at creating a “world seen without a self” (in The Waves), 
sought to out-Joyce Joyce, whose “damned egotistical self” she hated for distorting his writing.  See Judith 
Ryan, The Vanishing Subject: Early Psychology and Literary Modernism (University of Chicago Press, 
1991), p. 190. 
291 Froula, Woolf’s First Voyage, p. 126. 
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What is more, I will argue, if Rachel’s death is read through the prism of the 
novel’s primitivism, it may be seen as an aspect of a radical Woolfian critique of social 
convention that goes well beyond Daisy Miller. 
 
2. A Revaluation of Values 
The scenes of Rachel’s illness and death are moments of unprecedented, 
idiosyncratic and inventive writing.  True, Rachel Vinrace’s inarticulate, inchoate sense 
of herself seems doomed to give way to the unbearably artificial constraints that 
“civilized” life would place upon her as a wife and mother.  And the authentic, natural 
alternative to such artificiality, as she sees the lives of the “primitive women” in the 
Amazonian jungle, appears too radically other to come to terms with.  But by “infecting” 
Rachel during these scenes, Woolf is not half-heartedly turning to a tragic plot as a kind 
of Plan B.  Instead, through the use of primitivist tropes—the journey upriver, the jungle, 
the uncanny gaze of the native—she is challenging the reader to value Rachel as a 
symbol of the incomprehensible, authentic, unspeakable thing that civilization and 
progress cannot extinguish. 
Rachel’s tropical fever is linked to a radical critique which Woolf expressed in 
primitivist terms.  In On Being Ill, Woolf described illness as an “undiscovered country,” 
a “virgin forest” and a “primitive fact.”292 Woolf’s celebration of illness as primitive, 
factual, natural is a revaluation of values, a claim that illness is mankind’s original and 
natural status, whereas health is derivative, contrived, aberrant.  Her characterization of 
illness as primitive also plays on the term’s political implications. The healthy, civilized 
                                                 
292 Paris Press: Ashfield, MA, 2002, pp. 3, 11. 
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man sees the sick/primitive as an object to be accounted for, explained, and eliminated as 
such. His duty is “to civilize … [to] educate the native” (12).  Woolf’s essay values the 
sick and the savage precisely because they refute the presumption that everything can be 
known, said, and registered, recognizing that “there is a virgin forest in each [of us] 
…where even the print of birds’ feet is unknown” (11, 12).   According to the myth of 
progress, modern civilization comprehends and surpasses all that “preceded” it, yet 
civilization in reality not only fails to comprehend the past but suppresses huge swathes 
of the present.  Illness, conversely, recalls to us the experiences we were capable of 
having before we were formed into subjects—“until ‘I’ suppressed them” (18).  As Woolf 
revalues pathology as an escape from the ego, she traces an analogous idea of moving 
back from a civilized world of rigidly enforced individuality to a more primitive time 
when “the police [were] off-duty” and people enjoyed more authentic modes of being 
(20).293  The primitive and the ill are aware of a truth others suppress: their own 
contingency.  “It is only the recumbent who know what, after all, nature is at no pains to 
conceal—that she in the end will conquer” (15).  The sick/primitive values the flux of 
experience, of self and non-self, over and above the ego. 
The “recumbent” are epistemologically liberated but that liberation is intimately 
tied to their isolation.  Diseases are communicable, but the sick cannot communicate the 
experience of illness. As Woolf later wrote, “I believe these illnesses are in my case—
how shall I express it?—partly mystical.”294 Mystical knowledge can only be hinted at 
indirectly.  The experience of being ill is therefore an aesthetic touchstone, for it reveals 
                                                 
293 Illness reveals the half-bodily, half-spiritual nature of human beings, which Woolf, alluding to Thomas 
Browne, refers to as “amphibious”: “Have lain about here, in that odd amphibious life of headache…” 
Diary, ed. Anne Olivier Bell (London: Hogarth, 1980), 5 September 1925, Vol. III, p. 38.   
294 Diary, 16 February 1930, III, p. 287.   
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the difficulty and the value of finding words for experiences that, like Rachel’s, lie far 
outside the common social round.295 The sick person “is forced to coin words himself, 
and, taking his pain in one hand, and a lump of pure sound in the other (as perhaps the 
people of Babel did in the beginning), so to crush them together that a brand new word in 
the end drops out” (OBI 6). The value attached to the “brand new word” indicates not 
only the immense labor of the sufferer, but the fact that common language stifles 
authentic expression and life, such that a new language is needed.  Again, Woolf links her 
revaluation of illness to primitivist discourse, claiming that “it is not only a new language 
that we need, more primitive, more sensual, more obscene, but a new hierarchy of the 
passions” (7).  The bounded, policed, inauthentic, “healthy,” civilized ego must be 
diminished and quieted, until the artist can hear the voice of her own experiences and 
passions—both ontogenetic and phylogenetic, as people knew them “in the beginning” 
and before the individual “‘I’ suppressed them”—and try to create a language adequate to 
express them.  The extinction of the “I” is a prerequisite of this aesthetic of authenticity.  
This seems appropriate; the Greek root of the word “authentic” meant both “mastery” and 
“suicide”.296 
Woolf’s dream that the sick / primitive can invent an authentic language is 
reminiscent of Stephen Dedalus’ plan, at the end of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man, to “forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race,” creating a 
community through an internal act of heroic artifice. A “brand new word,” created by an 
                                                 
295 Both The Voyage Out and On Being Ill quote approvingly and repeatedly from the same section of 
Milton’s Comus (dealing with the goddess Sabrina); and both criticize Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire as unreadable (Rachel abandons her copy and has an epiphany while looking at a giant 
tree)(“not the book for influenza,” OBI 19).   
296 “Authenteo: to have full power over; also, to commit a murder.  Authentes: not only a master and a doer, 
but also a perpetrator, a murderer, a self murderer or suicide.”  Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity 
(Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1973), p. 131. 
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individual out of her own suffering, would be unknown to anyone else, and yet as a word 
it would be by definition significant and comprehensible within a language-community.  
The logic of primitivism tries to overcome this paradox by arguing that authentic 
language exists within us already.  Long forgotten, its invention is really a recovery. As a 
girl, Rachel Vinrace “was haunted by … [the] idea [that], if one went back far enough, 
everything perhaps was intelligible; everything was in common; for the mammoths who 
pastured in the fields of Richmond High Street had turned into paving stones and boxes 
full of ribbon, and her aunts” (VO 66).  Rachel’s desire for a time when “everything was 
in common” exposes the isolation and alienation of modernity, especially for women; a 
return to origins promises to regain the deep, shared connection preceding the 
pathetically circumscribed present of ribbons and aunts that has grown out of it. 
Whereas Joyce saves the dream of authentic language for the end of his first 
novel, Woolf courageously places it in the middle of hers, and things grind to a halt as the 
difficulty of authentic communication is borne home by Rachel’s and Terence’s love-
scene in the tropical jungle.  At first, the immediately, mutually perceived natural world 
floods their senses and seems to validate their language: “they began to speak naturally of 
ordinary things, of the flowers and the trees, how they grew there so red, like garden 
flowers at home, and there bent and crooked like the arm of a twisted old man” (283).  
Yet this sentence immediately stumbles over the dream of authenticity, because to say 
Amazonian flowers are like the ones at home is to misname the other as the same.  Affect 
thus shuttles from an attractive “garden” to a repulsive “twisted old man.”  Faced with the 
demand to be faithful to the uniqueness and specificity of the things it represents, 
language necessarily breaks down.  Rachel and Terence begin to talk less—“long silences 
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came between their words” (283)—and, lacking the buffer of words, their experiences 
oscillate from immediacy to mere disconnection.  At one moment, they are “drawn so 
close together …that there seemed no division between them … the next moment [they 
were] separate and far away again” (282).  As indicated by Terence’s (unrealized) plan to 
write a (silent) novel about the things people don’t say, it is immensely difficult to make 
a new language to replace the false one they seek to escape.297 
Regardless of its illustration of failure, this scene manages to give voice to a great 
theme of Woolf’s work: the importance of that which “escapes registration,” as she later 
put it in Between the Acts.  In her hands, primitivist discourse signals the need for a new 
language. The novel’s primitivism has been read as a kind of camouflage, revealing 
Woolf’s ambiguity towards her imagined, possibly hostile public.  But Woolf also used 
primitivism to convey her belief in the importance of the asocial, ahistorical experiences 
for which savage, obscene words must be coined. 
 
3. Primitivism and the Development of Woolf’s Critique 
To understand the role primitivism plays in The Voyage Out, it is necessary to 
appreciate the development of Woolf’s radical critique of language and history. Woolfian 
primitivism originated as a fantasy of a primitive subjectivity with which one could 
identify, but ultimately came to express a radically anti-subjective ethos. 
Roger Fry’s Post-Impressionist show opened a new front in the culture wars 
raging in 1910.  In her biography of Fry, Woolf recalled that “the public in 1910 was 
                                                 
297 Froula’s interpretation of this scene is analogous to mine: “Woolf represents speech and story – 
authority – as a burden heavy with terrors: of leaving the past behind, of groping without words in the 
silences of an unwritten world, of a tongue burdened by the past, of all the old words returning in spite of 
all effort to keep them at bay” (Froula, 272).  
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thrown into paroxysms of rage and laughter” by the show: “they were infuriated.… The 
pictures were outrageous, anarchistic and childish”.298  “The public” was not infuriated 
by actual primitives, but by the willful perversity of artists who imitated them. Woolf 
quotes “the Times critic” who opined, “Really primitive art is attractive because it is 
unconscious; but this is deliberate—it is the rejection of all that civilization has done, the 
good with the bad” (Fry, 154-55).  In the critic’s view, the primitivists’ pose of rejecting 
civilization is an insincere “joke at [the public’s] expense”; it is certainly not art.299  
Woolf responds to this attack by shifting the burden of sincerity back on to the attackers. 
“The cultivated classes … cared only for what could be labeled and classified ‘genuine.’ 
Their interest in [Fry’s] lectures had been a pose; art was to them merely a social asset” 
(Fry, 158, italics added).  Woolf argues that social conservatives produced the category 
of “genuine art” for non-aesthetic reasons,300  whereas Fry’s interest in art really was 
genuine.301   
Her underlying claim is that it is possible and preferable to experience art in ways 
not conditioned by one’s social status: taste itself should be innocent of social codes, of 
class awareness, of the desire for distinction.  And primitivism promises the ability to 
                                                 
298 Roger Fry: A Biography, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1940, pp. 153-54. 
299 Jonathan Culler argues that “authenticity” is necessarily a sign operating with others in a system of 
signification.  As such the authentic or genuine article only truly exists when it has been copied; in a sense, 
the real thing is secondary to its copy.  Thus Woolf’s “Gauguin Girl” performance, when she dressed up 
like one of the primitives in a French ex-stockbroker’s paintings to tweak the public, is almost decadent in 
its irony, yet reinscribes the basic ideas of primitivism.  On the other hand, Woolf’s first novel copied the 
structure of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness in its quest for authenticity.  One could thus argue that primitivism 
is a structure in which copying the authentic can produce it twice.  
300 While my discussion is limited to primitivism’s place in contemporary aesthetic battles, analogous ideas 
were being played out in other realms.  In 1905, in a Tory pamphlet entitled The Decline and Fall of the 
British Empire, the causes of British decline included “the prevalence of town over country life, and its 
disastrous effect upon the health and faith of the English people,” and the “growing tendency of the English 
to forsake the sea except as a health resort.” Quoted in Hynes, The Edwardian Turn of Mind, p. 24. 
301 Woolf’s goal is to gain Fry social approval (posthumously), notwithstanding her definition of genuine 
artistic taste by contrasting it to socially-motivated gestures of approval and disapproval. 
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recognize values and to experience meanings in ways unmediated by one’s social milieu, 
and to break free of that milieu (with its contingencies, contradictions, and compromises) 
by such recognition and experience.  What made Fry’s show so important, so worth 
defending, was its promise that such an authentic experience not only exists, but that it 
could be shared—that it was shared by the artists represented in the show.  My point is 
not to question this fantastic claim but to highlight the desire it expresses for authentic 
community. 
The moment in The Voyage Out that comes closest to the ideal of authentic 
community is the dance held for a young British couple who have become engaged.  
Local musicians play at the party; the musicians leave; the tourists want to continue 
dancing.  To gratify them Rachel plays the piano but soon exhausts her slim repertoire of 
modern dance tunes.  She begins to experiment with classical pieces: 
[She] went on to play an air by Mozart… she marked the rhythm boldly so as to 
simplify the way …. [The dancers] whirled around the room, now curtseying, 
now spinning round, now tripping this way and that like a child skipping through 
a meadow. “This is the dance for people who don’t know how to dance!” she 
cried …. Once their feet fell in with the rhythm they showed a complete lack of 
self-consciousness …. Rachel passed without stopping to old English hunting 
songs, carols, and hymn tunes … by degrees every person was tripping and 
turning …. Mrs. Thornbury tried to recall an old country dance which she had 
seen danced by her father’s tenants in the old days …. “Now for the great round 
dance!” Hewet shouted.  Instantly a gigantic circle was formed, the dancers 
holding hands and shouting out, “D’you ken John Peel,” as they swung faster and 
faster and faster, until the strain was too great …. (166) 
 
The English tourists, awkwardly perched on the mouth of the Amazon, are for once able 
to escape their self-consciousness.  The rhythm of the round dance “instantly” induces the 
tourists to form a “gigantic circle,” evoking a nostalgic, racial Englishness that appeals to 
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a common, unconscious identity.302 A prior draft of the novel is more explicit:  one 
character, after exclaiming that the dancers “ought to let themselves go more … they 
ought to leap and swing,” then “rose as the moon rises” to dance with an “anonymous 
gentleman whose blood ran darker than is nice” (Melymbrosia 121).  The communal 
dance is a common primitivist trope.303  The medium of rhythm combines lowbrow and 
highbrow culture (dance tunes, Mozart), merges past and present while erasing class (the 
landowners’ children recalling the tenants’ dances), and joins everyone together in a 
round each invents for himself. 
Woolf’s desire for an authentic community could lead her to fall into the sort of 
racial nationalism reflected in the “great round dance.”  Yet Woolf also used primitivism 
in precisely the opposite way: to critique and express her alienation from the racial myths 
of British civilization.  Terence, seeking to expose and expunge his faults before 
beginning his new life with Rachel, resolutely tells her, “Now I’m going to begin at the 
beginning” (VO 280).  Yet Woolf’s search for the authentic is so relentless that it 
discovers the creep of inauthenticity even in the quest for origins itself.  Rachel is, for 
instance, ecstatic when she reads the beginning of Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire: “never had any words been so vivid … Aethiopia … barbarian …. They 
seemed to drive roads back to the very beginning of the world, on either side of which the 
populations of all times and countries stood in avenues, and by passing down them all 
knowledge would be hers, and the book of the world turned back to the very first page” 
                                                 
302 In primitivist discourse, rhythm is important as a content-less but driving and deeply-felt aspect of both 
music and language.  Thus the ill “grasp what is beyond [the] surface meaning [of words]… [whereas] in 
health meaning has encroached upon sound” (OBI 20).  Cf. Eliot’s essay, “Beating a Drum in the Jungle.” 
303 See Prehistories of the Future.  And cf. Pound’s maxim, “the farther the poem strays from the song, and 
the farther the song strays from the dance, the less you’ve got a poem.” ABC of Reading.   
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(VO 175).  Envisioning this imperial parade, Rachel “immediately ceases to read”—
actual facts would impede her fantasy of total knowledge.  The imperialist metaphor 
exposes the quest for origins as a perversion, a desire to rechristen the Other in one’s own 
image.  
Woolf’s primitivist paradigm is the reverse: it recognizes otherness and ponders 
whether the self might be implicated or dependent upon it.  One character babbles of how 
much she “would give … to realize the ancient world,” because “one never does think 
enough about the ancients and all that they’ve done for us” (VO 114, my emphasis).  
Unconsciously presentist in assuming her debt to the past, this character turns to praise an 
elderly literary historian: “But you begin at the beginning.”  The historian’s reply 
indicates a different, primitivist paradigm: “When I think of the Greeks I think of them as 
naked black men” (ibid.).  From representing a kind of cultural ideal ego, an origin with 
which one identifies, the naked black Greeks become a touchstone of difference. 
Woolf ultimately had to leave behind primitivist tropes like the dance that 
confused authentic community with nostalgia for a never-never land of shared national 
and racial identity.  It took Woolf time to develop a primitivism of difference, but her 
feminist critique of colonialism required it, as did other considerations.  Early drafts of 
The Voyage Out attempt to subvert the illegitimacy of patriarchal history by envisioning a 
woman-centric prehistory for humanity, and contain such passages as, “A mature woman 
feels herself as old as the Pyramids, which have looked down upon countless generations, 
and sees her husband as the youngest, the most pitiable of mankind”.304  DeSalvo 
suggests that “Woolf was [originally] writing an angry novel about how the power of 
                                                 
304 Quoted in DeSalvo, “Introduction,” Virginia Woolf, Melymbrosia, xxxii. 
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women had eroded since the time of the Egyptians, since pre-Olympian Greece”.305  
Woolf may have been influenced to undertake this project by the Cambridge classicist 
and anthropological theorist Jane Harrison, whom she apparently met in 1904.306   
Harrison influentially argued that “no one … can have an adequate knowledge of Greek 
art without a study of the Mycenean and Minoan periods” from which Greek culture drew 
its roots.307 More “heretically,” Harrison proposed that those earlier periods centered on 
the worship of female deities, and “that the Great Mother is prior to the masculine 
divinities”.308  The primitivism of Woolf’s early drafts, to follow DeSalvo’s reading, 
seeks to find a common starting ground for modern women in the prehistoric period when 
they had not been alienated from, but were the creators of culture.   
This feminist search for an historical narrative of primitive origins was confronted 
by the patriarchal nature of History itself.  To illustrate why Woolf had to change tack, 
we can turn briefly to feminist criticism of Freud.  Freud theorized that before reaching 
the Oedipus complex, a young girl’s primary sexual-developmental phase is 
characterized by exclusive love for the (phallic) mother.  In “Feminine Sexuality,” Freud 
wrote that “our insight into this early, pre-Oedipus phase in girls comes to us as a 
surprise, like the discovery… of the Minoan-Mycenean civilization behind the 
civilization of Greece.” (1931). In this passage, Elizabeth Abel notes, Freud “radically 
gendered developmental narrative, decisively split between a maternal prehistory and a 
paternal history.”  Rather than declaring the prehistoric maternal period to be the sine qua 
                                                 
305 Ibid., xxxiii. 
306 “Florence Maitland… is going to introduce me to the repulsive Jane, and all the other learned ladies” at 
Newnham College, Cambridge.  Letters of Virginia Woolf, I, Letter 184 (22 Oct. 1904). 
307 Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion, 2nd ed., (London: Merlin, 1963 [1911]), p. 2.  
308 Op. cit., “Preface to the Second Edition,” p. ix. 
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non of historical understanding, as Harrison did with Minoan and Mycenean culture, 
“Freud reads from the onset of ‘history’ backward to remote, scarcely visible antecedents 
… the Oedipus complex becomes a point of origin before which everything recedes into 
the indistinction of prehistory.”309  In the face of such narratives, Harrison’s woman-
centered culture did not displace, but eternally receded from the Greek origin of history.   
Woolf’s primitivism ultimately overcame this limitation.  Instead of seeking 
primitive origins with which to identify, Woolf’s primitivism values the constantly-
receding and the unknowable. A scene in A Sketch of the Past shows that this kind of 
primitivism provided, for Woolf, a paradoxically selfless self-defense mechanism.  
Recalling her revulsion, as a child, at having her “private parts … explored” by Gerald 
Duckworth, she calls her revulsion “instinctive,” and argues that this instinct “proves that 
Virginia Stephen was not born on the 25th January 1882, but was born many thousands of 
years ago; and had from the very first to encounter instincts already acquired by 
thousands of ancestresses in the past.”310  Woolf does not identify with her ancient 
ancestresses, she invokes them as a means to reject subjectification and emphasize her 
own unknowability.  She is unknowable even to herself, whom she describes in the third 
person as a girl being forced to “encounter” ancient instincts, even as she embraces these 
as somehow constitutive of her own identity. 
By the same token, primitivism can be a sword as well as a shield: it exposes the 
inauthenticity of those who fail to realize they are driven by such instincts.311  Woolf uses 
                                                 
309 Elizabeth Abel, Virginia Woolf and the Fictions of Psychoanalysis (University of Chicago: 1989), p.8. 
310 “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, p. 69. 
311 Kurtz’s whisper, “the horror, the horror,” is the double horror of finding a savage within himself, and of 
recognizing that the savage has always already corrupted Kurtz’s noblest ambitions – that, long before he 
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primitivism to represent, beneath a speaker’s words, a deep, contradictory story he does 
not know he is telling.  One evening aboard ship, Helen and Rachel are retreating from 
the smoking room as two men begin recalling stories of their college days.  “‘Ah, one 
could tell strange stories of the old days,’ they heard Ridley say …. Glancing back, at the 
doorway, they saw Mr. Pepper as though he had suddenly loosened his clothes, and had 
become a vivacious and malicious old ape” (VO 17).   As they recall their college 
years—supposedly scenes of Bildung—the men enact a strange story of very old days 
indeed.  
Similarly, describing the history of the tourist colony at Santa Marina, Woolf 
employs primitivist discourse to undermine the myth of a glorious English past.  A 
celebration of “the hardy Englishmen” who first “colonized” Santa Marina turns into a 
catalogue of degeneracy: “tawny with sea-voyaging, hairy for lack of razors, with 
muscles like wire, fangs greedy for flesh … they drove the dying [natives] into the sea 
…” (Voyage 89).  The passage grimly inverts any notion that the “natives” were brutish 
savages and the Elizabethans were heroic explorers. Crucially, Woolf also shows that the 
Elizabethans’ brutality was linked to the corruption of their language.  The narrative slips 
via free indirect discourse into the antique diction of the Elizabethans, and describes the 
“Indians who came from the interior with subtle poisons, naked bodies, and painted 
Idols.” Woolf uses the Elizabethans’ self-contradictory claim – that their victims were 
simultaneously subtle and painted, yet naked and heathen – to expose their self-serving 
lust for power.  At the origin of modern English history, Woolf’s primitivism thus reveals 
that there is already the misrecognition of the other in the pursuit of power. Having 
                                                                                                                                                 
scrawled the words “exterminate the brutes,” his altruistic plan to civilize the Congo was a cryptic mark of 
savagery. 
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moved beyond the desire to identify a sort of feminist primitive historical moment, Woolf 
has developed primitivism into a sophisticated critique of identity. 
Woolf used primitivism to conceptualize and express her critique of that pursuit.  
Another example may be found in a personal experience that touched Woolf as a writer.  
In 1896, a young Virginia Stephen typed a letter to her brother Thoby. “How does the 
family Museum get on?,” she asks.  “Father says that they have discovered an ape which 
is nearer to us than anything else which has yet been found.”312  Then, under the words 
“Dictated by father,” comes her transcription of Leslie Stephen’s voice: “I wanted to see 
how fast this wretched girl can typewrite…”.313  An early draft of The Voyage Out seems 
to rewrite that moment of writing.  Richard Dalloway interrupts his wife as she writes a 
letter to her brother: “He kissed her passionately, so that her half-written letter slid to the 
ground.  Picking it up, he read it without asking leave. ‘Where’s your pen?’ he said; and 
added in his little masculine hand, ‘R.D. Loquitur…’” (Melymbrosia 37).  As girls and 
women try to write, their texts are taken over by the voices of fathers and husbands.  In 
the novel’s final version, Woolf exacts a Darwinian revenge when Rachel dreams about 
Richard Dalloway, transforming the overwriting man into a “little deformed man who 
squatted on the floor gibbering, with long nails … [and] the face of an animal” (VO 77).   
(An analogous strategy is at work in Woolf’s punning choice of the books Rachel 
is instructed to read.  Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; Balzac’s La 
cousine Bette; and the lines on “father Brute” from Milton’s Comus.  “Gibbon” becomes 
                                                 
312 The ape was Pithecanthropus erectus. 
313 Letters of Virginia Woolf, ed. Nigel Nicholson and Joanne Trautman (Harcourt: New York, 1975), 
Vol.1, Letter 2.  Douglas Mao notes that the creation of a family museum was “a standard piece of 
Victorian advice on child-rearing,” and quotes several books telling mothers to “encourage Tom to make a 
museum,” or that “every house ought to possess a ‘Museum’.” Solid Objects (Princeton: 1999?), p. 28.   
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a hairy ape; said aloud, La cousine Bette could refer to a beastly relative (La cousine 
bête); and “father Brute” becomes a subversively anti-patriarchal Darwinism.) 
Though Woolf’s early drafts theorized a primitive origin on which to base a claim 
to cultural autonomy, the published novel does not depend on a prehistory in which 
women escaped objectification.  Indeed, it recognizes that the reality may be the opposite 
during the tourists’ expedition to the native village.  A pair of tourists, Mr. and Mrs. 
Flushing, convince the others to join them on a trip they present as a journey of 
anthropological interest, but the Flushings’ real motive is profit: bringing along the others 
cuts down on their own share of the costs.  Mr. Flushing bargains with the “head man” of 
the native village for primitive artifacts he plans to resell in London.  These goods are the 
personal effects of the native women.  Their shawls, earrings and bracelets are taken 
according to an agreement between men—savage or civilized, modern or prehistoric, 
their treatment of women is indistinguishable. 
But what makes Woolf’s primitivism truly radical is that her feminist critique 
includes a critique of the extent to which women have been undermined by the language 
they must needs use to define themselves.  Insofar as the primate father exerts his control 
over language, the writing girl is wretched indeed.  “Suppose I, at fifteen, was a nervous, 
gibbering little monkey, always spitting or cracking a nut and shying the shells about, and 
swinging in rapture across the cage,” Woolf writes in “A Sketch of the Past.” Her father, 
Leslie Stephen, “was the pacing, dangerous, morose lion.”314  Trapped in the king of 
                                                 
314 “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, p. 116. 
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beasts’ linguistic cage, the girl gibbers.315  The question is how, if at all, the girl can 
escape that cage. 
The scene of Rachel and Terence alone in the jungle, presents a striking 
elaboration of Woolf’s sense of language as lie.  The young lovers are barely able to 
communicate beyond repeating one another.  “’Does this frighten you?’ Terence asked… 
‘No,’ she answered. ‘I like it.’ She repeated ‘I like it’… There was another pause.  ‘You 
like being with me?’ Terence asked.  ‘Yes, with you,’ she replied…. Silence seemed to 
have fallen upon the world… ‘We are happy together.’ ‘Very happy,’ she answered…. 
‘We love each other,’ Terence said. ‘We love each other,’ she repeated.” (VO 271). The 
fact that this conversation occurs on a tropical river, while the characters are waiting for a 
“steamer” en route to a native settlement, recalls a similar conversation in Conrad’s Heart 
of Darkness, where Marlowe tells his lie to Kurtz’s Intended, simply by repeating her. 
“‘He was a remarkable man,’ [said Marlowe]… ‘I knew him best.’ ‘You knew him best,’ 
I repeated. ‘But you have heard him! You know,’ she cried. ‘Yes, I know’.… ‘His words 
will remain,’ I said. ‘And his example,’ she whispered to herself.… ‘True,’ I said, ‘His 
example too.’”316  What Marlowe cannot repeat are Kurtz’s last, repeated words, “The 
horror! The horror!”; and so he lies: “The last word he pronounced was—your name” 
(HD 147).   
                                                 
315 Helen Ambrose, Rachel’s surrogate mother, “trusts to” the “medicine” of “talk … talk about everything, 
talk that was free, unguarded, and as candid as a habit of talking with men made natural in her own case” 
(VO 124).  But when the “medicine” of “talk” is male, when communication is not “natural” and “free” but 
demands the subtle erasure of one’s gender, language itself destroys the difference that would make 
communication worthwhile.  Helen, too late, admits, “I’m not a good hand at talking” (Melymbrosia 214). 
316 Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness / Youth / The End of the Tether (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1995), pp. 
144-146. 
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Marlowe’s repetitions mark his decision to allow a woman to continue to believe 
in the narcissistic fabrications upon which her life is based,317 to hide the truth that 
savagery lurks in the heart of European civilization.  Rachel’s repetitions allow Terence 
the same illusion of communication, but whereas Marlowe’s sense of self is undermined 
by his lie, Rachel is unable to tell whether she is lying or not, as she tries to build up a 
sense of self from repeating what is said to her.  What Kurtz’s revelation of “The horror! 
The horror!” did to Marlowe, the “terrible—terrible” primeval jungle does to Rachel: it 
reveals that her identity was based on a lie.  In Rachel’s case, the lie was that she could 
win an adequate sense of her own life experience through available civilized discourse. 
When she begins to pay attention to reality, “sounds stood out from the background, 
making a bridge across their silence; they heard the swish of trees and some beast 
croaking in a remote world” (VO 271).  This, again, is why the inscrutable women of the 
“native village” in the Amazon are uncanny, even threatening.  The “plunge of speech” 
into which the sight of the primitive woman pushes her civilized counterpart is the abyss 
yawning beneath the objectifying, patriarchal discourse with which the civilized women 
tourists had unwittingly constructed their own identities. 
Woolf emphasizes the point in describing the discomfiture of English worshippers 
during a service in the hotel’s chapel.  Greeted by “mild sweet chords issuing from a 
harmonium” (VO 226), they imagine “the sad and beautiful figure of Christ” (227), but 
the daily portion turns out to be a particularly bloodthirsty passage from the Old 
                                                 
317 “It’s queer how out of touch with truth women are.  They live in a world of their own… it is too 
beautiful altogether…. Some confounded fact we men have been living contentedly with ever since the day 
of creation would start up and knock the whole thing over.” Id., p. 59.  Marlowe thus makes all women his 
alibi for lying to one; he also seeks to separate his chivalric lie from “the horror” of covering up the heart of 
darkness, even though that is precisely its function.  
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Testament.  “It could be seen from a glance at their faces that most of the others, the men 
in particular, felt the inconvenience of the sudden intrusion of this old savage.  They 
looked more secular and critical as they listened to the ravings of the old black man with 
a cloth round his loins cursing with vehement gesture by a camp-fire in the desert” (ibid.)  
“For the men in particular,” perhaps, the savage is to be administered, not worshipped.  
The service that was previously “too familiar to be considered” (227) is now too close for 
comfort. 
The discomfort of the faithful in the presence of the origin of their faith reveals 
that savagery is the litmus test of authenticity.  As the figure of the primitive 
distinguishes the authentic from the inauthentic, so exposure to the savage creates critical 
distance and authentic taste by forcing a rupture from the status quo.318   Rachel, “for the 
first time in her life, instead of slipping at once into some curious pleasant cloud of 
emotion … listened critically to what was being said.” (228)  The irruption of the savage 
galvanizes Rachel by revealing a pervasive insincerity.  “All round her were people 
pretending to feel what they did not feel … all over the world … innumerable men and 
                                                 
318 Ridley Ambrose epitomizes cultural inauthenticity and the consequent value of rupture.  He spends the 
novel translating Pindar’s Odes; yet what could be the value of a better rendering of the Greek when “no 
one ever said a thing they meant” (VO 37)?  The bottom has dropped out of the fantasy that the British 
Empire represents the continuation and perfection of Greco-Roman civilization.  English civilization needs 
to produce translations of Pindar to shore up own validity—a moribund culture worshipping its own 
continuity.  The ship that, literally speaking, translated Ridley across the Atlantic—the Euphrosyne—is 
named after a compendium of forgettable poetry (by Lytton Strachey and Leonard Woolf, among others). 
Woolf had ridiculed this “first book of Bloomsbury” as a half-hearted attempt to carry Victorian literary 
values into an era that made them irrelevant.  As noted, Woolf envisioned her own project as translation’s 
opposite – “to coin words … as perhaps the people of Babel did in the beginning” – and she opposes to 
Ridley’s hollow labors a utopian version of translation.   
During a church service, St. John Hirst, like a naughty schoolboy, sneakily reads a small blue 
volume instead of his Bible.  “Sappho,” he whispers to his neighbor: “The one Swinburne did – the best 
thing that’s ever been written.”  Woolf represents the primitive as an agent of desperately-needed rupture 
and renewal.  Sappho’s lesbian odes disrupt the patriarchal Biblical text, and Swinburne’s “translation” 
disrupts the idea of a canon of classics, since, as the best thing ever written, Swinburne’s Sappho is better 
than Sappho herself.  As Hirst’s neighbor “gulp[s] down the Ode to Aphrodite during the litany,” one 
senses an authorial fantasy.  What better fate for Woolf’s novel than to be another such rupture: a 
subversive text that would spark the spontaneous formation of a discriminating but passionate readership. 
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women… finally gave up the effort to see, and relapsed tamely into praise and 
acquiescence … the thought [caused her] … physical discomfort” (VO 228).  Glancing 
around, Rachel sees a woman “adoring something shallow and smug, clinging to it … 
with the assiduity of a limpet … a limpet, with the sensitive side of her stuck to a rock” 
(229). The woman senses her own “discomfort” at “the old savage,” but represses it, just 
as the tourists look away from the gaze of the native women in the village.  Conversely, 
Rachel’s “physical discomfort” at the sight of that repression grows until “the face” of 
this worshipper “became printed on Rachel’s mind with an impression of keen horror” 
(VO 229).  Rachel is not horrified by man’s ineradicable savagery, but by those who 
refuse to recognize it.  If Kurtz was horrified because the savage turned out to be 
inescapable, Rachel is horrified because the civilized woman found the lie of civilization 
so easy to swallow. 
 
4. An Impersonal Primitivism 
The primitive women, with their uncanny stare, “fix” their civilized spectators, 
who, wriggling uncomfortably, are surprised to find themselves placed in the Prufrock 
position by primitives whom they had planned to approach as anthropological or even 
aesthetic objects.  As the women “squatting on the ground in triangular shapes” swivel 
their eyes around at the tourist party, it is as though Lily Briscoe’s abstraction of Mrs. 
Ramsay into a “triangular shape” of paint on canvas had come uncannily alive. This 
moment says something about Woolf’s goals for modernist art, including her first 
novel—it should look back and challenge the viewer’s sense of herself. The native 
women’s unsettling, “inexpressive” gaze suggests “the indifference” Woolf valued in the 
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natural object world and in works of art, which “console not by their thought of us but by 
their forgetfulness” (OBI 21).  As discussed above, Woolf’s primitivism emphasizes that 
authenticity lies in recognizing otherness, not projecting sameness onto it.  In my view, 
primitivism also provided, for Woolf, the beginnings of a theory and a technique that she 
would develop into an aesthetic of impersonality. 
In describing Fry’s attitude toward Post-Impressionist paintings, Woolf recalls 
him “gazing at them, plunging his eyes into them as if he were a humming-bird hawk-
moth hanging over a flower, quivering but still.”  Yet as important as Fry’s phallic 
response to them are the paintings themselves, which “stood upon chairs … bold, bright, 
impudent almost, in contrast with the Watts portrait of a beautiful Victorian lady that 
hung on the wall behind them.”  These bright, impudent modern paintings – Woolf’s 
language suggests a connection between these paintings and the sort of “painted lady” 
who is thrown out of the tourist hotel in her first novel --  assert themselves in the center 
of the room, and close the distance of safe interpretation and aesthetic judgment; like the 
native women, they look back. 
The less that is known about women, the harder it is to objectify them; and Woolf 
insists that the primitive woman is inexplicable.  In Roger Fry, Woolf is implicitly critical 
when she represents Fry excitedly arguing that the Gauguins and Picassos getting up off 
their chairs signify “transition” and “continuity” rather than a “break” from traditions.  
Woolf is not interested in continuity when tradition is represented by the “Victorian 
woman” hanging meekly on the wall.  Describing Fry’s fetishistic collection of primitive 
“trophies,” Woolf mimics his enthusiasm but undermines his claims: 
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[There were] stuffs… pots … [and] cotton goods from Manchester, made to suit 
the taste of the Negroes ….  There were hats, enormous hats, boldly decorated 
and thickly plaited to withstand a tropical sun and delight the untutored taste of 
negresses.  And what magnificent taste the untutored negress had! Under [Fry’s] 
influence, his pressure, his excitement, pictures, hats, cotton goods, all were 
connected.319 
 
The connections Fry makes between cotton goods made for export and exotic paintings 
made for the domestic art market is a tribute to the aroused “pressure” of his discourse; 
but nothing more.  Woolf insists that Fry’s aesthetic revolves around a primitive figure 
about whom nothing is or can be known.  (In any case, how can one guess what the 
primitive woman’s “untutored taste” would be, when “Manchester” is working to turn her 
into a consumer?)  Woolf’s insistence that “the negress” is beyond comprehension, that 
the native women are “beyond the plunge of speech,” confronts us with the dilemma of 
looking and saying nothing.   
Fry, noting that the silhouette often appears in primitive art, argues that it 
represents the primitive’s perception of “a single whole,” as opposed to conceptual 
drawings “reconstruct[ed] from separately apprehended [and conceptualized] parts.”320 In 
Woolf, a silhouette’s blackness and the racial difference of “natives” signify 
unreadability.  As Rachel dies, she sees for “a moment distinctly; a large head above her; 
it became fringed with black and then became altogether black”.  As another character 
recovers from her death, he senses a “pattern” in the “procession of objects, black and 
indistinct, the figures of people,” that pass “across his eyes” (VO 231, 244).  In a 
narrative that and is extremely skeptical of claims to omniscient understanding of 
                                                 
319 Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry: A Biography, 152-153. 
320 Roger Fry, “The Art of the Bushmen,” [1910], in Vision and Design, p. 64 (Chatto and Windus: London, 
1924 [reprint: New York: Peter Smith, 1947]). 
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interiority, the black, primitive silhouette represents the commitment to representing the 
unknowable without projecting onto it.   
In this sense primitivism was an aesthetic precursor to the goal Woolf articulated 
in her 1923 review of Revolving Lights, where she wrote that Dorothy Richardson had 
created “a sentence which we might call the psychological sentence of the feminine 
gender.  It is of a more elastic fibre than the old, capable of stretching to the extreme, of 
suspending the frailest particles, of enveloping the vaguest shapes.”321  By contrast, a 
superficially appealing character named Clarissa Dalloway initially enthralls Rachel 
because “she seemed to be dealing with the world as she chose; the enormous solid globe 
spun round this way and that beneath her fingers” (VO 47).  In fact, Clarissa’s poise 
recalls a line from Sir Thomas Browne - “The world that I regard is myself … I use it but 
like my globe, and turn it round sometimes for my recreation … there is all Africa and 
her prodigies in us” - which Woolf elsewhere attacks for its “immense egotism” 
(Common Reader 71-72) and which Conrad would reverse with his ominous line, “the 
mind of man is capable of anything, for all the past is in it, as well as all the future.”  
Clarissa’s husband, Richard, says of the British Empire, “It’s taken a long time, but 
we’ve pretty nearly done it … it remains to consolidate.”322 Richard’s “consolidation” 
and Clarissa’s “solid globe” suggest that Rachel’s ideal language will be far more 
fluid.323   
                                                 
321 Modernism: An Anthology of Documents and Sources, ed. Vassily Kolocotroni, Jane Goldman, Olga 
Taxidou.  U Chicago: 1998, p. 486. 
322 With an irony that is murderous in its unselfconscious assurance, he adds, “It takes all sorts to make a 
world” (VO 51).  In fact, only some “sorts” should be allowed to define the world thereby created. “May I 
be in my grave before a woman has the right to vote in England!” Woolf then puns: “the solemnity of her 
husband’s assertion made Clarissa grave” (VO 43).   
323 A letter of 1905 provides an instance of Woolf imagining her writing through images of voyages, seas, 
and connection between women: “It seems absurd that we should still be in the same place where you left 
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Not only fluid, in fact, but capable of representing experience at an almost pre-
conscious level. In “The Art of the Bushmen” (first printed in 1910), Fry’s appreciation 
of primitive art (a category that included both extant tribal peoples and Paleolithic 
cultures) led him to advance a theory of art that is also a historical hypothesis about 
consciousness and perception.  He begins with cave paintings of “animals trotting.”  
While prior generations of aesthetes dismissed these paintings as crude, he writes, we can 
now see that their “crudity” is in fact a mark of the accuracy of their vision.  “[T]he 
gesture is seen by us to be true only because our slow and imperfect vision has been 
helped out by the instantaneous photograph” (“Bushmen” 60). Edweard Muybridge’s 
stroboscopic photographs of galloping horses prove that the awkward cave-drawings are 
actually perfect renderings of animals running. 
The high-speed camera is a prosthesis as much as a technological achievement; 
the very need to have invented it is symptomatic of the fact that civilization’s successes 
are also failures.  In Fry’s view, “it is to be noted that all the peoples whose drawing 
shows [the highest] power of visualization belong to what we call the lowest of savages” 
(“Bushmen” 61).  The march of civilization causes and results from the loss of this visual 
power.  It was with “Neolithic man,” apparently, that “the conceptual view of nature 
began to predominate” (62).  The unfortunate “habit of thinking of things in terms of 
concepts … deprived him … of the power to see what they looked like.  With Neolithic 
man drawing came to express man’s thought about things rather than his sensations of 
them” (62).  “Civilization” is merely an accumulation of concepts that replace the 
                                                                                                                                                 
us… the Capital—or Mother City of the Empire.… I have been scribbling [reviews] all the time you have 
been sailing, and if all the sheets I have written were pasted together they would just catch you up—all but 
three feet 2 inches and ¼.” Letters of Virginia Woolf, I, 252 [p.211, Nov. 10 1905. 
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instinctual apprehension of the world with a simulacrum of cognitive representations.  
“Paleolithic man,” conversely, was still “at a stage of intellectual development where the 
concepts were not so clearly grasped as to have begun to interfere with perception, and 
where therefore the retinal image passed into a clear memory picture with scarcely any 
intervening mental process” (63).   
Woolf voiced a similar idea. “We look back with envy to those happier warriors,” 
earlier writers, because, with their “simple tools and primitive materials,” the “fight” to 
represent reality “was not so fierce for them as it [is] for us” (Common Reader 207).  The 
fight is fiercer for us because we are burdened with all the modes of representing reality 
that came before us; reality itself has become ever more elusive.  It is the immediate 
translation of experience into memory without conceptual interference—what Woolf 
calls “my capacity for scene-receiving”—that would form the central theory of “A Sketch 
of the Past.”  Woolf’s “instinctive notion” was that “we are sealed vessels afloat upon 
what it is convenient to call reality; at some moments, without an effort, the sealing 
matter cracks; in floods reality; that is a scene” (Sketch, 142).    
It is a theory both of consciousness and of Woolf’s own identity.  The 
“exceptional moments” of her childhood were those in which she ceased to exist as 
something separate from her external environment.  They “brought with them a peculiar 
horror,” a “shock.”  Yet horror was the wrong response: “the shock-receiving capacity is 
what makes me a writer,” since “a shock is at once in my case followed by the desire to 
explain it. … It is only by putting it into words that I make it whole …. Perhaps this is the 
strongest pleasure known to me.  It is the rapture I get in writing”.324  The rapture of 
                                                 
324 “A Sketch of the Past,” in Moments of Being, ed. Jeanne Schulkind (Harcourt: New York, 1985), p. 72. 
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writing lies in the explanation of the shock: self-transcendence recuperates self-
obliteration.  Yet the self in question is itself largely the result of shock.  Woolf’s 
mother’s death “had been a latent sorrow” because “at thirteen one could not master it, 
envisage it, deal with it,” but in its latency it “had toned my mind and made it … 
unnaturally responsive … when once more … the second blow of death struck” (Sketch 
124).  The death of her half-sister Stella two years later “fell on a different substance; a 
mind stuff and being stuff that was extraordinarily unprotected, unformed, unshielded, 
apprehensive, receptive, anticipatory” (124).   
This extending chain of adjectives indicates that Woolf, writing her memoir, is 
not remembering but constructing a self whose primary characteristic is that, like Fry’s 
primitive artist, it is utterly susceptible to experience. The development and refinement of 
this self leads not to stability or identity, but only to ever-greater receptivity.  Even the 
desire to “explain the shock” is a quest for “rapture” -- for being carried away from 
oneself -- and stems from an impersonal instinct.  “These scenes … are not … a literary 
device [;] scene making is my natural way of marking the past.  A scene always comes to 
the top; arranged; representative” (Sketch 142).  Similarly, in “Modern Fiction,” Woolf 
drew a picture of reality as the scoring of the brain by “a myriad impressions—trivial, 
fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel.  From all sides they come, 
an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall… the accent falls differently 
from of old” (CR 212).  Capturing this accent is the true object and goal of novelistic 
representation.  The brain of the writer, like Rachel as she is rolled about by Helen and 
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the jungle floods her senses, and like the retina of the savage, is authentic in its 
impersonal recording of experience.325  
The primitive signifies the primal, natural, pre-subjective openness to experience 
available outside the discourses of “civilization.” This openness is without discernible 
attributes or content—it cannot be defined.  The analogy between Rachel and the 
primitive represents Woolf’s rejection of the drive to define, to impose identity.  Hirst 
argues to Hewet that the tourists live inside tiny “circles,” enclosing only a few people; 
each night, they retreat to the “little boxlike squares” of their hotel rooms (VO 80). In the 
face of encirclement and being boxed in, the primitivist value of inchoate openness 
should be seen not as a failure but as a positive value. 
This valuation of the inchoate and the unknowable is in tension with the 
expectation that Rachel will grow up or be rounded out as a character.  She and Terence 
seem, in the words of one critic, “to come together without past histories …. One learns 
less about [their] pasts than about the pasts of any other characters in the novel … [they] 
inhabit … the province of myth”.326 Rachel, an only child, has no mother; her father is 
distant and has left her uneducated; “friends might have told her things” but she has none, 
having been cloistered with elderly great-aunts (VO 34-5).327  Yet while Rachel’s 
                                                 
325 In A Room With A View, E M Forster mocks a tourist who goes to study “the tactile virtues of Giotto.” 
Oliver Stallybrass identifies the source of Forster’s ire in a contemporary, art-historical argument that these 
“virtues” were superior in the way they struck the optic nerve, as if by touch.  (A Room With A View, 
Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1978, note to p. 38.)  Such theories of unmediated or anti-conceptual aesthetics 
were in the air at the time.  Seurat’s mature paintings, for instance, were based on the theory that separate, 
pure colors were the most effective, pre-conscious way to stimulate nerves. 
326 Virginia Woolf’s First Voyage, pp. 114-15. 
327 The narrative itself, at one level, participates in this desire for Rachel to achieve autonomy.  Rachel, like 
the ship that carries her to the mouth of the Amazon, is “a virgin unknown of men” (VO 32), but upon 
arrival in the tourist colony of Santa Marina, Rachel begins taking walks at night.  She watches “the young 
women, with their hair magnificently swept in coils, a red flower behind the ear, [who] sat on the 
doorsteps, or issued out on to balconies, while the young men range[d] up and down beneath … stopping 
here and there to enter into amorous talk” (VO 99).  With this incipient carnal knowledge, “The girl 
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upbringing is marked by enforced ignorance and the lack of educational opportunities 
Woolf fiercely criticized elsewhere, Rachel ultimately remains “vague” and “unmarked” 
(VO 24) not because she can’t grow up, but because she is less valuable as a character 
than as a focalizer for impersonal moments of being.  Helen Ambrose thinks that 
Rachel’s mind “was in the state of an intelligent man’s in the beginning of the reign of 
Queen Elizabeth; she would believe practically anything she was told, invent reasons for 
anything she said…. [which] had one great advantage…. it put no obstacle in the way of 
any real talent that the pupil might chance to have” (VO 34).  The analogy to the 
Elizabethans implies that a potentially world-changing power resides in Rachel’s very 
distance from modernity.328 
The phrase, “the plunge of speech” suggests that the native women are at the 
bottom of a body of water; the figure recurs when Rachel, dying of fever, is described as 
sinking to the bottom of a body of water where words reach her only as a “dull booming.”  
Like the primitive women, by the end of the novel Rachel is submerged too deeply for 
discursive understanding, and represents a truth that language is inadequate to express.  
                                                                                                                                                 
[became] more definite and self-confident … her skin was brown, her eyes certainly brighter, and she 
attended to what was said as though she might be going to contradict it” (VO 97).  The narrative’s desire 
for autonomy, however, is largely driven by its critique of older characters who stymie or prey upon their 
juniors, as Rachel’s father Willoughby wants to turn her into a perfect “Tory hostess” to replace his 
deceased wife.  “When you consider what a nice girl she was—only just engaged … it seems so tragic,” 
says one tourist of Rachel’s death (VO 364), as if the deaths of girls with no prospects would be preferable. 
328 For Woolf the New World symbolized a challenge to express the vast variety of the unclassified and 
unfamiliar.  Woolf found Hakluyt captured this variety but failed to translate it into a whole greater than the 
sum of its parts.  Hakluyt is “not so much a book as … an emporium, a lumber room strewn with ancient 
sacks … one is forever untying this packet here, sampling that heap over there … while outside tumble the 
huge waves of the uncharted Elizabethan sea” (The Common Reader, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1925; “The 
Elizabethan Lumber Room,” 61-72, p.61).  Like the diversity of the New World, Rachel Vinrace challenges 
conventional representation, and is similarity misrepresented by a monologic discourse.  The motherless 
Rachel needs to find the sort of matrix Woolf intimates in the image of “the Elizabethan sea.” Rachel 
creates a false idol of a politician named Richard Dalloway whom she meets on ship.  Whereas Hakluyt’s 
prose failed “to grasp a thought closely and firmly,” Dalloway “grasped things so firmly but so loosely” 
(VO 47).  
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At her death, Rachel seems to lack the disturbing agency of the native women’s gaze—
but perhaps, if the novel succeeds, it will similarly transfix the reader’s mind’s eye, just 
as the tourists are transfixed by the native women staring them in the face.  The analogy 
between the reader and the tourists suggests an aggressive conception of the novel: that it, 
like the primitive women, represents an uncanny truth.  With such primitivist scenes The 
Voyage Out signals that it does not intend to speak its readers’ language, but to 
undermine it. 
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Creo que sí: Primitivism and the question of belief in D. H. Lawrence 
 
The birthplace of the novel is the solitary individual, who is no longer able  
to express himself by giving examples of his most important concerns, is  
himself uncounselled, and cannot counsel others. To write a novel means to  
carry the incommensurable to extremes in the representation of human life.  
Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller”329 
 
Lawrence wrote that The Plumed Serpent was the novel “that mean[t] the most to 
[him],” the one “closest to [his] heart.” It may be his most critically-reviled novel. It is 
also the work in which he most thoroughly expressed his sense of civilization’s decline, 
and interrogated the possibility of its renovation by imagining the marriage of primitive 
rites to a modern political revolution.  
After the first world war, Lawrence fled England for Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
Australia, and the American southwest on a “savage pilgrimage,” looking “over all the 
world for something that would strike me as religious,” and finding it in Native American 
rituals that he witnessed in New Mexico.330 By “religious” he meant ceremonies and 
rituals that reaffirmed oneness with the world, in which every moment and thing carries 
an immanent spiritual meaning.331 He felt that the sense of oneness or spiritual plenitude 
that still characterized the worldview of “primitive” peoples had once been the general 
possession of all people.332 “White civilization” has lost this worldview and lives in a 
disenchanted world; “our” dominant epistemology derives not from lived experience but 
                                                 
329 Benjamin, Illuminations, (Schocken: New York, 2002), p.87. 
330 D.H. Lawrence, Phoenix, (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1972), p. 143. 
331 “The Indian does not consider himself as created, an therefore external to God, or the creature of God…. 
In everything the shimmer of creation, and never the finality of the created.” Lawrence, Mornings in 
Mexico and Etruscan Places, (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1986), p. 106. 
332 Lawrence described in detail an ancient, world-wide civilization that he hypothesized once existed and 
which explained the presence of common elements in contemporary cultures. Lawrence, Fantasia of the 
Unconscious, and Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1986), p.12. 
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the objectifying study of inanimate objects, “a science of the dead world”; religion has 
degenerated into self-conscious performance for a distant, spectatorial God; and other 
cultural achievements, especially secular art and literature, have fallen even further into 
alienation and anxiety.333 In hindsight, from the regretful point of view of the subject of 
modernity, Lawrence argued that “the supreme lesson of human consciousness is to learn 
how not to know.”334 
Lawrence was not content with melancholic nostalgia for the primitive and his 
forgotten, superior mode of being in the world; he wanted to use the primitive to reform 
modernity. How can one learn to un-know one’s own alienation when alienation is the 
basis of one’s epistemology, even one’s mode of being? The challenge Lawrence set 
himself was thus to mediate the primitive to the modern subject who will only 
unwillingly grant it a hearing. The Plumed Serpent is Lawrence’s response to this 
challenge. 
Focalized through Kate Leslie, the novel represents the attempt of a few Mexicans 
– Don Ramón Carrasco and General Cipriano Viedma – to resuscitate, or reinvent, the 
pre-Colombian religion of Quetzalcoatl. Ramón tries to build an explicitly anti-modern 
national community, where myth rather than democracy is the founding principle. Kate 
agrees that modernity is bankrupt. She is repulsed both by European and American 
“civilization” and by the ressentiment against it that she perceives in Mexico – a country, 
she thinks, that modernity has pushed aside and left behind. But Kate sees no hope for 
Mexico in political revolution, a despair born of the fatal efforts of her late husband, 
                                                 
333 Lawrence, “Indians and Entertainment,” in Mornings in Mexico, op.cit. 
334 Lawrence, Fantasia of the Unconscious, op. cit., p. 76. 
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Joachim (whom we learn about only in the past tense) to foment revolution in their native 
Ireland. 
The Plumed Serpent traces Kate’s struggle to accept the role Ramón and Cipriano 
have projected for her in their primitivist revolution. Kate is to become Malintzi, the 
goddess in a pantheon comprising Queztalcoatl (Ramón) and Huitzilopochtli (Cipriano), 
and to marry the latter. As Ramón’s revolution begins to take control of Mexican 
territory, it unfolds in Kate as well, who tentatively repudiates her civilized, autonomous 
“self” or “individual ego.”  From viewing Cipriano’s pretensions to godhood as 
ridiculous, to fearing that marrying him will lead to her subjugation within a patriarchal 
theocracy, she begins – tentatively – to desire precisely that which will engulf her “old” 
self as the only hope for a new, liberated subjectivity. Lawrence invites the reader to 
identify with Kate at moments when she seems to undergo a sort of conversion, such as 
her realization that “everything is possible, even that oneself is elusive among the gods,” 
but Kate’s struggle does not culminate in a blissful, final conversion. In the last line of 
the novel, she ambiguously accuses, thanks or pleads with Ramón, “you won’t let me 
go!” (PS 341, 420).  
Many critics view the novel’s primitivism as a mask for misogyny, racism and 
neo-colonialism, and often blame what they see as the novel’s aesthetic failure on its 
ideological sins: instead of rendering luminous, human experience, the novel is filled 
with turgid passages describing Ramón and Cipriano’s primitivist rituals.335 The novel’s 
                                                 
335 T S Eliot’s cutting post-mortem review, entitled “The Victim and the Sacrificial Knife” (1934), set the 
tone for critical discussion of The Plumed Serpent: “in his travels to more primitive lands, [Lawrence] 
could never take the crude peoples simply for what they are; he must needs always be expecting something 
of them that they could not give, something peculiarly medicinal for himself” (reprinted in R. P. Draper, D 
H Lawrence: The Critical Heritage, Routledge: 1997, p. 362). Lawrence’s racism, which Eliot handles 
clumsily, has also been censured. Hugh Stevens argues that the novel’s Mexican setting allows 
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politics deserve scrutiny, but as a starting point, its aesthetic choices are particularly 
intriguing. Surely a novel seeking to convert its readers to a “primitive” worldview would 
represent that worldview as attractively as possible – like “somebody in the fresh … 
morning … singing rather beautifully, letting the sound, as it were, produce itself”336 – 
drawing them in through empathetic characters, or the kind of lyrical descriptions of the 
natural landscape that Lawrence had long since mastered. Yet the most surprising feature 
of The Plumed Serpent – which accounts of its aesthetic “failure” tend to overlook – is 
that it does not fail to meet such expectations, but deliberately thwarts them. Why, when 
Kate dons her wedding dress prior to the ritual in which she will incarnate the goddess 
Malintzi, does the narrator mention that she “sighed,” because she saw that the dress 
“was but a shirt with flowers upturned at the bottom” (PS 344)?  Why does the novel, 
which denigrates the “trashy,” “cheap charade” and “frowsty images” of the Catholic 
rites that the Quetzalcoatl religion intends to replace, go on to emphasize that Ramón 
uses three different colors of fireworks to dignify his religious ceremonies? (PS 357, 290, 
                                                                                                                                                 
homoeroticism to coincide with political domination. The “rich” physique of “native” men resembles that 
of “Greek” sculptural nudes, Lawrence tells us. Stevens argues that by choosing Mexico over the 
Mediterranean setting (Greece, Stevens points out, was virtually a homosexual cliché), Lawrence gained 
the benefit of a change of skin color. Instead of statuesque white, the “native men” are a “reddish brown.”  
This racial difference allows Lawrence a free hand to revel in a scopophilic, power-laden relationship to his 
Mexican peons. Other critics also condemn the novel’s sexual investment in authority, but locate this 
investment in its misogyny. Laura Frost reads The Plumed Serpent as representing Lawrence’s libidinal 
authoritarianism – politics and sexuality are both reduced to servant (female) and master (male) 
relationships. Moreover, Frost argues, The Plumed Serpent solves the dilemma of Lawrence’s previous 
novels by replacing the male–male pairs at the center of Aaron’s Rod and Kangaroo with a female–male 
relationship. A woman now represents the subject in need of subjugation, which allows for a less fraught 
eroticisation of male power, as well as a more amenable object of that power. Kate’s masochism frees the 
male–male pair of Ramón and Cipriano from the impossible imperative of representing “good” 
relationships in both political (dominance and submission) and sexual (“balanced,” “star equilibrium”) 
spheres—the imperative, in Frost’s view, which had scuttled the loves of Lilly and Aaron, Kangaroo and 
Somers. The novel is not fully-realized fiction but “pure doctrine,” says Frank Kermode (in Lawrence, 
1973); Michael Bell calls one character’s death “the sign of an ideology that has forgotten humanity.” Bell, 
D. H. Lawrence: Language and Being, (Cambridge: 1992), see chapter 6, “Sentimental primitivism in The 
Plumed Serpent”. 
336 Lawence, The Plumed Serpent, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1988, p. 257. References to this novel are 
hereafter cited in the text as (PS). 
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305) Similarly, Lawrence follows up Cipriano’s proposal to Kate – “won’t you sit beside 
me, and be wife of me when I am a god” – with the following dialogue: “‘I am going to 
be the living Huitzilopochtli,’ he said. ‘Are you? When?’ … ‘On Thursday. The day of 
Huitzilopochtli is to be Thursday.’” (PS 387)  
One might expect that such passages would occur early on in the novel but would 
fade and disappear with Kate’s conversion. But the novel relentlessly calls attention to 
the contrived, cobbled-together nature of supposedly “primitive” rites. Ramón invokes a 
“return” to “ancient” religion and rituals in order to undo the damage of modernity to the 
subject, yet he frequently admits that such a “past” may need to be invented rather than 
rediscovered, inculcated rather than excavated.337 The Plumed Serpent takes as its project 
the reinstatement of a mythic sense of history, but seems to invite the reader into the 
process before the show is ready to be staged, while the costumes are still being sewn and 
the script rewritten; it seems like a camp version of “The Waste Land.”  
Critics have attempted to explain these features of The Plumed Serpent by arguing 
that Lawrence failed to “believe” adequately in his own novelistic project. But it seems 
clear that Lawrence’s “perverse materialism” (PS 318) is intentional, and that his goal 
was not to lull readers into uncritically accepting a primitivist revolution, but to draw 
their attention to the gap between Ramón’s ideal and what he produces. Instead of 
questioning Lawrence’s failure to command belief (or at least the suspension of 
disbelief), I will argue that his novel raises the question of belief in order to show the 
seemingly paradoxical necessity of creating, or making up, something primitive to 
                                                 
337 Lawrence’s voluntarist statements elsewhere invite such a reading; e.g., “I don’t believe in evolution” 
(Mornings in Mexico, “Corasmin and the Parrots”); “I like the wide world of centuries and vast ages – 
mammoth worlds beyond our day, and mankind so wonderful in his distances, his history that has no 
beginning” (Fantasia of the Unconscious, p. 14).  
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believe in. The novel’s foundational claim, typical of primitivism, is that the modern 
artist can and should create objects that subvert the alienated mindset of modern 
civilization by channeling deep psychic and social forces, just as fetishes and rituals 
supposedly do in “primitive” societies, and that do not repress uncouth urges. But The 
Plumed Serpent is unique in its investigation of the related claim that modern subjects 
can invent and respond to rituals as if they themselves were “primitives.” Indeed, 
Lawrence takes this as-if claim as his subject. The entire action of the novel describes the 
construction of Ramón and Cipriano’s cult, and constantly raises the question of how 
modern subjects like Kate could see that cult not just as the strange project of a pair of 
egomaniacs, but as representing something ancient and essential.  
Lawrence exhaustively describes the depravities of modern life – passages that 
serve as evidence in favor of Ramón and Ciprian’s belief-project – and in these and other 
passages the narrative seems to adopt their perspective. But these passages must be 
reconciled with Kate’s skepticism, and the “perverse materialism” described above. 
Lawrence’s novel, strangely enough, is thoroughly concerned with the reader’s attitude: it 
both elicits skepticism and attempts to oblige the reader to question that reaction by 
emphasizing the urgency of creating a belief-system that can save modern civilization.  
 
1. Collapse 
Traveling through Italy in 1911, Lawrence had met an old peasant woman: 
She was spinning [wool], spontaneously, like a little wind. Under her arm she 
held a distaff of dark, ripe wood … with a clutch at the end, like a grasp of brown 
fingers full of … rusty fleece … her fingers were plucking spontaneously at the 
strands of wool … And hanging near her feet, spinning round upon a black thread, 
spinning busily, like a thing in a gay wind, was her shuttle, her bobbin wound fat 
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with the coarse, blackish worsted … “That is an old way of spinning,” I said. 
(Twilight in Italy [1911], 219) 
 
This description may owe something to Lawrence’s reading of E. B. Tylor, the “father of 
anthropology,” who had introduced his concept of “survivals” with the example of an old 
woman with a hand-loom338:  
I know an old Somersetshire woman whose hand-loom dates from the time before 
the introduction of the ‘flying shuttle’, which new-fangled appliance she has never even 
learnt to use, and I have seen her throw her shuttle from hand to hand in true classic 
fashion…. (Tylor 16) 339   
 
In Tylor’s theory, “survivals” are “processes, customs, opinions, and so forth, which have 
been carried on by force of habit into a new state of society different from that in which 
they had their original home.” The survival theory found epistemological value in 
outmoded fragments of the past precisely because they were obsolete.340 For Lawrence, 
the spinning woman’s mentality itself represents a precious survival, an alternative to 
modern anxiety and self-consciousness: 
She knew that I was an inhabitant of lands which she had never seen. But what of 
that! There were parts of her own body which she had never seen, which 
physiologically she could never see. They were none the less her own because she 
had never seen them. The lands she had not seen were corporate parts of her own 
living body, the knowledge she had not attained was only the hidden knowledge 
of her own self. She was the substance of the knowledge, whether she had the 
knowledge in her mind or not. (TiI 220-221)  
 
Describing the woman’s Ptolemaic status as “the sun, the firmament” of her world 
(TiI 220), Lawrence momentarily glimpses a mode of being that is bodily, centered 
without being egocentric, and thus untouched by the alienated anxiety of virtually 
                                                 
338 Tylor, E. B. Primitive Culture (v. 1: The Origins of Culture: Harper, NY, 1958 [1871]). 
339 Within Tylor’s lifetime, piece-work, “cottage” weavers like the old woman could only stay employed by 
lowering the cost of their labor, first to sub-Indian, then to sub-factory levels. See Wolff, Europe and the 
People Without History. 
340 Tylor muses, “It needs but a glance into the trivial details of our own daily life to set us thinking how far 
we are really its originators, and how far but the transmitters and modifiers of the results of long past ages,” 
a “history” that is secretly “stamped” upon both objects and practices (17). 
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everyone else in Europe. The idea of such an authentic, indestructible mentality would 
become increasingly important to Lawrence after the war, when he would elaborate it in 
explicitly primitivist terms. 
Though Lawrence was rejected for military duty due to his delicate health, his 
experience of the First World War was nonetheless hellish. Having married a cousin of 
Manfred von Richtofen (“the Red Baron”) in July 1914, Lawrence became a scapegoat 
after the war began in August. He was guilty by association with the brutish, militaristic 
“Hun,” a stereotype that threatened Britain and democratic civilization itself.341  The 
Lawrences were hounded from Cornwall to London – they were suspected of signaling to 
German submarines off the coast, among other unlikely activities – even as the Defense 
of the Realm Act prevented them from fleeing Britain.342  In the view of one biographer, 
the effects of Lawrence’s wartime persecution on his writing “cannot be 
overestimated.”343  Certainly it is hard to imagine a more vulnerable victim of wartime 
paranoia and routinized intolerance than Lawrence – the slight, tubercular author of such 
volumes of poetry as Birds, Beasts and Flowers!, whom a contemporary called a 
“delicate sensorium, quivering and vociferating to every physical fact.”344  Lawrence 
later lamented, “The War finished me: it was the spear through the side of all sorrows and 
hopes.”345 
                                                 
341 Moore, Gregory. “The Super-Hun and the Super-State: Allied Propaganda and German Philosophy 
during the First World War.” German Life and Letters, Vol. 54 (4), October 2001, p. 310. 
342 The Defense of the Realm Acts of 1914 and 1915 “effectively restricted private travel abroad” for the 
duration of the war. Paul Fussell, Abroad: British Literary Traveling Between the Wars, Oxford: New 
York, 1980, p. 9.  
343 Mark Kinkead-Weekes, “Decolonising Imagination,” in The Cambridge Companion to D.H. Lawrence.  
344 H. M. Tomlinson, Norman Douglas, London: Harper & Brothers, 1931, p. 8. 
345 J. T. Boulton and G. J. Zytaruk, eds., The Letters of D. H. Lawrence (Cambridge: 2002), Vol. 2, p. 268. 
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He fled England in 1919, an end that was the beginning of a period, not much 
beloved of critics, during which he wrote his “leadership novels” – Aaron’s Rod (1922), 
Kangaroo (1923), and The Plumed Serpent (1926). As he traveled from England to Italy, 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Australia, and ultimately the American southwest and Mexico – 
another biographer called this period a “savage pilgrimage” – Lawrence sought 
alternatives to post-war Europe. In his travel writings, Lawrence still found utopias that 
had escaped history – in 1921, for instance, he described Sardinia as a place which no 
civilization had “captured,” a place with “no history, no date, no race, no offering”346 – 
but in his novels he staged a series of violent, anti-democratic revolutions. 
Post-war, Lawrence diagnosed civilization’s decline as terminal; it could not be 
reformed from within. What took root in the arid soil of his disillusionment was 
primitivism. Like T. S. Eliot’s “The Waste Land,” Lawrence’s primitivist works, as he 
put it in his novel The Plumed Serpent, are attempts to rejuvenate an “earth” gone “dry … 
like a memory gone dry and sterile, hellish” (PS 443). In the present, even memory is 
dry; yet beneath the regions accessible to what Proust would call our “memoire 
voluntaire” there exists a buried, primitive substratum, which we can regain and use to 
construct alternative ways to live our lives. In the view of primitivists like Lawrence, 
primitive societies gave expression to eternal, essential human drives, such that the 
primitive society represents the ideal of a community structured by rituals of deep self-
                                                 
346 Lawrence, Sea and Sardinia, op. cit., p. 11. The word “offering” implies that history is comprised of 
idolatrous sacrifices on the bloody altar of nationalisms. Sardinia was an inverted England. England had 
tried to master history and fit other peoples into a grand historical scheme, and for its pains had become an 
offering in 1914-18. Sardinia had suffered, but had never succumbed to the awful fate of a self-imposed 
historical identity. 
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realization and fulfillment. (Lawrence does not dwell on the prohibitions commonly 
associated with primitive societies, such as the incest taboo.)   
Primitivism’s promise thus bears an affinity to the fascist, völkish, and racist 
ideologies that critics have identified in Lawrence’s leadership novels.347 These 
ideologies include the claim that geography and race are deeply linked (an idea satirically 
summed up as “Blut und Boden”) and the subsumption of the individual to his 
racial/national group. Individual fulfillment is accordingly found by playing one’s pre-
determined social role and by participating in collective rituals.348 Those roles and rituals 
were justified as having originated naturally from the interaction of place and people to 
produce a race and a culture to which the individual owed his identity and thus his 
loyalty. Lawrence’s own ostracism and exile evidently bear a complex relationship to the 
appeal that such group- and place-based ideologies held for him, but his disdain for an 
opposing ideology, liberal democracy, is explicable insofar as its promise to defend 
individual freedoms had proved a sham in his case. 
Not only did volkish and racist ideology justify authoritarianism – since great 
leaders could tap into the collective unconscious of their people – but authoritarianism 
was particularly appealing to Lawrence’s post-war politics because he viewed it as the 
best guarantor of individual freedom. “I shall be glad when men hate their common, 
world-alike clothes, when they tear them up and clothe themselves fiercely for 
distinction, savage distinction, savage distinction against the rest of the creeping 
                                                 
347 Most recently, the connections between Lawrence’s fascism and his primitivism have been analysed by 
Jad Smith, “Völkisch Organicism and the Use of Primitivism in Lawrence’s The Plumed Serpent,” D.H. 
Lawrence Review 30:3, 2002. 
348 Cf., e.g., J. W. Barrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (Yale: New Haven, 2000), 
p. 137. 
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world.”349  It is hard to see the writer of these lines joining the Blackshirts, particularly 
after fascism became entrenched. Lawrence’s attraction to authoritarianism stems, at least 
in part, from his fear that democracy is a threat to individual artistic freedom. Another 
experience during Lawrence’s travels in Italy exemplifies his anti-democratic mode. In 
Messina, Lawrence saw two prisoners – one young, one old – on a train platform. 
Sensing “instinctively” that the convicts were “evil,” he mused, “It is a great mistake to 
abolish the death penalty. If I were dictator, I should order the old one to be hanged at 
once.… I must remember again Oscar Wilde on Reading platform, a convict. What a 
terrible mistake, to let oneself be destroyed by a lot of canaille. A man must say his say. 
But noli me tangere [touch me not].”350  Lawrence argues that we need dictators to 
protect unpopular artists from the deadly “touch” of the “canaille” (“the riffraff,” the 
masses). Democracy, in this view, is the anti-individualistic rule of the lowest common 
denominator, which elevates mob prejudices to principles of government. Wilde’s fate 
revealed that democracies pay lip service to freedom of expression but ultimately 
sacrifice individuals who say their say (particularly regarding the love that dare not speak 
its name). What is needed to save the Wildes of the future, Lawrence argues, is a society 
in which power is centralized in a dictator who can recognize and protect genius from the 
threatening members of the masses.  
The war had “finished” more than Lawrence’s faith in liberal democracy.351  It 
destroyed his belief in Progress itself: his sense that “the great procession is marching, on 
                                                 
349 Sea and Sardinia (1921), p. 103. The Blackshirts, which became the paramilitary wing of Mussolini’s 
Fascist party, was first formed in 1919. 
350 Lawrence, Sea and Sardinia (Doubleday: New York, 1954 [1923]), pp. 18-19. 
351 In The Plumed Serpent, Lawrence’s scorn for political ideologies is as capacious as it is merciless. 
Democratic socialism is variously the “inferiority complex” of the “bottom dog,” or an intellectual fad of 
cosmopolitan dilettantes. Capitalism finds an apoplectic old American spokesman in a certain Judge 
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the whole, in the right direction,” and his “wonder” at the “great purpose” behind this 
advance.352  Consequently Lawrence also lost his faith that, as a writer, “I can help the 
march.”  His goal, he remarked in 1912, was to “bludgeon [the English] into realizing 
their own selves” with his work.353 He repeated a version of this motto a year later: “I do 
write because I want folk – English folk – to alter, and have more sense”.354  In the view 
of biographer John Worthen, the war shattered Lawrence’s confidence that these goals 
were attainable:  
At a stroke, the country's energies re-directed themselves into barbarous 
opposition, hatred and a relapse into communal - not individual - emotion; and the 
writer who believed in the progress and development of “the great racial or 
human consciousness, a little of which is in me” and who wanted people to read 
his fictions and “be made alert and active” (Letters II: 302), to alter their 
relationships, to realize their own hearts and desires, felt himself utterly 
displaced.355 
 
The war revealed a scale of failure and barbarism that extended well beyond 
England’s borders.356  With his “savage pilgrimage,” Lawrence – like many post-war 
writers – attempted to escape civilization for the ends of the earth. A contemporary, H. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Burlap. To Lawrence, partisans of the former ideology want all of society to be geared toward their own 
benefit, and hide their concern with their own welfare by touting the common weal. Capitalists, despite 
surface differences, are equally egocentric. Both ideologies were mere symptoms of the egotism and 
alienation to which the modern subject is condemned. Similarly, Lawrence saw such peace-making efforts 
as the League of Nations as top-down attempts to codify relations between subjects, which encouraged 
individuals to accept shallow, managerial definitions of themselves.  
352 G. T. Boulton, ed., The Letters of D.H. Lawrence (Cambridge: 2002), Vol. I: 57 (hereafter cited as 
“Letters I”). John Worthen quotes these letters in his D H Lawrence: The Life of an Outsider, London: 
2005, Chapter 10: “In England at War.” 
353 Letters, Vol. I, p. 424. 
354 Ibid., p. 544. 
355 See Worthen, Lawrence, op. cit., Chapter 4. 
356 In 1898, Conrad published Mr. Kurtz’s expression, “the horror, the horror,” to communicate the 
uncanny realization that the seemingly vast distance between civilization and the savages of the jungle was 
illusory. The uncanny, unsettling effect depends on the terms, civilization and savagery, retaining their 
meanings. After the war, the terms’ meanings had inverted. In 1918, Theodore Roosevelt, reviewing 
William Beebe’s Jungle Peace, wrote, “This volume was written when the author’s soul was sick of the 
carnage which has turned the soil of Northern France into a red desert of horror. To him the jungle seemed 
peaceful…”  Beebe and Roosevelt identified the “horror” with Europe; the savage jungle was peaceful by 
comparison. 
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M. Tomlinson, traveled as far as Borneo, only to meet another veteran who remarked, 
“The Somme told me all I wanted to know of Europe – that and the Vimy Ridge …. 
[D]on’t worry about me. I shall be fine here with the orang-utans.”357 
The war had shattered Lawrence’s self-image as a writer contributing to the more-
or-less inevitable creation of a society which would enable each individual to fully realize 
herself. Before the war, Lawrence had written that his goals were to reestablish a lost 
connection with a deeper identity, a “great racial or human consciousness,” which is also 
the source of individual “alertness” and “sense.”  Giving expression to this consciousness 
would be “a sort of answer to the want of today: to the real, deep want of the English 
people.”358 Having then found himself exiled not only from England, but from the 
narratives “civilization” used to describe itself, Lawrence continued to believe in the 
existence of a deep, “racial or human consciousness.” Indeed, after the war, there was 
little else in which to believe. At this impasse, primitivism offered Lawrence the means to 
create a ground for artistic production that was outside modernity and free from its 
corruption, while also remaining, as a critical discourse, connected and relevant to 
modernity.  
 
2. Lawrence’s primitivist turn 
The late 19th century saw “Europe … gripped by the fear that its ‘superior races’ 
were in decline.”359  By the 1890s, Britain faced a decline in her “national health” that 
                                                 
357 Tomlinson, 1923, quoted in Paul Fussell, Abroad: British Literary traveling between the Wars (Oxford: 
1980), p. 7. 
358 Letters Vol. I, p. 511. 
359 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (Vintage: New York, 2000), p. 82. 
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was blamed on unsanitary urban living conditions, poor nutrition, and overwork.360 More 
troubling still was the possibility that these or other external circumstances were leading 
to the degeneration of the British race itself – the human organism as it existed in the 
British Isles.361  Such fears only increased with the First World War, which caused the 
deaths of around 13 million Europeans.362  The trope of civilization’s decline fed the 
discourse of primitivism, which saw the primitive as hardy, masculine, self-sufficient, 
and at one with an unspoiled environment.363  
In Aaron’s Rod, Rawdon Lilly thinks that the European upper classes – “this little 
gang of wastrels” – have “exterminated all the peoples worth knowing.” He muses, “I 
would have loved the Aztecs and the Red Indians…. The American races – and the South 
Sea Islanders – the Marquesans, the Maori blood.” The peoples who are thriving are 
another matter. “I can’t do with folk who teem by the billion, like the … Orientals .…  
Only vermin teem by the billion.”364 The world, in Lilly’s view, is evidently in need of a 
good exterminator. The wastrels are responsible for letting the world be overrun with 
vermin, and both are equidistant from the preferable but absent primitive. Nonetheless, 
the primitive remains eerily present, capable of holding up a mirror to the Medusa’s head 
of civilization. In Studies in Classic American Literature he predicts – he almost vows – 
                                                 
360 Fred Reid, “The Disintegration of Liberalism, 1895-1931,” in The Context of English Literature 1900-
1930, ed. Michael Bell (Holmes and Meier: NY, 1980), p.97-100. 
361 See, e.g., Max Nordau, Degeneration, which intermixes analysis of individual physiological and more 
abstract cultural degeneration. 
362 Mazower, op cit., p. 78. 
363 Sir Arthur Keith, an eminent anthropologist, “contrasted the life led by modern city-dwellers with that of 
their ‘tribal ancestors’ … Whereas ancient village life was supposed to have bred a sense of community and 
encouraged child-rearing, the modern city offered … temptations which threatened family solidarity and 
fed individual selfishness and alienation.”  Mazower, p. 93. 
364 Lawrence, Aaron’s Rod (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1950 [1922]), pp. 118-120. Hereafter cited in the 
text as (AR). 
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that once the last “red man” dies, the murderous “white man” will be haunted and 
tormented by the ghost of the Indian.365 
In passages like these, the primitive signals complete alienation: Lawrence’s 
antipathy towards modernity is so all-consuming that he equates authenticity with the 
primitive’s very extinction, as if the fact of having already been exterminated spared him 
the degradations of modernity. In Women in Love a kindred misanthropy underlies Rupert 
Birkin’s apocalyptic musings on a post-human world, which he describes as “a beautiful 
clean thought, a world empty of people, just uninterrupted grass, and a hare sitting up”.  
The technique of identifying with a privileged, authentic, disappearing primitive 
essence while debasing one’s conscious ego seems an almost masochistic response to the 
pressures that modernity was placing upon its subjects. Primitivism, perhaps, results from 
a subject under threat identifying threatened existence with a higher form of subjectivity. 
Primitivism reproduces the absent, ever-receding primitive within the modern subject – as 
a deep essence that can neither represent itself, not be easily grasped or identified without 
a kind of violation. But primitivism’s insistence on the purity of the long-distant primitive 
represents both a protest against and an attempt to overcome the inauthentic, alienated, 
corrupting influence of modernity. 
Lawrence uses the primitive – akin to a beautiful clean thought in a world run by 
wastrels and teeming with vermin – to create a cordon sanitaire around his protagonists, 
immunizing them from the modern diseases of alienation and inauthenticity. Aaron’s Rod 
thus describes an upper-class Christmas party at which Josephine Ford suggests, “it 
would be pretty to put candles on one of the growing trees, instead of having a 
                                                 
365 Lawrence, “The Spirit of Place,” Studies in Classic American Literature (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 
1990). 
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Christmas-tree indoors” (AR 42). The rest of the party instantly cheapens her suggestion: 
“We ought to do a ritual dance! We ought to worship the tree’” (AR 44). The party-
goers’ mock-ritual is a symptom of alienation, something done merely to pass the time. 
When Aaron, a working class “man from the coal-pit,” stumbles upon the party, his 
origins immunize him to these wastrels’ disease. Aaron is thus linked to Josephine, whom 
the narrator unexpectedly remarks “had some aboriginal American in her blood” (AR 
60). When the group of party-goers later attends a performance of Aïda, Josephine “was 
filled with disgust”; she “looked down with the fixed gravity of a Red Indian, immovable, 
inscrutable” (AR 61). Josephine’s primitive blood rebels at the “the sham Egypt of Aïda 
[which] hid from her nothing of its shame.… The vulgar bodies of the fleshy women 
were unendurable.… [T]he leading tenor … looked like a eunuch.”  Turning to “the 
audience,” she sees “a million heads, a million hands, and one monstrous, unnatural 
consciousness” (AR 60-62). Among the fleshpots of Aïda, Josephine singles out Aaron in 
the orchestra pit, distinguishing him: “‘It is he,’ she said quietly” (AR 69). A primitive 
authenticity saves Lawrence’s protagonists from an all-pervasive, unnatural 
consciousness, even as they must live their lives surrounded by it.  
As Lawrence used primitivist discourse to signal the authenticity of characters 
within his novels, he used it to construct the novels themselves as authentic artifacts 
unsullied by the modern degradation they described and represented. The primitive 
allowed him to imagine modernity from the outside, granting him a distance from which 
to enter into dialogue with an otherwise nightmarish and claustrophobic historical 
moment.  
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The textual history of Women in Love indicates that Lawrence used primitivist 
discourse to clear a space for imaginative production. The Sisters, the ur-text of the 
Brangwen saga, “began with a plot for Women in Love,” but after writing it, Lawrence 
“proceeded backwards in fictional time,” writing The Rainbow, which traces the pre-
history of Women in Love.366  Lawrence’s drafts of The Rainbow, in turn, pushed farther 
and farther back into the past. The final version opens with a set of repetitive, cyclical 
actions closely connected to the land, which are described from a non-individualized 
point of view. Lawrence describes the Brangwen men as they seek out and participate in 
the seasonal, natural rhythms of “pulsing,” “sowing,” and “inseminating.”  Critics have 
interpreted the opening of The Rainbow as drawing on contemporary ideas of primitive 
societies, which included a cyclical sense of time and a deep connection to the natural 
environment.367  Indeed, Lawrence used the same trope a decade later to describe a 
Native American dance: 
The spirits of the men go out … seeking the creative presence … in the creative 
pulse, on and on into the … maize that lies under the ground, there, with the 
throbbing, pulsing, clapping rhythm that comes from the dark, creative blood … 
to stimulate the … seed-germ, till it throws forth its rhythms of creative energy 
into rising blades of leaf and stem.368 
 
Lawrence’s movement of the Brangwen saga back in time until he had reached an 
ahistorical, primitive moment, allowed him to begin his fiction from a point outside of the 
historical epoch he sought to critique. Lawrence wanted his novels “to be a great kick at 
misery,” but lacked models; he found that “all the modern stuff since Flaubert … seems 
                                                 
366 Charles L. Ross, Women in Love: A Novel of Mythic Realism, p. 6. 
367 Michael Bell, drawing on the work of Ernst Cassirer, argues that The Rainbow recapitulates the 
anthropological hypothesis of human development from primitive to civilized, which was prominent in 
Lawrence’s day. Bell, Primitivism (Methuen: London, 1972). 
368 Lawrence, Mornings in Mexico, op. cit., 107-109. 
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like an acceptance”.369 The primitivist tropes that Lawrence uses to open The Rainbow 
represent a way to avoid the kind of social realism he repudiated. The novel’s ahistorical 
opening, in this reading, frames the subsequent narrative as a tragic fall into modernity; 
primitivism gives Lawrence a running start for his kick at misery, it opens a space in 
which his own creativity could operate unhindered. The opening of The Rainbow 
represents Lawrence’s discovery of a kind of pure story which his own “creative energy” 
could spark into life.370 
 
3. The answer to alienation 
Primitivist discourse gave Lawrence a foundation from which to write, grounding 
his attempts to imagine an alternative to the misery of modern life, because it posited the 
existence of a distant, remote and uncorrupted essence that could nonetheless be 
retrieved. By the same token, primitivism provided Lawrence with a diagnosis of 
civilization and its discontents.  
Lawrence’s starting point is that the modern reader is alienated but aching for 
something other than his current lot. This alienation is inherent in our intellectual, 
ratiocinative, objectifying mode of perceiving the world. Intellectual historians have 
argued, for instance, that the modern sense of history, unlike the mythic sense, is 
                                                 
369 Letters, Vol. I, p. 459. 
370 By using primitivist tropes to push backward in time, thus increasing the chronological referents of his 
fiction, Lawrence was making a typical modernist move. Michael Levenson notes that in editing “The 
Waste Land,” Eliot and Ezra Pound replaced allusions to relatively recent cultural texts with allusions to 
relatively distant ones. By describing the misery of modernity in so many historically diverse voices, the 
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anxiously aware of the presence of alternative histories that need to be refuted.371  To 
refute them requires one to produce an “objective” or “disinterested” point of view from 
which to deliver one’s refutation. By the 19th century, this approach had been adopted by 
critical scholars. The study of unfounded beliefs would help humanity consciously seize 
its historical destiny.372  But while criticism had devalued myth it offered nothing in 
return as an object of belief, even as it alienated modern subjects from the myths that had 
generated truth-value for subjective experiences.373 Nietzsche, whose influence on 
Lawrence critics have thoroughly explored, bemoaned “the loss of myth, of a mythic 
home, a mythic womb”: “Man today, stripped of myth, stands famished among all his 
pasts” (Birth of Tragedy, Ch. 23). Lawrence felt that the wheel had begun to turn full 
circle. Ancient “myths now begin to hypnotize us” because “our … impulse” towards 
other “ways of understanding” is “spent” (Fantasia of the Unconscious 13).  
Lawrence argued that “white civilization” has condemned itself to 
disenchantment. Our perception of the world is predetermined by our objectifying 
episteme, which strips its objects of any spiritual significance.374 We exclude ourselves 
                                                 
371 Tony Judt, The Burden of Responsibility,(Chicago University Press: 1998), p.4.  
372 A colorful example is Max Nordau, the author of Degeneration, in his attack on the Hebrew Bible: “We 
find collected in this book the superstitious beliefs of the ancient inhabitants of Palestine … which are 
rarely distinguished by beauties of the highest order but frequently by superfluity of expression, coarseness, 
bad taste, and genuine Oriental sensuality. As a literary monument the Bible is of … late origin … as a 
work of literary merit it is surpassed by everything written in the last 2000 years by authors even of second 
rank … [it is] childish and its morality [is] revolting… And yet men… pretend to reverence this ancient 
work … and they pretend to be … inspired when they read it.” “The Lie of Religion,” 1883, quoted in 
Stanislawski, Michael, Zionism and the Fin de Siècle: Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism from Nordau to 
Jabotinsky, University of California Press: Berkeley, 2001. 
373 Wyndham Lewis argued that the dominance of the critical approach had transformed art: “…none of the 
pictorial and plastic arts… are today any more than an adjunct to the critical and historic faculty. The 
contemporary audience is essentially an audience of critics. They are, that is to say, as active as the 
performer—who indeed, exists chiefly in order that the critic may act—as a Critic. The only rationale of 
the professional artist at the present moment is to provide the critic with material for criticism.” (Lewis, The 
Dithyrambic Spectator, p. 170). 
374 “Indians and Entertainment,” Mornings in Mexico, p. 50. 
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from the world by our disinterested, instrumental relationship to it. The result is a kind of 
infernal spectatorship, in which the ways we seek to find “satisfaction” (a negative, 
loaded word for Lawrence) distance us from the objectified source of pleasure, when we 
should rather open ourselves to it. Like the unnatural, million-headed audience attending 
Aida, “we go to the theater to be entertained … to be taken out of ourselves,” but our 
capacity to do so has been corroded by our egocentric worldview. What we really want is 
not to lose ourselves but “to become spectators at our own show. We lean down from the 
plush seats like little gods … and see ourselves away below there, on the world of the 
stage … we see ourselves: we survey ourselves … we are the gods above of our own 
destinies.”375  
Our religious rituals, and our art and literature, have degenerated into a closed 
circuit of self-conscious performances, at a cost that is far worse than mere boredom. In 
reality, we can barely stand the success of our efforts to make our lives predictable and 
controllable: “Oh, God, to be free of all the hemmed-in life, the horror of human tension, 
the absolute insanity of machine persistence.”376  The vaunted individualism of civilized 
people is a mirage. “Men today were half-made, women were half-made … half-
responsible … acting in terrible swarms … to avoid the responsibility of achieving any 
more perfected being or identity. The queer, rabid hate of being urged on into purer self. 
The morbid fanaticism of the non-integrate” (PS 115).377   
                                                 
375 Ibid. 
376 Lawrence, Sea and Sardinia, p. 35. 
377 Lawrence’s critique evokes, perhaps, Georg Simmel’s thesis that the hypertrophy of individuality in 
modernity—as seen, for instance, in the dandy’s cultivation of idiosyncrasies—is an adaptive characteristic 
of people in “the metropolis,” who must fight the tendency toward anonymity (or meaninglessness as an 
individual) in an environment where an abstraction, money, is the source of all value.  
156 
 
Lawrence viewed the primitive as having retained a participatory mode of 
dwelling in a spiritually meaningful world.378  It was an anthropological commonplace 
among contemporary authors (from Tylor to Frazer to Levy-Bruhl) that the “primitive 
mentality” revolved around an animistic perception of the natural environment, in which 
each tree or rock had a spirit dwelling within. In Lawrence’s view, the primitive 
experienced his environment as brimming with spiritual significance.379 For “the Indian,” 
there is no self-God-world division; “everything is godly,” and the ritual performance is 
not done for an audience but to break through to and more fully embody that godliness. 
To Lawrence, in a world that had just survived the War, the primitive represented the 
continuing possibility of experiencing what Freud would call “the oceanic.” 
The primitive’s animistic worldview meant that the quotidian objects of his life 
took on a heightened, experiential significance that our own society’s artworks can barely 
aspire to in the modern spectator’s experience. Moreover, unlike art today, art in 
primitive cultures played a central role in communal life as well as in individual 
experience. “Only a horizon ringed about with myths can unify a culture,” Nietzsche 
claimed, and the “images of myth” function as “daemonic guardians” in such a culture, 
“presiding over the growth of the child’s mind and interpreting to the mature man his life 
and struggles” (Birth of Tragedy, Ch. 23). The primitive, myth-enacting ritual came to 
represent a cultural ideal, where social unity depended upon art, and art opened up 
society as a whole to experiencing spiritual significance. 
                                                 
378 Lawrence argued that the spirituality of “primitive” societies had survived from a lost, ancient 
civilization, Atlantis, from which all people are descended. Fantasia of the Unconscious, p. 12. 
379 “… Creation is a great flood, forever flowing, in lovely and terrible waves.” Mornings in Mexico, p. 
106. 
157 
 
Lawrence read Jane Harrison’s influential Ancient Art and Ritual (1913) on the 
origins of Greek drama.380  Harrison argued that primitive rituals were artistic forms 
originating in spontaneous, “deep,” communally-“shared emotions” about individual and 
communal survival. In short, rituals were born from the anxieties about “food and 
children” that were aroused each year by the change from the growing and reaping 
seasons to winter. The natural environment affected everyone in a primitive community 
similarly, and artists expressed these common responses in ways that were 
simultaneously spiritual, communal, and aesthetic. In ancient Greece, where art and ritual 
had not yet split apart, Harrison argues, “it is … one and the same impulse that sends a 
man to church and to the theater” (9). Religious theater, or ritual, represented primitive 
man’s attempts to influence the environment by enacting what was needed for his 
community’s survival—rain, a good harvest, the return of the sun. Historically, “there is 
no division at first between actors and spectators… all are actors, all are doing the thing 
done, dancing the dance danced … whereas … now … most are spectators, watching, 
feeling, thinking, not doing” (126).381  
Harrison’s present tense “is” makes the ancient Greeks a source of possibility for 
the modern reader. The opening of The Plumed Serpent diagnoses the modern condition 
by inverting the opening of Ancient Art and Ritual almost exactly. Harrison begins by 
                                                 
380 Lawrence’s reading about primitive peoples was extensive, and included Leo Frobenius, James Frazer, 
Jane Harrison, and E. B. Tylor. 
381 Harrison notes that “the oldest festival of Dionysos was … held [not in an amphitheater but]… in the 
agora, or market place” (Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, Thornton Butterworth: London, 1913, p. 127). 
Lawrence’s “Market Day,” in Mornings in Mexico, celebrates the market as a kind of ritual space: “In the 
old world, men make themselves two great excuses for coming together to a center, and commingling 
freely in a mixed, unsuspicious host. Money and religion. (MM 88)… [T]hey have had their moment of 
contact and centripetal flow. They have been part of a great stream of men flowing to a center, to the 
vortex… they have felt life concentrate upon them, they have been jammed between the soft hot bodies of 
strange men come from afar, they have had the sound of strangers’ voices in their ears… there is no goal, 
and no abiding place, and nothing is fixed… (MM 95)” 
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imagining an “Athenian citizen … passing through the entrance gate to the theatre” to 
attend the Dionysian festival. He is “at once on holy ground … [and] pay[s] nothing for 
his seat; his attendance is an act of worship” (Ancient Art 10). The Plumed Serpent opens 
with foreign tourists buying tickets to a Mexican bullfight “in [a] concrete and iron 
amphitheatre. A real gutter-lout came … to see which seats they had booked … in a … 
big concrete beetle trap” (PS 12). As Harrison describes Athens, “the theatre is open to 
all … but the ordinary man will not venture to seat himself in the front row. … [There,] 
the seats have backs … [and] on each seat the name of the owner is inscribed … all 
priests” (Ancient Art 10-11). At the Mexican bullfight, “a few commonplace people in an 
expanse of concrete were the elect” (PS 19), the President never arrives, and “anybody 
who was anything sat … at the top of the amphitheater,” “far away” from the front 
row.382  The Greek religious ceremony involved several “chosen young men of the 
Athenians, in the flower of their youth—epheboi.”  At the bullfight, “four grotesque and 
effeminate-looking fellows in tight, ornate clothes were the heroes. With their rather fat 
posteriors and their squiffs of pigtails and their clean-shaven faces, they looked like 
eunuchs, or women in tight pants, these precious toreadors” (PS 19). The ancient 
Athenian bull “was … the primitive incarnation of the god … Dionysos himself was 
brought to the theatre … It was expressly ordained that the bull should be ‘worthy of the 
god’”” (Ancient Art 12). In Mexico City, on “the Sunday after Easter,” “special bulls had 
                                                 
382 Those who “venture” to sit up front are like waves in a flood of filth: “the masses in the middle, 
unreserved seats suddenly burst and rushed down on to the lowest, reserved seats … like a burst reservoir 
… [they] poured down … round and about our astonished, frightened trio” (PS p. 13, 16; the scene recalls 
Klaus Theweleit’s thesis, in Male Fantasies, that fascism was built around a fantasy of masculinity as 
armored, distinct and hard, and opposed to the wet, flowing, mingling qualities of the feminine. While 
Lawrence’s primitivism shares a good deal with fascism, it goes beyond fascism’s emphasis on hardness 
and separateness, to insist on the openness to experience and the identification with the world – qualities 
that Lawrence praised as “religious”).  
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been brought over from Spain … [due to] the lack of ‘pep’… in the native animal” (PS 
11). The protagonist, Kate Leslie, “had always been afraid of bulls, fear tempered with 
reverence of the great Mithraic beast. [But] now she saw how stupid he was, in spite of 
his long horns and his massive maleness” (PS 21). 
The opening scene of The Plumed Serpent, which inverts Harrison’s study, also 
inverts Lawrence’s own use of primitivism in the Brangwen saga. The Rainbow began 
with the communal scene of men reaping and sowing. Because this iterative, ahistorical 
starting-point did not need to be explained in terms of cause and effect, it enabled 
Lawrence to avoid representations that, in his view, would have amounted to 
surrendering to the modern status quo. By contrast, The Plumed Serpent begins from the 
bottom of the modern gutter. By describing that gutter in terms that are the perfect mirror 
image of the primitive rituals Harrison describes, Lawrence signals that his novel will 
provide an answer to the misery the Brangwen novels kicked against.  
Like the “evil” convicts on the train platform in Italy who reminded Lawrence of 
the sacrifice of Oscar Wilde, and like the “million-headed” audience at Aida, the 
audience at the bullfight reveals the inability of modern individuals to perceive and 
respond to art in the right way. The bullfight is a “shameless spectacle” (Quetzalcoatl 
7).383  And as a degenerate ritual, the bullfight’s very ugliness points back to its primitive 
origin. Where Kate had hoped to see “a gallant display”, she sees a horse being gored 
“before she could look away” (Q 6-8). The goring is represented in disgusting detail, and 
Kate is “shocked.”  But more disturbing still is the realization that modern people, from 
the “degenerate mob of Mexico city” (PS 19) on up the social ladder, want to be shocked. 
                                                 
383 Quetzalcoatl was a completed novel, which Lawrence revised and published as The Plumed Serpent. 
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The final straw, for Kate, is an American tourist’s desire to watch even the goring, 
“craning his neck in one more frantic effort to see” (Q 15, emphasis in original). The 
credo of primitive participation has been replaced by the perverse, collective desire for a 
new sensation, a new experience.  
What is needed is a return to active, participatory belief. The opposite of the 
bullfight’s filthy display—“‘they might as well sit and enjoy someone else’s diarrhea,’ 
thought Kate” (PS 24)—is the cleansing theme of a later chapter, “The First Waters,” 
about Ramón’s primitive revolution. The opposite of the self-willed, visual “shock” of 
the bullfight, is the ritual beating of a drum that “acts on the helpless blood direct” (PS 
349). As modern mass-spectacles represent what we have become, Lawrence implies, 
mythic rituals could help return us to who we really are. 
 
4. The question of belief  
We return to the question of why The Plumed Serpent draws attention to the 
creakiness of its own primitivist plot, as it recounts the Quixotic attempts of Don Ramón 
Carrasco and General Cipriano Viedma to resuscitate, or reinvent, the pre-Colombian 
religion of Quezalcoatl.  
Ramón is repelled by European and American civilization, but is particularly 
harsh when describing Mexico, which he sees as overtaken by ressentiment. Modern 
Mexicans are “reptilian”: a “people who never really changed. Men who were not faithful 
to life, to the living actuality. Faithful to some dark necessity out of the past” (PS 432). 
Realizing that this dark, ancient aspect of the Mexican character had grown bitter under 
conquest, forgetfulness, and the resentment of the wealth of other nations, Ramón 
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launches a revolution. He reincarnates Mexico’s ancient rituals and in the process deifies 
himself: he becomes Quetzalcoatl, the mythic winged snake of the title. Improbably 
enough, by novel’s end, the revolutionaries appear to be succeeding. The “men of 
Quetzalcoatl” have taken over a town, repurposed a Catholic church, repelled an attack, 
executed spies and traitors, and infiltrated the Mexican army. Such is the weakness of 
modern Mexico, and such the strength of her ancient rituals. 
Primitivist themes seem inherently difficult to novelize. Lawrence emphasized 
that a primitive drumbeat “wakes dark, ancient echoes in the heart of every man, the thud 
of the primeval world,” whether it is “heard in … Ceylon, from the temple,” or in “the 
north, when the Red Indians were dancing,” or in central Mexico (PS 348).384  But 
Samuel Johnson’s dismissive quip, “one set of savages is like another,” hints that 
primitivist narratives focused on basic, common human characteristics, maybe doomed to 
work against the grain of the novel as a genre. The Plumed Serpent attempts to establish 
primitivism as an alternative to the modern sense of history and character, without 
realizing how deeply implicated it is, as a novel, in this very sensibility.385  The basic, 
primitive desires Lawrence celebrates, paradoxically militate against Kate’s “awakening” 
                                                 
384 Ramón also holds to a variant theory, such that he justifies his revolution as the truest expression of the 
culture born of a specific locale. Thus the Germans, Irish, and Mexicans all need to “substantiate” different 
gods (cf. PS 278, 375, 443). Ramón reconciles the two primitivisms by arguing, “the final mystery is one 
mystery. But the manifestations are many” (375). Ramón recapitulates a völkish nationalist trope, 
descended from Herder’s concept of each “world-historical” nation’s “mission.”  See J. W. Barrow, The 
Crisis of Reason, op. cit., p. 136. 
385 The Plumed Serpent was hardly alone in turning to myth as an answer to the illegitimacy of the age. 
Modernism has been characterized by a widespread desire to escape from history through the 
“transformation of historical imagination into myth—an imagination for which time does not exist.”  
Joseph Frank coined the term “spatial form” to describe the literary results of that desire (The Widening 
Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in Modern Literature, Rutgers: 1963, p. 60). But Lawrence’s novel does not 
formally embody such a transformation. To write that “sometimes, the day of historic humanity would melt 
out of Kate’s consciousness, and she would begin to approximate to the old mode of consciousness, the old, 
dark will… non-cerebral, but vertebrate” (PS 431) is to describe, but not to re-present Kate’s primitive state 
of mind. Lawrence’s novel is formally conservative. 
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plot, which requires interiority and character-development. Critics have almost 
unanimously seen the main characters of The Plumed Serpent as “two-dimensional.”386  
The Plumed Serpent insists that Ramón’s primitive revolution had to create the 
past on which it based itself. In particular, Lawrence draws attention to the fact that 
Ramón’s primitivism is a pragmatic response to contemporary needs—yet primitivism 
claimed to provide an answer to those needs precisely because it was in contact with an 
ancient, prehistorical essence that pre-existed them. Take for example the description of 
Ramón’s creation of a small Quetzalcoatl cottage industry: children weave ceremonial 
serapes, a sculptor chisels gods according to blueprints, a blacksmith creates an iron ikon. 
The making of “beautiful things” (183) is conceived, à la William Morris, as unalienated 
craftsmanship.387  There is also a hint of William Yeats’s Byzantium, where “religious, 
aesthetic and practical life were one.” 388  Ramón is not content to daydream of a non-
fragmented, non-alienated culture. “The Irish,” Ramón tells Kate, “have been so wordy 
about their far-off heroes and green days of the heroic gods. Now tell them to substantiate 
them, as we have tried to substantiate Quetzalcoatl and Huitzilopochtli” (443).389  
Byzantium must be rebuilt. Yet the narrator’s insistence on the materiality of Ramón’s 
                                                 
386 André Malraux similarly criticized Lady Chatterley’s Lover because “the entire technique of the novel is 
concentrated in the means the author uses to substitute for sexuality the living character of Mellors, or vice-
versa” (reprinted in R.P. Draper, D.H. Lawrence: The Critical Heritage, op. cit., p. 197). 
387 A “pudgy” sculptor is saved by his love for Ramón and pride in his work: “his fat, pale face took on an 
expression of peace, a noble, motionless transfiguration, the blue-grey eyes calm, proud, reaching into the 
beyond” (PS 185). Similarly, the men Ramón finds to sing the “songs of Queztalcoatl” are singers rescued 
from alcoholism and the gutters of Mexico City. 
388 A Vision, quoted in the Norton Anthology of Poetry, 3rd Ed. (Norton: New York), p. 886. Yeats 
envisioned Byzantium as that-which-modernity-is-not: “the painter, the mosaic worker, the worker in gold 
and silver, the illuminator of sacred books, were almost impersonal, almost perhaps without the 
consciousness of individual design, absorbed in their subject-matter and that the vision of a whole people.” 
389 Yeats’s Celtic Mystical Order, which researched and even attempted to reenact ancient Irish rituals – 
partly in an attempt to counteract Protestantism – was actually a step closer to “substantiating” myth than 
Lawrence’s envisioned “Ramanim,” a “spiritual community” he planned to launch. On Yeats, see Patricia 
Rae, “Anthropology,” A Companion to Modernist Literature and Culture (Wiley-Blackwell: 2008), ed. 
David Bradshaw, Kevin Dettmar, p. 97. 
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props is nonetheless strange, because it serves to remind us that they have all been 
designed by Ramón only moments before: “two hoops of iron, one smaller than the 
other”; “some flat discs of iron, triangular in shape”;  “two heavy hand-looms,” “a zig-
zag border of natural black wool and blue, in little diamonds, and the ends a complication 
of blackish and blue diamond-pattern”; “the man was just beginning to do the center … 
and he looked anxiously at the design that was tacked to the loom” (PS 182, 185, 186). 
The craftsman is anxiously working from a design, evidently drawn up by Ramón in a 
moment of arts-and-crafts inspiration, when the essence of primitivism’s claim was that 
the craftsman drew only on deep, inner, authentic, spiritually meaningful drives. 
Ramón’s wife, Carlota, decries the “buffoonery” of “this Quetzalcoatl business” 
as a ruse, masking “vanity” and lust for “power” (PS 201, 174). Ramón, “an educated 
man,” “can’t really believe” such “nonsense” (PS 174, emphasis in original). Carlota 
dies, but her criticism lives on. Sandra Gilbert ascribes a “let’s pretend” quality to the 
novel, as if the characters were “children playing at make-believe” in “their serious way.”  
Gilbert’s phrase, make-believe, perfectly encapsulates the difficulty of believing in 
something still under construction, still being worked on. And if the necessity of building 
a new society perhaps explains Ramón’s actions, it fails to explain the narrative’s 
repeated hints that the intended spiritual meaning of Ramón’s props has failed to “take.”  
Lawrence needles any reader who attempts willingly to suspend his disbelief.  
The novel thus complicates the reader’s responses to the hymns and prayers to 
Quetzalcoatl. Instead of presenting these as examples of “primitive mentality,” the novel 
confronts us with the realization that Ramón has just written them for instrumental 
purposes. The first “myths” of the Quetzalcoatl religion amount to obvious rewritings of 
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Aztec and Christian theology. Kate, having moved to the small village of Sayula, goes to 
the plaza and hears a singer reciting a new myth. The song places Quetzalcoatl at the 
beginning of history, when he created humanity and taught it to worship him. “But men 
forgot me,” he recalls; they created false religions (saying, e.g., “The sun is angry. He 
wants to drink us up. Let us give him blood of victims”) (PS 133). The god grew old, and 
went “home” to the “Master-Sun, the dark one,” which lies “beyond” the visible sun. 
Then “the dark sun … brought white men out of the east. And they came with a dead god 
on the Cross, saying: Lo! This is the Son of God!”  Today, this god is also old and tired: 
“Jesus is going home… and Mary is going back … and both will recover … during the 
long sleep” (PS 134). Quetzalcoatl has recovered already, and is planning his return.  
This myth’s designs upon its peon, Catholic audience are so obvious that the 
reader interprets this myth as part of the plot, and nothing more. Yet the next moment, the 
narrator states that as the singer begins to beat a drum and “sing in the fashion of the old 
Red Indians,” his song “swirled the soul back into the very center of time, which is older 
than age” (PS 135). The first moment draws attention to primitivism as rhetoric and 
opens a gap between author and text; the second moment collapses the gap and seriously 
espouses primitivist values.390 
                                                 
390 Ramón’s absurdities are oddly similar to those concocted by Robespierre. His “last great comic 
[theatrical] moment before his fall was an occasion in which virtually the whole population of Paris 
participated… This was the famous Festival of the Supreme Being of 8 June 1793, in which… the French 
nation dedicated itself to the theistic creed…. Whether by intention or inadvertence. the day appointed for 
the festival was Whitsunday …. The celebration reached its climax on the Champs de Mars, renamed the 
Champs de la Réunion, where the people stood massed before its legislators, who were seated on the 
artificial mound that symbolized the ‘Mountain’ of the Convention; it was crowned by a Tree of Liberty. 
Robespierre presided, holding in his hand a bouquet of flowers and an ear of wheat. There were many 
speeches and the vast assemblage was led first in a hymn to the Being whose existence it was ratifying and 
then in patriotic songs. Multitude and unanimity proved intoxicating; to salvoes of artillery and with cries 
of ‘Vive la République!’, fervent embraces were exchanged. The enormous public act of faith had been 
inaugurated … that morning … in the Tuileries Gardens. Here the representatives of the people … had met, 
arrayed in their brilliant new official dress, carrying flowers, wheat, and fruit. To them Robespierre … had 
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Critics describe such inconsistencies as Lawrence’s failure to command the 
reader’s belief, and even posit that he failed to fully believe in his novel-world. But such 
inconsistencies are so consistent in the novel that we should ask whether, instead of 
intending to provoke belief, Lawrence intended to raise the question of belief. This is not 
to argue that Lawrence did not stand fully behind the primitivist project outlined in the 
novel, but that he did not believe that writing a typical novel would move that project 
forward. What if the reader’s perception of a gap between mentalities (primitive and 
civilized, artist and audience) that cannot be bridged by will or by ratiocination is not 
evidence of a mistake, but a desired effect and theme?  As Marjorie Perloff argues, in 
response to Marianne Torgovnick’s Gone Primitive, the paradoxes of primitivism were 
not wholly invisible to modernists. Some modernists sometimes chose primitivism as a 
way of mobilizing these paradoxes.  
Lawrence’s description of “the soul” being “swirled” by the song in a properly 
primitive way is, in a way, prescriptive; as if to say, “unlikely as it may seem, gentle 
reader, your soul would have swirled too, had you been there.”  Yet Lawrence further 
defines “singing in the fashion of the old Red Indians”: it means “singing inwardly, 
singing to [one’s] own soul, not outward to the world.” He signals that “the soul” of the 
reader is free to submit or to repudiate the song; the singer’s own belief is what is crucial, 
and his singing was genuine. In this reading, part of the meaning of this passage is that 
the artwork being performed before the reader is not being performed for him; it is up to 
                                                                                                                                                 
delivered an oration in praise of theism, at the conclusion of which he set fire to an effigy of Atheism, from 
whose ashes there emerged, by means of machinery, the image of Wisdom, unfortunately a little scorched 
by the flames. The whole magniloquent occasion had been designed, directed, and rehearsed by David and 
was judged to be his finest achievement in this line of work.” Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity 
(Harvard: Cambridge, 1973), pp. 69-71. 
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the reader to attain a primitive, mythic mentality that will enable him to appreciate the 
performance. Lawrence demands that the reader accept his primitivist argument while 
confronting him with the make-believe nature of Ramón’s revolution.  
However unusual this tactic appears, it marks a development in the way Lawrence 
dealt with the reader’s state of mind. At one point in Aaron’s Rod391, the narrator 
brusquely informs the reader that the narrative is the only window onto the protagonist’s 
mentality: 
If I, as a word-user, must translate his deep conscious vibrations into finite words, 
 that is my own business. I do but make a translation of the man. He would speak 
 in music. I speak with words. The inaudible music of his conscious soul conveyed 
 his meaning in him quite as clearly as I convey it in words … Don’t grumble at 
 me then, gentle reader, and swear at me that this damned fellow wasn’t half clever 
 enough to think all these smart things, and realize all these fine-drawn-out 
 subtleties. You are quite right, he wasn’t, yet it all resolved itself in him as I say, 
 and it is for you to prove that it didn’t. (AR 199)392   
 
This narrative moment is particularly strange in that Lawrence created it to insist that the 
reader should be convinced of something fictional. At analogous moments in The Plumed 
Serpent, the narrative draws attention to the fact that Ramón is making up a primitive 
religion as he goes along, despite the countervailing insistence of primitivist discourse 
that certain beliefs, rites and objects “act on the helpless blood direct.”  
At such moments, Lawrence acknowledges the severity of the crisis of modernity. 
Lawrence’s thesis was that modern civilization, as compared to the religious rituals of 
primitive society, tend to satisfy our desire for control and self-identity. Egocentricity has 
                                                 
391 Lawrence, Aaron’s Rod (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1950 [1922]). 
392 Frank Kermode argues that this and similar narrative moments in Aaron’s Rod and in Kangaroo, 
represent a fragmentation in which Lawrence can no longer sustain narrative and the representation of a 
fictional world. If Kermode is partly correct, his is nonetheless a purely negative description of what 
Lawrence is doing. One could say that Aaron’s Rod, as a novel, breaks down at this point; but one might 
equally say that it expands enormously, seeking to interpolate and engulf the reader. Kermode, Lawrence 
(Fontana: London, 1973). 
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cost us the ability to experience life as spiritually meaningful. Modern fiction must do 
more than create a pleasing mimesis – even if those pleasing representations are of 
modernity’s primitive opposite – if it is to break through the modern reader’s alienated 
shell. It must oblige her to revalue her values, to recognize the depth to which her own 
self-conception is inauthentic and contaminated by alienation. It proceeds, therefore, to 
force the reader to confront her own critical detachment, in order that she will come to 
see it as a sign of her alienation. The novel does not ask us to suspend our disbelief so 
much as it tries to force us to acknowledge that disbelief as representing a set of 
unquestioned, questionable values. 
The novel’s own valuation of the ability to believe is represented in a passage that 
seems, at first glance, to be one of manipulation and credulity. The scene rewrites the 
trope of the pitiable, gullible, superstitious savage, familiar to readers of Victorian 
adventure novels in which adventurers in dire straits gained power over superstitious 
natives by deploying some commonplace technology – anything from rifles to almanacs. 
Rider Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mines, for instance, features a lunar eclipse that Allan 
Quatermain pretends to “magically” control, thereby wresting the credulous natives away 
from an evil witch doctor and saving his party’s lives. In The Plumed Serpent, Allan 
Quatermain’s tactic discredits those who employ it. Local Mexican officials, using an 
unconnected telephone, pretend to communicate the complaints of Indians to the capitol, 
as “the Indians sit gaping” at the “miracle” (PS 43). Ramón, conversely, uses the same 
tactic to restore “superstition” to the status of belief. One evening, Ramón “hesitate[s]” 
before calling his followers for their evening service, “and look[s] at the sky. ‘Viene el 
agua?’ he said. ‘Creo que sí, Patrón’,” replies a trusty peon (PS 206). Ramón “sounds 
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the summons,” and delivers a sermon—to their peril, Mexicans have forgotten the living 
“serpent of the earth” and the “bird of the sky” (PS 210-11). He then calls upon the “dark 
Bird” to return to Mexico, “with thunder in your pinions and a dark snake of lightning in 
your beak” (PS 211). Moments later, the predicted thunderstorm arrives. Importantly, 
everyone in his audience already knew the rains were coming. Ramón steps into the role 
of the adventure-novel’s evil witchdoctor, but revalues it by creating a spiritual meaning 
for the peons’ experience of their environment. Belief is, in fact, a matter of life and 
death. Later, after an attempt on his life, Kate asks Ramón whether he has killed his 
attackers. “‘Creo que sí!’ he replied” (PS 311), indicating that his survival was a miracle 
brought about by his faith in his own godhood. 
Lawrence signals his awareness that the reader will find the novel hard to take 
through Kate and Carlota,393 who are asked to believe in the eternal sanctity of things that 
lack any history or wider acceptance. Nor does Lawrence purport to create such 
acceptance within the fiction. Carlota dies, and Kate faults Ramon’s spiritual revolution 
as patriarchal, ridicules Cipriano’s pretensions to godhood, and fears that marrying the 
latter will mean acquiescing in her own subjugation. Kate remains, irritable and dubious, 
in Sayula; the reader, dubious and irritable, keeps turning the pages. The fact that Kate is 
still hesitating at the novel’s end indicates Lawrence’s desire that the novel should keep 
bothering us after we close it. 
                                                 
393 If Kate’s predicament parallels the reader’s, Ramon’s powers presumably mirror Lawrence’s. Only 
Ramon can live both in the modern, quotidian world, and remove himself to the mythical world of his own 
invention. He can do “what Kate had not known anyone to do before”: namely, “withdraw his 
consciousness away” and “break the cords of the world” to reach a primitive, preconscious “oblivion” (PS 
181). Ramón’s painful return to the world from his primitive nirvana – “it was hard to come back” (PS 193) 
– indicates an altruistic concern for humanity. 
169 
 
Although there is no guarantee Kate will repudiate her civilized, “individual ego” 
(by accepting her role as Malintzi), the prize for doing so is clear: a life of spiritual 
plenitude and an escape from alienation. Kate does, on occasion, come to desire that 
which will engulf her “old” self. Such self-loss, she discovers, is her only chance to attain 
a new subjectivity. Kate experiences a kind of auto-enchantment—“now she wanted this 
veiled elusiveness in herself” (PS 336, my emphasis)—and realizes that the way to 
produce it is through belief in Ramón’s religion, where (as noted above) “everything is 
possible, even that oneself is elusive among the gods” (PS 341).  
Lawrence’s novel prods and pushes the reader to make a primitivist leap of faith – 
to accept that at some deep level, his or her identity is part of a universal pattern, and that 
it is worth trying to create a life based around this intuition. Moments where the narrative 
insists on the materiality of Ramon’s attempts to instigate a spiritual revolution are 
challenges to the reader, as if to say, as the narrator did in Aaron’s Rod, “it all resolved 
itself as I say, and it is for you to prove that it didn’t.” It is as though the reader is 
simultaneously asked to believe in the Wizard of Oz, and to pay attention to that man 
behind the curtain. 
 
5. Primitivist splitting 
Lawrence imagines the change from modern alienation to an almost animistic 
sense of the world and of one’s inextricable place within it by splitting the subject into 
primitive and modern selves. The Plumed Serpent does not mask this move – which has 
disturbing political ramifications – but tries to enact it in the reader, in order to create in 
him an awareness of a lack of access to his own primitivity that can only be overcome 
170 
 
through belief. Splitting the subject, for Lawrence, represents a means of achieving 
oneness: creating (the desire for) a “religious,” non-objectifying approach to the world.  
One target of this splitting is “the Mexicans” themselves, whose primitive essence 
becomes both the object and the guarantor of Ramón’s reforms. Mexicans need to 
discover their inner primitives to escape from the injustice of conquest and imperialism. 
Cortés created a “heavy, bloody-eyed resentment” among a people “who have never been 
able to win a soul for themselves.” “Degenerate” modern-day Mexicans, whose “jeering” 
anti-élitism follows dialectically from their conquered history, nonetheless secretly thrill 
to drumbeats and human sacrifice. Only a return to pre-Colombian religion can throw off 
“the heavy, evil-smelling weight of an unconquered past” (PS 145). 
Because the modern and the primitive halves of the personality are sundered, 
modern Mexicans have no access to their own submerged cultural and psychical 
essence.394  It is left for Don Ramón, an aristocratic, Columbia University-trained 
anthropologist of colonial Spanish extraction, to “consciously, carefully” (PS 147) pick 
and choose for them, from a set of “bygone” primitive practices that have “indeed gone 
by,” but “never shall pass away” (PS 325). Mexicans cannot be trusted to pick their own 
ideologies, but “when you got these dark-faced people away from wrong contacts like 
agitators and socialism, they made one feel that life was vast” (PS 113). Nor does Ramón 
need these dark-faced people to help him interpret their own dimly-remembered cultural 
practices. These practices retain their atemporal power, which dispenses with the need for 
traditional knowledge or hermeneutic techniques to give them meaning. It is thanks to 
Ramón that “this strange dumb people of Mexico was opening its voice at last” (PS 366).  
                                                 
394 The Orientalist’s vision of the “Arab” as having “centuries of experience but no wisdom” (Edward Said, 
Orientalism , Vintage: New York, 1979, p. 320) fits Lawrence’s vision of the “Mexican” all too well.  
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Can the primitive speak?  Lawrence elsewhere speaks of envisioning “mankind so 
wonderful in his distances, his history that has no beginning” (Fantasia of the 
Unconscious 14). Primitivism, while mourning the impassable chasm that separates 
modern life from man’s natural, primitive state, insists on and produces that gap. “They 
say the word Mexico means below this!,” Ramón recalls (PS 195). As a man with his ear 
to the ground, Ramon is listening for that which the Mexicans themselves cannot 
enunciate. The primitive begs to be re-presented; he belongs to “some distant period of 
time” (PS 171), after all, “not … to the realm of that which comes forth” (PS 131). His 
authenticity inheres in the fact that he cannot represent himself.395   
Kate’s inner revolution comes about through a splitting that divides her into a 
modern, verbal self—individualistic, willful, misanthropic, tortured by ennui—and a 
primitive, “elusive,” mute subjectivity. The latter gradually replaces the former, until 
Kate finds fulfillment in silent, “absolute submission” to “the phallic mystery.” What 
Ramón’s rites, hymns and fireworks do for the peons, sex with Cipriano does for Kate. It 
takes her “back to… the ancient … world, where the soul of woman was dumb, to be 
forever unspoken” (PS 326), and so allows her inner “Malintzi” to speak. Kate must 
renounce “the curious irritant … of talk” as the medium of her ego; she must also become 
“aware of her own desire for frictional, irritant sensation. … [and of] the worthlessness of 
this foam-effervescence” (PS 439). Lawrence links (female) speech with clitoral orgasm 
as self-centered perversions of language and sex, which had originally been unalienated, 
open forms of interpersonal existence, language and sex. Kate’s “dark, Indian” husband, 
                                                 
395 Margaret Mead once vented her annoyance at a “culture” she has “almost completed” by imagining her 
tribal interlocutors “reading the index to The Golden Bough just to see if they had missed anything.”  Letter 
of April 21, 1932, quoted in Clifford, James, “On Collecting Art and Culture,” p. 66, in The Cultural 
Studies Reader, ed. Simon During, 2nd ed., (Routledge: New York, 2001). 
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“in his dark, hot silence would bring her back to the new, soft, heavy, hot flow, when she 
was like a fountain gushing noiseless” (PS 439, my emphases). Vaginal sex, “the greater 
sex,” is an authentic, primitive silence, and it creates a world-renewing mystery: “it was 
always the first time. And it made her again always a virgin girl. … How else… is one to 
begin again, save by refinding one’s virginity? And when one finds one’s virginity, one 
realizes one is among the gods” (PS 409). 
In The Plumed Serpent, Lawrence describes modern female sexuality as “prying” 
and degraded by the will-to-power, and uses primitivist discourse to open a path beyond 
it.396  Kate must accept that “the clue to all living and to all moving-on into new living 
lay in the vivid blood-relation between man and woman” (PS 414)—her escape from 
alienation depends upon her acceptance of a new, submissive sexual identity as 
transcendentally or mythically important.  
Lawrence argued that in contrast to modern sexuality, in “primitive” society, the 
bodily and the spiritual were linked. Today, “the senses become a conscious aim unto 
themselves,” which is “destructive, always consuming and reducing to the ecstasy of 
sensation.” By contrast, upon meeting an old woman – a peasant – in Italy, Lawrence 
discerns in her “soul” a “lapse back, back to the original position … of the divinity of the 
flesh” (Twilight in Italy 221). That pure, unconscious, primitive relationship to the body 
mysteriously represents to Lawrence a deeper kind of individuality:  “The senses are 
superbly arrogant … the absolute, the god-like. For I can never have another man’s 
senses. These are me, my senses absolutely me” (“The Lemon Gardens,” 232).  
                                                 
396 Torgovnick identifies the changed gender and valuation of the primitive in Lawrence: from negative 
depictions of the female primitive in Women in Love, to positive, male primitives in The Plumed Serpent. 
Marianne Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (University of Chicago: 1991), see 
“Oh, Mexico!: D. H. Lawrence’s The Plumed Serpent.” 
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In Women in Love, Rupert Birkin explains Julius Halliday’s primitive “Fetish” as 
the “unbearably condensed” expression of a putative ancient civilization organized 
around “pure sensuality.”  This African civilization, which was structured by a non-
cognitive, bodily knowledge, was itself centuries old, and descended from a still older 
civilization in which the sensual and the spiritual were merged. That merger, for Birkin, 
recedes into an impossibly remote pre-history. The primitive fetish, in other words, 
signifies the unbridgeable difference between sensuality and spirituality, and so recalls 
the impasse of Birkin’s relationship with Ursula. He thinks of sex with her as a way out 
of the unfulfilling, “willed” quality of their overly-conscious relationship, but he equally 
fears sex as self-betrayal for mere erotic sensation.397 
Lawrence also represents Gerald Crich’s sexual impasse in primitivist terms. The 
“Fetish” scene finds Crich aroused but confused about his homosexual desire. At 
Halliday’s flat, Crich mis-identifies a man as “one of the Hindus down from Oxford,” but 
later realizes that he is literally an “untouchable” Indian manservant398; later, Crich 
oscillates between finding a young Russian man “golden” and merely “animal … 
somehow humiliating” (WIL 77). In the novel’s first draft, at this point of racialized 
sexual confusion, “Birkin suddenly appeared … in a state of pure nudity,” and his “white 
body” strikes Crich as being “like a hieroglyph” (First WIL 65). The thin white body is as 
filled with alluring, hidden meaning as piece of ancient, primitive writing. Birkin seems, 
momentarily, to resolve the sensual and the spiritual into one. Crich renounces the female 
                                                 
397 As the primitive fetish exemplifies the danger of pure sensuality, another primitive woman symbolizes 
Birkin’s view of consciousness as a sterile trap: when he “stones the moon,” trying to “go away” from 
himself by breaking up its bright reflection on the dark pond, he names “her” as another ancient goddess, 
“the accursed Syria Dea”—the Syrian version of Astarte or Artemis, whom Robert Graves used as a unique 
example of a cult of goddess-worship. 
398 Lawrence, Women in Love (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1993), p. 73. Hereafter cited in text as (WIL). 
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figure, apparently representing heterosexual desire: “The African figure was low and 
gross and to be ignored, whilst Birkin’s figure, white and thin and abstract, gave it all the 
lie … and the naked carven piece of wood was like dirt beside a jet of reality” (First WIL 
68).399  But when Gerald asks Birkin to repudiate the fetish, he is disappointed. Birkin 
appreciates it as “art.” Gerald’s response is “shocked, resentful”: “You like the wrong 
things, Rupert.”  Ambiguity changes to “hate” for “the African thing” (First WIL 79), as 
the primitive fetish moves from symbolizing inchoate arousal to representing blockage.400 
With The Plumed Serpent, primitivism continues to signify aspects of sexuality 
that the individual cannot grasp, and that constitute a threat to his or her subjectivity. 
Ramón possesses “the aloofness of the savage” (PS 327), and Kate sees his “naked” body 
as representing a “pure sensuality” (PS 194)—Birkin’s phrase for the “naked” fetish. In 
her frustration at the “arrogance” of that aloof sensuality, Kate imagines a “knife between 
his shoulder blades.” But where Birkin is stymied, Kate’s fantasy gives way to “grief and 
shame,” until she comes to value Ramón’s sensuality for its “remoteness.”  Kate 
repudiates her desire to possess Ramón by recognizing that it is “better to lapse away 
from one’s own prying, assertive self, into the soft, untrespassing self, to whom 
nakedness is neither shame nor excitement” (PS 195).  
The technique of primitivist splitting disturbingly overlaps with colonialist, racist, 
and misogynist discourses, even as it forms an integral part of Lawrence’s project of 
creating an unalienated relationship between the subject and his or her external world. 
                                                 
399 The First Women in Love, eds. J. Worthen, L. Vasey (Cambridge University Press: 2004), p. 68. 
Hereafter cited in text as (First WIL). 
400 Ironically this frustration leads to Gerald’s fall into the same sensuality he feared when, in looking at the 
fetish, “he saw the Pussum in it. And he knew her” (WIL 79). In a final, degenerate irony, Gerald’s 
“primitive” sensuality is actually parasitic upon his morality. He is aroused by a sadistic “pity” for the 
Pussum (WIL 79), “her inchoate look of a violated slave, whose fulfillment lies in her further violation, 
made his nerves quiver with acutely desirable sensation” (WIL 80). 
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The experience of religious ritual, sex, and art should be one that overwhelms the 
conscious ego; and to achieve this goal, the ego ought to dethrone itself and discover the 
hidden primitive ur-subject that is capable of authentic erotic – aesthetic experience. But 
that primitive “self” is not really a self; it must remain forever “elusive,” itself an object 
of desire and thus, in a sense, of belief. 
Other critics have described the troubling aspects of Lawrence’s primitivism, but 
what perhaps still needs to be explored are the areas of overlap between critical 
condemnation and critical praise of Lawrence. In fact, my account of Lawrence’s 
primitivist splitting of the personality, and his privileging of the elusive, ultimately 
unknowable primitive self, is comparable to Jonathan Arac’s praise of Lawrence as a 
deconstructionist avant la lettre. Arac takes the moon (in the “Moony” chapter of Women 
in Love) as representing, for Lawrence, a Romantic symbol of sublime oneness, totality, a 
coherent and closed system401. Birkin’s “mindless” throwing of stones at the moon’s 
reflection represents for Arac a radical break. Arac quotes Lawrence’s statement of his 
goal: to shatter that which is “static, petrified, turning towards what has been, and 
crystallized against that which shall be” (Letters 2:633). In Lawrence’s injunction to 
transcend “that passionate desire for the mastery of the medium of narrative, that will of 
the writer to be greater than and undisputed lord over the stuff he writes” (Phoenix 308), 
Arac finds an inviting, deconstructionist ethics (Arac 149).402  Lawrence’s writing 
celebrates the way “writing solicits from us our interpretive power, the stones we critics 
                                                 
401 Jonathan Arac, Critical Genealogies: Historical Situations for Postmodern Literary Studies (Columbia 
University Press: 1987), Chapter 6, “D. H. Lawrence and the Modernist Sublime: Stoning the Moon,” pp 
139-156. 
402 Since for Lawrence “all vital truth contains the memory of all that for which it is not true” (Letters 
2:247), it follows that “a work of art’s greatness is measured by its capacity to include that which calls it 
most thoroughly into question” (Phoenix 476). 
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and readers throw to shatter the old fixed images and startle new life in again” (Arac 
155). 
 But this stone-throwing ethics can itself become a dangerous, totalizing system of 
thought. In Lawrence’s later short story, “The Princess,” the title character (probably 
based on his American benefactress, Mabel Dodge Luhan), is a monster of egocentricity. 
At a guest-ranch, she meets Romero, the “dark-skinned” man on whose land the ranch 
was built (Princess 179). She asks him to be her guide on a trip to the mountains, which 
she has a “fixed desire” to see (Princess 193). But as they crest a mountain ridge, instead 
of the sublime, Romantic vista she imagined, she sees “the massive, gruesome, repellent 
core of the Rockies … so inhuman” (197). As if to recover herself, she “wills” Romero to 
take her to an isolated valley and make love to her: “she had willed that it should happen 
to her. And according to her will, she lay and let it happen.” (207)  The next morning, she 
has regained her imperious attitude and demands to be taken home. But Lawrence will 
not allow Princess to turn her back after coming this far, to refuse to acknowledge within 
herself the primitive truth she has seen in the Rockies and sparked in Romero. At this 
point there is an ugly reprise of “Moony”:  
[Romero] rose and reached her clothes, that hung on a peg … She saw him stride 
down to the dark-green pool in the frozen shadow of that deep cup of a valley. He tossed 
the clothing and the boots out on the pool. Ice had formed .… Romero picked up rocks 
and heaved them out at the ice, till the surface broke and the fluttering clothing 
disappeared in the rattling water, while the valley echoed and shouted again with the 
sound. (Princess 210)  
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Romero rapes Princess repeatedly. “She would have called to him, with love” (216), 
except that she refused to soften her heart.403  Forest Rangers eventually come looking for 
them, and kill Romero. 
 “Princess” maintains the same values Arac praises in “Moony.”  As Lawrence 
wrote, “it is life to feel the white ideas and the ‘oneness’ crumbling into a thousand 
pieces, and all sorts of wonder shining through” (Letters V: 67). Lawrence was willing to 
make his characters pay for this “wonder” by imagining rape. Lawrence’s primitivism 
insisted on a kind of splitting quite similar to the deconstructionist decentering that Arac 
praises, but Lawrence’s primitivism also shows that the valuation of alterity may itself be 
used to justify violence. 
The Plumed Serpent persists in the kind of imaginary violence that cannot be 
whitewashed as deconstructionism, and that in many respects is directly opposed to the 
anti-violence of endless discourse. But in one important respect the novel is more humane 
than “Princess,” for the novel constantly invites the reader to question its assertions. It 
does so aggressively, and with the aim of leading the reader to throw away her 
skepticism. But the novel never loses sight of itself as a text in a relationship with a 
reader who can accept or ignore its primitivist challenge. 
                                                 
403 The Portable D H Lawrence, ed. Diana Trilling, Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1988. 
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